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Executive Summary
The	current	EU	involvement	in	the	regulation	of	TSO	
revenues and transmission grid tarification is limited 
and mainly addresses issues related to interconnec-
tion and supply security as well as the definition of 
underlying principles for third party grid access and 
capacity	 pricing.	 Heterogeneity	 among	 national,	 or	
even	local,	transmission	tariffs	might	be	an	obstacle	
for functioning competition and adequate invest-
ments into the grids. Even though transmission tar-
iffs	account	for	only	a	small	share	of	final	industrial	
consumer	 electricity	 and	 natural	 gas	 prices,	 both	
their level and structure can have a strong impact on 
infrastructure investments and on how commodities 
are traded within and between countries.
We	 investigate	 whether	 the	 current	 challenges	 in	
the	 energy	 sector,	 accompanying	 the	move	 towards	
“2014”,	 “2020”,	 and	 “2050”,	 warrant	 a	 stronger	 har-
monization	 in	 transmission	 tarification	 and,	 if	 yes,	
what form this should take and what the potential 
role	of	 the	EU	could	be	 in	this	process.	To	discover	
the	need	for	further	EU	involvement	and	harmoniza-
tion,	we	ask	(1)	whether	the	existing	heterogeneities	
in regulatory practice might hamper adequate invest-
ments	 or	 impede	 efficient	 competition	 and,	 if	 yes,	
(2)	whether	new	EU	legislation	in	place	and	new	EU	
instruments notably from the Third Package – once 
enforced – provide an efficient solution. Increased 
trans-national	 involvement	may	 have	 benefits,	 such	
as the better functioning of markets and the facilita-
tion	of	infrastructure	development,	but	it	also	comes	
at	 a	 cost,	 such	as	 increased	 information	asymmetry	
between individual decision makers and higher-level 
coordinating	or	regulating	institutions.	Both	have	to	
be weighted carefully. Practical and political imple-
mentability of the proposed solutions (both in the 
near- and long-term) is one of our key concerns.
Chapter 2 provides the analytical framework to ex-
amine policy measures going beyond the national 
level.	 Three	 questions	 are	 to	 be	 answered:	 First,	
whether	EU	involvement	is	justified	on	the	grounds	
of	subsidiarity,	considering	that	the	higher	European	
level of decision-making shall avoid pre-empting any 
area	of	legitimate	Member	State	involvement.	Second,	
whether the achievement of policy targets is hindered 
by profound and permanent market failures. And fi-
nally,	whether	the	necessary	regulatory	actions	could	
be decentralized among various local players and ob-
jectives be achieved based on voluntary regional co-
operation	instead	of	being	the	result	of	a	top-down,	
centralized decision as to get a workable implementa-
tion process.
Chapter 3	addresses	the	regulation	of	TSO	revenues.	
The observed heterogeneity in general price control 
mechanisms and instruments used to promote new 
investments probably does not hamper adequate 
investments in national infrastructures without a 
strong cross-border impact. Key parameters deter-
mining investment incentives such as an adequate 
risk-reward	 ratio,	 regulatory	 stability	 and	 transpar-
ency,	 are	 all	 issues	 national	 regulators	 can	 properly	
address.	 Cross-country	 comparability,	 however,	 has	
shown to be problematic which could make it diffi-
cult to attract funds from external investors needed 
to meet the substantial financing needs in the coming 
decades.	Moreover,	differing	methodologies	used	 to	
calculate the allowed revenue could actually hamper 
adequate investments regarding projects that have a 
regional (i.e. cross-border) impact. 
We recommend for future EU involvement:
First,	we	do	see	neither	the	need	nor	the	justification	
for	 an	 EU-wide	 harmonization	 of	 the	 regulation	 of	
TSO	revenues.	Nevertheless,	we	recommend	that	de-
cisions regarding the projects with a pan-European 
impact	might	be	taken	on	the	EU	level	instead	of	be-
ing the result of a reaction to rates-of-return settled 
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by	 national	 regulators	 in	 different	 Member	 States.	
Where	 a	 region-specific	 solution	 has	 to	 be	 found	
(e.g.	offshore	grid),	decentral	cooperation	and	coor-
dination among relevant stakeholders are appropri-
ate.	Second,	ACER	should	take	the	responsibility	for	
benchmarking national practices and formulate an 
opinion about the appropriateness of various meth-
odologies employed. Transparency (i.e. reporting) 
standards	should	be	extended.	Third,	 innovative	so-
lutions to trigger investments (e.g. competitive ten-
dering	or	a	European	tariff	component)	should	also	
become common tools. 
In Chapter 4 we analyze transmission grid tarifica-
tion in the electricity sector. The heterogeneity does 
hamper both adequate investments and efficient 
competition.	While	the	EU	has	defined	general	prin-
ciples	of	tarification,	EU	involvement	with	respect	to	
tariff	design	is	very	limited.	The	existing	ITC	mecha-
nism is an ex-post instrument that intends to com-
pensate	 TSOs	 for	 the	 costs	 resulting	 from	 hosting	
cross-border flows. Apart from some methodological 
weaknesses,	it	is	not	designed	to	incentivize	the	time-
ly realization of grid investments or to allocate costs 
of new infrastructures. These issues are expected to 
be addressed by the proposed Energy Infrastructure 
Package.	 However,	 we	 identified	 some	 factors	 that	
might hamper the successful implementation and ef-
fectiveness	of	this	new	Regulation.	
We recommend for future EU involvement:
First,	 to	increase	transparency,	the	cost	components	
included	 in	 transmission	 tariffs	 should	 be	 harmo-
nized. They should only include cost related to trans-
mission	network	infrastructure.	Second,	it	should	be	
ensured that the behavior of grid users in the com-
petitive	sector	is	not	distorted	due	to	tarification,	i.e.	
transmission	tariffs	covering	the	long-term	cost	of	in-
frastructure should not be charged based on energy 
transported	(i.e.	in	€/MWh).	Instead	they	should	be	
paid	 based	 on	 booked	 capacity	 or	 lump-sum,	 with	
charges	being	computed	separately	for	different	types	
of	grid	users	in	different	areas	so	that	charges	properly	
reflect the network-related relevant characteristics of 
the	network	users.	Third,	tariffs	should	be	allocated	as	
far as possible based on the principle of cost causality. 
Locational	signals	should	be	introduced,	taking	into	
account national system specificities based on sound 
methodologies and providing reliable ex-ante signals. 
The provision of time signals to improve efficient 
short-term use of the existing grid should be consid-
ered,	too.	To	give	economic	signals	to	generators,	ob-
viously	a	certain	share	of	the	tariff	needs	to	be	paid	by	
them.	In	order	to	avoid	a	distortion	of	competition,	
the	EU	might	fix	an	average	share	of	the	G/L	compo-
nent;	thus,	introduce	a	minimum	G-component.
Fourth,	 the	 EU	 should	 call	 for	 the	 removal	 of	 the	
legal barriers that might impede grid investments 
where strong geographical asymmetries in costs (i.e. 
investment needs) and benefits occur. It is necessary 
that	third	parties	can	invest	where	incumbent	TSOs	
do not show interest to realize identified priority 
projects. Given the uneven distribution of benefits 
among stakeholders arising from increased inter-
connection capacities and the concern that national 
regulators tend to protect domestic consumers from 
rising	prices,	effective	means	have	to	be	found	to	in-
centivize	NRAs	to	support	the	development	of	identi-
fied priority projects. 
In Chapter 5 we discuss transmission grid tarification 
in	the	natural	gas	sector.	Heterogeneity	in	tariff	struc-
tures itself does not hamper adequate investments 
while it might certainly hamper efficient competition. 
There are more than 30 entry-exit zones with mainly 
administratively	determined	borders.	Furthermore,	a	
systematic bias exists in the form of a cross-subsidiza-
tion between short-distance transmission and long-
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distance transportation and domestic consumers 
tend	to	cross-subsidize	transit	flows.	Other	obstacles	
to functioning competition include contractual con-
gestion,	inefficient	pricing	of	non-standard	products,	
a	persisting	lack	of	backhaul	capacities,	or	the	limited	
compatibility	 of	 capacity	 products	 offered.	The	 im-
plementation	of	 new	 legislation	 (i.e.	Third	Package,	
Network Code on capacity allocation mechanisms) 
substantially will increase transparency and compat-
ibility,	reduce	therefore	transaction	costs	and	will	fa-
cilitate	natural	gas	trade	and	competition.	However,	it	
does not address all persisting obstacles. 
We recommend for future EU involvement:
First,	the	EU	should	set	principles	for	determining	the	
ideal	size	of	entry-exit	zones,	but	let	involved	NRAs	
and	 TSOs	 agree	 on	 the	 result.	 Boundaries	 of	 price	
zones should reflect the technical and economic con-
ditions rather than political borders; mergers of mar-
ket areas shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
based	on	expected	economic	benefits	and	costs.	Once	
market	 areas	 are	merged,	 there	 are	 good	 economic	
reasons to implement a system of common tarifica-
tion.	The	 role	 for	 the	EU	here	 should	be	 limited	 to	
support agreements between the respective stake-
holders; the actual implementation of harmonization 
of	tariff	structures	and	definition	of	a	mechanism	to	
compensate	TSOs	can	be	managed	at	regional	level.	
Second,	we	recommend	some	harmonization	in	tari-
fication to ensure that the breakdown of costs among 
grid users and among entry- and exit points is de-
signed to respect as much as possible the principle of 
cost-reflectiveness. Adequate discounts on short-haul 
transports should be encouraged. Asymmetric re-
allocation	of	 costs	 such	 that	 ‘captive’	 domestic	 con-
sumers intentionally have to bear disproportionately 
high	costs,	shall	be	prohibited.	Third,	the	EU,	through	
ACER,	should	formulate	a	set	of	‘good	practice	guide-
lines’	regarding	natural	gas	transmission	tarification.	
Entry- and exit charges should be actively used to 
provide locational signals to grid users wherever 
this	 is	 economically	 reasonable.	 Furthermore,	 com-
modity-related components should reflect short-run 
marginal costs to avoid distortions in the behavior of 
shippers in the commodity market and network tar-
iffs	should	clearly	be	identified,	containing	only	those	
cost elements that are related to the transmission. 
Finally,	Chapter 6 concludes.
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1. Introduction 
Background
Transmission	tariffs	account	for	only	about	12%	(7%)	
of final industrial consumer electricity (natural gas) 
prices,	but	both	their	 level	and	structure	can	have	a	
strong impact on infrastructure investments and on 
how commodities are traded within and between 
countries.	 Heterogeneity	 among	 national,	 or	 even	
local,	 transmission	 tariffs	 might	 be	 an	 obstacle	 for	
functioning competition and adequate investments 
into the grids. 
The European electricity and gas industries are cur-
rently both on the path to reach energy and environ-
mental	 objectives.	The	 key	 EU	 energy	 policy	 goals	
when	 looking	 at	 transmission	grid	 tariffs	 are	 three-
fold: to link regional markets and eliminate any bar-
riers	to	efficient	cross-border	trade	(“2014	target”);	to	
support	 the	 reduction	 in	greenhouse	gas	 emissions,	
promote	 renewable	 energy	 sources,	 increase	 energy	
efficiency	 –	 thus,	 to	 support	 the	move	 towards	 full	
decarbonization	 (“2020	 and	 2050	 targets”);	 and	 at	
the	same	time,	to	ensure	supply	security,	both	in	the	
long- and in the short-term. 
The realization of these goals will require substantial 
changes in the resource mix and network infrastruc-
tures and involves a number of well-known challeng-
es	related	to	energy	infrastructures,	both	for	natural	
gas	and	electricity.	In	this	context,	transmission	tariffs	
have	different	objectives	to	fulfill	that	are	not	always	
compatible	with	each	other,	 such	as	 the	recovery	of	
short-run	and	 long-run	costs,	 and	 the	 indication	of	
short-run and long-run capacity shortages. Histori-
cally,	the	regulation	of	grid	operators	was	a	domain	of	
national	Ministries	or	regulatory	authorities;	with	the	
implementation of the third European energy pack-
age,	 issues	about	 the	EU	 involvement	have	come	 to	
the	 fore	 that	may	 imply	 a	 changing	 role	 of	 the	EU,	
both	in	the	shorter-term,	until	2014,	and	in	the	long-
er-term.
The	current	EU	involvement	in	the	regulation	of	TSO	
revenues and transmission grid tarification is limited 
and mainly addresses issues related to interconnec-
tion and supply security as well as the definition of 
underlying principles for third party grid access and 
capacity	pricing.	However,	sophisticated	cost-benefit	
allocation mechanisms might be required to align 
costs of infrastructure investments benefiting several 
Member	States.	As	EU	grids	are	said	to	enter	a	period	
of massive investments (hundreds of billion €; see e.g. 
EC,	2011),	an	efficient	cost-benefit	alignment	of	grid	
investments	and	operation	across	Member	States	will	
influence	decisions	taken	by	TSOs	and	national	regu-
lators.	This	necessarily	makes	 the	 role	of	 the	EU	 in	
electricity and gas grid tarification a very timely issue.
This 6th report of THINK addresses the question of 
alternative forms of trans-national involvement in 
electricity	 and	gas	 transmission	 tarification.	We	ask	
whether the current challenges in the energy sector 
warrant a stronger involvement in transmission tari-
fication	and,	if	yes,	what	form	this	involvement	could	
take	and	what	the	potential	role	of	the	EU	might	be	in	
this	process.	Our	hypothesis	 is	that	increased	trans-
national	involvement	may	have	benefits,	such	as	the	
better functioning of markets and the facilitation of 
infrastructure	development,	but	that	this	comes	at	a	
cost,	 such	 as	 increased	 information	 asymmetry	 be-
tween	 individual	 decision	 makers	 (e.g.	 TSOs)	 and	
higher-level coordinating or regulating institutions. 
Both	 have	 to	 be	 weighted	 carefully.	 Depending	 on	
what	policy	goals	are	considered	more	important,	dif-
ferent	 instruments	can	be	judged	differently,	so	that	
no	 ‘first-best’	 institutional	 setting	 for	 transmission	
tarification can be identified. 
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Scope of our report
Figure	1	displays	different	stages	of	an	infrastructure	
development,	from	the	planning	to	the	final	cost	al-
location.	At	 each	 stage,	 regulation	plays	a	 role.	Our	
analyses will focus on two key areas of regulation re-
garding the transmission network. The first includes 
the	 regulation	 of	 TSO	 revenues,	 stipulating	 the	 in-
centives	 for	TSOs’	 investment	decisions;	 the	 second	
is	 the	pricing	of	network	 services,	 or	 tarification	 in	
the	narrow	sense,	 i.e.	 the	allocation	of	 costs	 to	grid	
users.	“Tarification”	means	all	cost	allocation	mecha-
nisms,	namely	 those	used	 to	allocate	 the	amount	of	
TSO	revenues	among	grid	users	and	those	used	to	al-
locate	network	costs	among	the	various	TSO	zones.	
The proper planning and financing of infrastructure 
are	not	 the	core	 focus	of	 this	report;	however,	since	
they are inter-linked with revenue regulation and 
grid tarification we will take them into account where 
needed. 
We	will	 address	 both	national	 and	 cross-border	 in-
frastructures and give recommendations for a short- 
and	medium-term	perspective	(2014,	2020).	We	will	
notably	 see	 if	 a	more	 active	 role	 of	 the	EU	 is	more	
relevant for the infrastructure involving more than 
one	Member	State.	
Figure 1: Comprehensive overview of the areas of regulatory intervention
Source: THINK own depiction
Methodology 
Existing studies investigating natural gas and elec-
tricity grids mainly focus on isolated issues such as 
principles	 for	 tarification	 (e.g.	 Lévêque,	 2003b;	Pé-
rez-Arriaga	and	Smeers,	2003),	measures	to	promote	
interconnector	 projects	 (e.g.	 Kapff	 and	 Pelkmans,	
2010;	Riechmann,	2011;	Supponen,	2011),	financing	
(e.g.	Hirschhausen,	2011),	modeling	of	optimal	grid	
investments based on social welfare optimization 
(e.g.	Rosellón	and	Weigt,	2011),	or	descriptive	stud-
ies	on	existing	regulatory	practices	(e.g.	Green,	1997;	
Montero	 et	 al.	 2001;	 Sakhrani	 and	 Parsons,	 2010).	
Our	report	distinguishes	 from	these	works	both	 in	
terms of scope and methodology. Taking current 
heterogeneity among national regulatory practices 
as	 a	 starting	point,	we	 investigate	 the	need	 for	EU	
involvement and harmonization given that grids are 
key	 to	 achieve	EU	 energy	 policy	 goals.	 To	 address	
new	challenges,	regulation	of	revenue	and	transmis-
sion	tarification	should:	(1)	ensure	adequate	invest-
http://think.eui.eu 3
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ments into the grid and (2) avoid any distortion in 
competition impeding an efficient operation of the 
energy system. 
1	-	Ensure adequate investments into the grid. Ad-
equate	investments	address	quantity-,	timing-	as	well	
as quality issues. A sound regulatory design should 
provide sufficient incentives to promote the necessary 
investment,	but	at	same	time,	should	achieve	overall	
system adequacy (tuning both load and supply) at 
minimum cost. It should also inhibit the monopoly 
rent-seeking behavior that would result in under-
investment.	Nevertheless,	one	has	to	be	aware	of	the	
potential	trade-off	between	seeking	the	optimum	so-
lution which might delay the investment and making 
timely investment at the risk of under- or over-invest-
ment.	Moreover,	as	we	are	in	a	dynamic	period	with	
technical innovations along the whole value chain 
and considerable changes happening in system archi-
tecture,	the	regulation	of	grid	operators’	investments	
should enable upstream and downstream innovations 
(like	e.g.	new	characteristics	of	offshore	wind	genera-
tion;	see	also	THINK,	2012)	and	allow	for	the	neces-
sary	R&D.		
2 - Avoid any distortions in competition impeding 
an efficient operation of the energy system.	 First,	
regulation and tarification of the transmission grid 
should not distort the behavior of generators and sup-
pliers in the energy market (from long-term to real-
time).	 Second,	 the	 existing	 differences	 in	 national	
tariffs	should	not	hamper	efficient	competition	across	
Member	State	borders.	It	is	of	particular	importance	
to	the	EU	as	a	whole	as	to	its	numerous	constituen-
cies	that	all	economic	opportunity	of	reducing	costs,	
uncertainties and risks of our energy systems are duly 
exploited. 
We	use	these	two	criteria	to	carry	out	the	evaluations.	
To discover the need for further trans-national (or 
EU-)	involvement	and	harmonization,	we	will	inves-
tigate	whether	the	current	heterogeneity	of	tariff	de-
sign and regulation is problematic by finding answers 
to three questions:
1.	 Does	 the	 heterogeneity	 in	 national	 regulatory	
practices hamper adequate investments?
2. Does the heterogeneity in national regulatory 
practices distort efficient competition?
3.	 Are	new	EU	legislations	in	place	and	new	EU	in-
struments notably from the Third Package – once 
enforced – suitable to support adequate invest-
ments and efficient competition?
We	will	assume	that	European	energy	markets	are	as	
they currently are – far from the ideal picture of per-
fect market economics and will deliberately welcome 
what	economists	call	‘second	best’	or	‘third	best’	out-
comes.	We	also	explicitly	recognize	both	in	our	analy-
sis and in our policy advice that economic arrange-
ments stand on given institutions. The practical and 
political implementability of the proposed solutions 
(both in the near- and long-term) is therefore one of 
our key concerns.
Our	report	is	structured	as	follows.	Chapter	2	intro-
duces	 economic	 rationales	 for	 EU	 involvement	 and	
harmonization	 as	 well	 as	 different	 forms	 thereof.	
Chapter	 3	 discusses	 EU	 involvement	 regarding	 the	
regulation	 of	 TSO	 revenues.	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5	 ad-
dress	 EU	 involvement	 regarding	 transmission	 tariff	
structures	 in	 the	 electricity	 and	natural	 gas	 sectors,	
respectively. Chapter 6 concludes and summarizes 
recommendations. 
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2. Trans-regional coordination 
and the potential role of the EU: The 
case of transmission infrastructures
In	the	following,	we	provide	the	analytical	framework	
for the analysis of policy measures going beyond the 
national level. Three questions are to be answered: 
First,	 whether	 EU	 involvement	 is	 justified	 on	 the	
grounds of subsidiarity considering that the higher 
European level of decision-making shall avoid pre-
empting	any	area	of	legitimate	Member	State	involve-
ment.	Second,	whether	the	market	areas	targeted	by	
the	policy	objectives	are	impeded	to	effectively	deliv-
er due to consistent and permanent market failures. 
And	finally,	whether	the	necessary	regulatory	actions	
could be decentralized among various local play-
ers	 and	 objectives	 be	 achieved	 based	 on	 voluntary,	
regional cooperation instead of being centralized 
(“Brussels	or	Ljubljana”)	as	to	get	a	workable	imple-
mentation process.
2.1 Economic rationale for EU involve-
ment and harmonization
Alternative	forms	of	EU	involvement	have	been	ad-
dressed	 previously	 by	 the	 THINK	 Report	 No.	 4	
(THINK,	2011).	They	are	based	on	 the	 implicit	un-
derstanding that the move of regulatory power from 
a	lower	to	a	higher	federal	level,	i.e.	from	the	national	
to	the	trans-national	or	even	the	European	level,	has	
benefits and costs: benefits may result in the conver-
gence	 of	 national	 policies	 and,	 thus,	 to	 overall	 eco-
nomic benefits that can be shared; transnational ex-
ternalities can be internalized and thus treated more 
efficiently,	and	network	benefits	be	reaped	that	might	
not have been realized by national policies. Potential 
disadvantages of a more intense trans-national or 
even	EU-involvement	(and	thus	arguments	favoring	
national approaches) are the disregard of national 
specifics,	 reduction	 of	 institutional	 competition	 be-
tween	alternative	policy	approaches,	and	 the	 loss	of	
decentralized	“participatory	energy”.
There is a need for higher level action once the lower 
level	cannot	reap	the	benefits	of	integration,	or	when	
essential	 functions	 such	 as	financing,	 are	more	 effi-
ciently solved at the higher level. The new institution-
al economic approach suggests to consider the trans-
action costs of alternative regulatory regimes: these 
include the costs of running markets and organiza-
tional	 hierarchies	 (such	 as	 national	 governments,	
trans-national	 and	 European	 institutions),	 but	 also	
costs resulting from information asymmetries be-
tween	principals	and	agents,	financing	costs,	etc.	Also	
questions	 of	 political	 commitment,	 reliability,	 and	
time	consistency	of	decisions	affect	the	choice	of	an	
appropriate	federal	level.	For	example,	if	one	(small)	
country can put an important transmission line at the 
other	end	of	Europe	in	peril,	this	might	speak	in	favor	
of	high	centralization	of	decision	power.	Ultimately,	
the appropriate institutional setting should be chosen 
such that the sum of production costs and transaction 
costs is minimized.
2.1.1 Is any trans-national involvement 
justified on the grounds of subsidiarity?
In	theory,	if	the	whole	European	electricity	(or	natu-
ral	gas)	 sector	would	be	controlled	by	a	single	TSO	
underlying	European	(instead	of	national)	regulation,	
it would permit of complete harmonization of the 
regulation of transmission activities and transmission 
pricing regimes. Political or property borders would 
not play any role. Trading across national boundaries 
would	be	“seamless”.	Of	course,	the	EU	looks	differ-
ent	 with	 (sub-)	 national	 TSOs	 and	 a	 “patchwork of 
different policy regimes”	 (ECF,	2011,	p.	4).	 In	such	a	
setting with multiple stakeholders – being not only 
numerous	TSOs	but	 also	 various	 grid	users,	NRAs,	
governments,	etc.	–	many	challenges	appear.	A	 lack	
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of harmonization might hamper a level playing field 
and distort efficient competition. Strong asymmetry 
in costs and benefits of existing or new infrastruc-
tures actually calls for due cross-country compensa-
tion mechanisms; etc.
However,	 any	EU	 involvement	must	not	 go	beyond	
what is necessary to achieve the high-level objectives 
in	 the	EU	Treaties,	 except	 for	areas	of	EU	exclusive	
competences.	EU	action	shall	only	be	taken	when	it	
is	more	 effective	 than	 actions	 at	 national,	 regional,	
or	local	level.	Thus,	regulatory	powers	should	be	as-
signed to national or European levels of authority 
following the principle of subsidiarity – as defined in 
Art.	5	of	the	Treaty	of	the	European	Union1. 
From	 an	 institutional	 perspective,	 there	 are	 shared	
competences	 between	 Member	 States	 and	 the	 EU	
regarding the achievement of the European ener-
gy policy goals – i.e. the completion of the internal 
market,	 a	 sustainable	 and	 environmentally	 friendly	
energy	system,	and	security	of	energy	supplies	(Art.	
194,	Treaty	of	the	Functioning	of	the	EU).	It	is	then	
legitimate to look at this more closely to see if there 
are substantial economic benefits to be made from a 
renewed	EU	involvement.
2.1.2 Is there any economic rationale for 
public involvement beyond the Member 
State level?
The following paragraphs list several possible eco-
nomic rationales justifying involvement in the regu-
lation and tarification of transmission infrastructures 
that	goes	beyond	the	level	of	the	Member	States;	this	
could be decentral regional cooperation or interven-
tion at the European level.
1	 See	also	Konstadinides	(2009).	See	Kapff	and	Pelkmans	
(2010)	 and	 further	 literature	 therein	 [Pelkmans,	 2006(b)]	 for	
an in-depth discussion of the development and application of a 
functional	subsidiarity	test	to	EU	(energy)	policy.
1// Presence of externalities 
Individual actions in many cases have direct impli-
cations	on	other	stakeholders	(other	Member	States,	
TSOs,	grid	users,	etc.;	see	e.g.	Crampes,	2011;	Riech-
mann,	 2011)	 while	 being	 not	 properly	 handled	 by	
ordinary	 market	 mechanisms.	 These	 “externalities”	
can	 be	 positive,	 (e.g.	 new	 transmission	 lines	 en-
hance short- and long-term supply security or reduce 
congestions,	 which	 basically	 are	 public	 goods;	 they	
furthermore are a key enabler of the move towards 
“2020”).	 Benefits,	 being	 not	 yet	 recognized	 and/or	
monetized	 for	 a	 large	number	of	 stakeholders,	may	
be	substantial.	Thus,	positive	externalities	could	lead	
to a situation where benefits that can be captured 
by the investors are smaller than the overall societal 
benefits.	The	externalities	also	can	be	negative,	 (e.g.	
costs incurred in transit countries that do not directly 
benefit). Another type of interaction actually works 
properly in the market as the case of an increased 
market inter-connection which leads to price align-
ment with areas of lower prices facing price increases. 
While	being	“market	normal”	these	price	movements	
cause large transfers of welfare across borders and 
among stakeholders and should be carefully looked 
at	(see	below	2//	“distributional	concerns”).	
In the absence of functioning mechanisms to correct 
for	 these	 externalities,	 decentralized	 decision-mak-
ing will not result in the socially optimal investments 
from	a	regional	or	an	EU-wide	perspective.	Since	ex-
ternalities	typically	call	for	multi-lateral	agreements,	
they could be one fundamental reason for additional 
EU	involvement	and	justify	a	more	centralized	deci-
sion making and extended common actions.
2// Distributional concerns 
A second rationale for trans-national involvement 
are	distributional	concerns	[to	some	extent	related	to	
1//].	As	 soon	 as	multiple	 stakeholders	 are	 involved,	
diverging interests can hamper efficient decision 
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making. This could even become more severe for two 
reasons: (a) It is not trivial to identify and quantify 
benefits; particularly for new grid investments since 
beside the monetary benefits they are also contribut-
ing to supply security and enable the move to a low-
carbon economy; (b) there could be an asymmetry 
in costs vis-à-vis benefits related to the operation of 
existing infrastructures or new lines. It is true espe-
cially in well-interconnected electricity systems and 
consequently will become more and more relevant 
the	more	we	approach	towards	the	“2014”	ideal	of	a	
functioning	internal	market.	Mechanisms	ensuring	a	
fair distribution of costs among beneficiaries have to 
be developed ex-ante (before the investment) and not 
only ex-post (on already existing infrastructures). 
3// Discovery of ‘best practice’
A third rationale for trans-national involvement is to 
stimulate the information benefits we can get from 
various national regulatory authorities being learn-
ing	 from	their	diverse	 regulatory	approaches.	Many	
of	these	regulatory	differences	originate	from	due	fac-
tors,	including	individual	market	characteristics,	the	
process	of	development	of	the	national	regulation,	the	
resulting economic and institutional endowment of 
the	regulatory	authorities	(see	also	Rious	et	al.,	2011),	
etc.	Therefore,	for	many	issues	there	will	not	be	one	
unique second- (or third-) best solution that shall be 
easily	implemented	everywhere	in	the	European	Un-
ion.	One	should	rather	get	“ad	hoc”	adequate	meas-
ures that once implemented somewhere could help to 
achieve certain policy goals in a particular context. 
An active and coherent cross-national exchange of 
regulatory experiences – coordinated and evaluated 
centrally through a European institution such as 
ACER	–	can	therefore	reveal	the	working	of	regula-
tion	in	real-world	settings,	increase	market	transpar-
ency,	 spread	 innovating	 regulatory	 models,	 and	 in	
some cases establish a kind of recognized ‘best prac-
tice’	(as	we	have	seen	with	“market	coupling”	in	the	
electricity	sector	or	“open	season”	in	the	gas	sector).	
2.1.3 Decentral coordination and EU in-
struments
Coordination and cooperation among stakeholders 
from	 different	 countries	 become	 especially	 relevant	
when cross-border infrastructures are involved (see 
also	Bujis	et	al.,	2010;	Glachant	and	Khalfallah,	2011).	
These will play a more and more important role with 
the interconnection of formerly more or less isolated 
markets.	In	the	coming	“2014”	internal	energy	mar-
ket	multiple	TSOs	will	 be	 responsible	 for	 planning,	
investing and operating the grid and decisions regard-
ing permit granting and regulation of infrastructures 
or issues related to tarification will have to be taken by 
more than one national regulator. The question that 
immediately appears is whether any voluntary coop-
eration to solve the targeted problems is feasible and 
credible. 
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 several	 initiatives	 of	 cooperation	
and	common	action	have	been	initiated	in	the	past,	
being	a	very	typical	feature	of	the	EU	energy	reform	
processes:	e.g.	the	electricity	and	natural	gas	Regional	
Initiatives,	ENTSO-E’s	predecessor	ETSO,	Gas	Infra-
structure	Europe,	 the	Florence	 and	Madrid	Forums	
in	 which	 NRAs,	 governments,	 the	 Commission,	
TSOs,	traders	and	grid	users	work	together	to	move	
towards	 the	 internal	market,	 or	 numerous	 bilateral	
and	multilateral	agreements.	In	electricity,	countries	
like France or Germany have developed transmission 
lines	to	Switzerland	to	secure	regional	optimization,	
a development that might be emulated to connect the 
“blue	battery”	 in	Scandinavia	 to	continental	Europe	
and	the	UK.	A	more	regional	scenario	might	even	be	
a plausible institutional form for superhighway pro-
jects	such	as	the	North	Sea	Grid,	where	the	North	Sea	
Offshore	 Grid	 Initiative	 (NSOGI)	 is	 currently	 pro-
ceeding without a European coverage. Such more de-
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centralized solutions based on regional cooperation 
benefit from lower transaction costs and a possible 
increase of local participation and involvement. 
On	the	other	hand,	voluntary	cooperation	might	fail	
when long-term commitment of involved parties 
cannot	be	ensured;	“NRAs	are	(by	nature)	nationally	
focused”	(CIEP,	2009,	p.	39).	This	becomes	more	se-
vere when stronger externalities and/or more money 
are involved; or when it is more difficult to identify 
benefits	and	allocate	costs.	Obviously,	within	volun-
tary agreements the room for sanctions in case of 
non-compliance is rather limited as badly exemplified 
by the major European electricity blackout in 2006. 
An example where voluntary action clearly failed is 
the enabling of reverse flows in natural gas pipelines. 
Even though these investments are of quite low cost 
and	 can	 significantly	 increase	 supply	 security,	 their	
importance	was	only	 truly	recognized,	and	required	
for	within	a	new	EU	Regulation,	after	 the	gas	crises	
caused	by	conflicts	between	Russia	and	transit	coun-
tries during the past years.2 Another example from the 
electricity	sector	can	appear	for	the	North	and	Baltic	
Sea	Grid	expansions.	Egerer	et	al.	(2011)	indicate	that	
countries with a traditional trade surplus and modest 
generation	suffer	a	loss	in	the	overall	welfare	(such	as	
France	and	Germany),	while	other	countries	stand	to	
benefit	 (e.g.	UK,	Netherlands,	Norway,	 or	 Sweden).	
Buijs	et	al.	(2011)	also	conclude	that	a	negative	welfare	
effect	can	occur	in	an	optimal	supranational	plan	for	
the	 transmission	 investment	 planning.	 In	 this	 case,	
the net loser is unlikely to be cooperative to undertake 
the	investment	project,	unless	a	sound	cost-benefit	al-
location mechanism is in place.  
2	 	Regulation	994/2010	still	 leaves	 the	decision	on	pos-
sible exemptions from reverse flow investments on interconnec-
tors	 to	NRAs.	The	past	has	 shown	that	exemptions	are	granted	
in	order	to	protect	own	markets	from	competition.	Thus,	it	is	of	
utmost	 importance,	to	enforce	this	existing	piece	of	EU	legisla-
tion.
2.2 Choosing among different forms 
of EU involvement
The	different	forms	of	EU	involvement	must	be	con-
sidered	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 trade-offs	 sketched	 out	
above,	mainly	 the	 reasons	 for	 trans-national	action,	
and then the specific arguments for more decentral or 
more central policy intervention.
Within	this	report,	we	do	not	consider	“EU	involve-
ment”	as	referring	to	a	single	type	of	tool.	EU	involve-
ment is only a way to get more European welfare and 
policy achievement. It has to be tailored in practice 
to	really	cure	the	deficiencies	we	are	facing	and,	thus,	
might target amongst others harmonization among 
national	practices,	the	enforcement	of	existing	pieces	
of	 legislation,	 supporting	 innovation,	 standardiza-
tion,	etc.	We	distinguish	three	different	forms	of	EU	
involvement3,		with	the	term	“EU”	referring	to	a	host	
of European political institutions including the Euro-
pean	Commission,	Parliament	and	Council,	and	at-
tached institutions like the Association of the Coun-
cil	 of	 Energy	 Regulators	 (ACER)	 or	 the	 European	
Investment	Bank	(EIB):
First form – EU definition of general underlying prin-
ciples:	With	this	type	of	involvement	the	EU	does	not	
accomplish by itself. It only frames the process of ac-
tions	being	still	decentralized	among	Member	States	
and local players. It provides the basis for a common 
understanding and ensures that decentralized regula-
tory actions may converge towards the high-level en-
ergy	policy	goals	(“2014”	and/or	“2020”).	An	example	
are the principles for electricity and natural gas trans-
3			 See	also	Knill	and	Lenschow	(2005)	for	an	interesting	
continuative analysis of the relationship between supra-national 
regulatory policy and national responses. They distinguish be-
tween	 ‘governance	 by	 compliance’	 as	 the	 strongest	 form	of	 EU	
legislation with leaves little or no discretion to national imple-
menters,	‘governance	by	competition’	which	is	basically	restricted	
to	a	definition	of	legally	binding	underlying	principles,	and	‘gov-
ernance	by	communication’	 (i.e.	 the	stimulation	of	 information	
exchange and best practice). 
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mission	 pricing	 specified	 in	 Regulations	 714/2009	
(Art.	14)	and	715/2009	(Art.	13),	respectively:	prices	
shall	be	transparent,	cost	reflective,	non-discrimina-
tory,	and	take	into	account	network	security	–	all	be-
ing necessary preconditions to allow the development 
of a functioning internal market.
Second form – EU harmonization of the set of regu-
latory instruments: This form of involvement pre-
scribes concrete rules to be adhered to but leaves the 
implementation	 up	 to	 the	Member	 States,	 in	 some	
cases in coordination with a European institution. A 
harmonization of the existing alternative instruments 
becomes relevant if too much divergence in national 
regulatory designs impedes the achievement of high-
er	(i.e.	regional-	or	EU-)	level	policy	goals.	An	exam-
ple	 would	 be	 the	 by	 ERGEG	 proposed	 framework	
guidelines regarding capacity allocation mechanisms 
in	the	natural	gas	sector	(ERGEG,	2010d).	It	notably	
recommends harmonization of capacity products be-
ing	offered	as	well	as	capacity	allocation	procedures.	
Third form – design and implementation of a single 
EU instrument	regardless	of	local	specificities:	An	EU	
instrument	is	a	very	strong	form	of	EU	involvement.	
It is appropriate when (a) harmonization should re-
strict the variety of regulatory instruments and the 
Member	States	agree	on	a	single	most	suited	instru-
ment	(as	with	the	EU	ETS,	the	Ten	Year	Network	De-
velopment Plans or the gas security of supply regula-
tion	R994/2010)	 and/or	when	 (b)	 individual	 action	
cannot solve a specific problem and only a single co-
ordinated instrument can provide a common action. 
An	example	 is	 the	 inter-TSO	compensation	mecha-
nism	 for	electricity.	Clearly	an	EU-wide	 instrument	
is	only	justified	if	lower	levels	of	intervention,	such	as	
decentral,	regional	solutions,	are	unlikely	to	solve	the	
problems.
3. Regulation of TSO revenues
3.1 Introduction
This	 chapter	 addresses	 the	 regulation	 of	 TSO	 rev-
enues.	 Regulatory	 intervention	 regarding	 electricity	
and natural gas transmission is necessary to ensure 
non-discriminatory access to the grid and avoid mo-
nopoly pricing for infrastructure use4.	 	 Regulators	
aim at increasing overall efficiency and sharing any 
resulting gains with consumers. The main constraint 
thereby is to find the optimal balance between giv-
ing enough long-run economic incentive for reliable 
grid operation and necessary grid expansions on the 
one	hand,	and	inhibiting	the	extraction	of	monopoly	
profits	by	the	TSO	on	the	other.	We	investigate	cur-
rent	regulatory	practices	in	Member	States	from	the	
following two aspects5: 
1	-	Ensure adequate investments: Transmission net-
work assets shall provide the service of electricity or 
natural	gas	transmission	in	a	given	area,	taking	into	
account the existing configuration of upstream sup-
ply	and	downstream	consumption,	ensuring	defined	
levels	 of	 quality	 of	 service	 and	 supply	 security,	 and	
supporting	 the	move	 towards	“2014”,	 “2020”	and	 in	
4  It should be noted that unlike electricity or natural 
gas	distribution	or	electricity	transmission,	the	natural	gas	long-
distance transportation infrastructure is not necessarily a natural 
monopoly	in	all	cases	(see	also	Jamasb	et	al.,	2008,	and	references	
therein). Although there are clearly economies of scale related to 
the	pipeline	diameter,	some	markets	for	natural	gas	can	be	served	
by several transmission pipelines. 
5	 Baker	and	Gottstein	(2011),	referring	to	the	electricity	
sector,	also	highlight	another	 important	aspect.	Given	the	 large	
magnitude	 of	 investments	 required	 to	 meet	 2014-,	 2020-,	 and	
2050	targets,	it	is	not	only	important	to	ensure	that	realized	in-
vestments	are	fully	justified	and	represent	the	most	cost-effective	
alternatives,	 but	 also	 that	 network	 operation	 is	 improved	 such	
that existing assets – which often have quite low average utili-
zation	rates	–	are	optimally	used.	Actually,	 the	same	 is	 true	 for	
natural	gas,	where	especially	the	problems	of	contractual	conges-
tion and an unsatisfactory use of storage capacities (according to 
ERGEG	(2011c)	most	 storage	 facilities	are	congested	and	com-
petition between storage operators is limited) cause sub-optimal 
infrastructure usage.
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the	longer-term	also	“2050”6.  
Adequate	 investments	refer	 to	(i)	 the	right	 ‘amount’	
of	 investments,	 i.e.	 neither	 under-	 nor	 over-invest-
ment	into	grid	infrastructures,	(ii)	the	right	‘types’	of	
investments	 (architecture,	 cost,	 technology,	 energy	
policy	adequacy	–	see	Chapter	1)	as	well	as	(iii)	the	
right timing.
•	 Without	 regulatory	 intervention,	 the	 revenue	
maximization behavior of a monopolist (or oli-
gopolist) would lead to investments below the 
social optimum that would occur in a perfectly 
competitive	 market.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 too	
high	allowed	rate-of-return	(RoR)	will	result	 in	
over-investment and thus unjustified high net-
work costs that will be passed through into grid 
user	tariffs.	The	right	balance	needs	to	be	found.	
•	 Beside	 the	 RoR,	 other	 factors	 have	 an	 at	 least	
equally	 important	 impact	 on	 stakeholders’	 in-
centives	 to	 invest	 in	 grid	 infrastructures,	 such	
as	regulatory	stability,	access	to	financial	means	
(internal	and	external	equity,	debt),	 transaction	
costs (e.g. due to time-consuming permitting 
procedures),	etc.	
•	 Regulation	 furthermore	 can	 be	 designed	 such	
that it supports the achievement of other policy 
goals	(e.g.	investments	into	R&D7 ). Adequate in-
6	 Directives	2009/72/EC	(Art.	12)	and	2009/73/EC	(Art.	
13)	provide	the	legal	formulations	of	the	tasks	of	electricity	(and	
respectively	natural	gas)	TSOs.	See	also	Rious	et	al.	(2008)	for	an	
interesting	discussion	on	diversity	of	TSO	design	given	that	they	
all	have	to	fulfill	the	same	three	basic	tasks,	namely	(i)	short-term	
management	of	electricity	flow	externalities,	(ii)	longer-term	grid	
development,	 and	 (iii)	 coordination	with	 neighboring	TSOs	 to	
deal	with	cross-border	effects.
7 It should be noted that technical innovation is less im-
portant	in	the	natural	gas	market.	For	the	electricity	sector,	major	
needs for technological or process developments are at the dis-
tribution	level,	given	the	move	towards	a	system	that	will	have	to	
absorb substantial distributed generation and where also demand 
side	management	gains	 in	 importance.	 In	 this	context,	THINK	
(2011)	concludes,	amongst	others,	that	“smart	grids	need	smart	
regulation”	and	that	the	conventional	regulatory	framework	has	
several shortcomings. It does not incentivize grid companies to 
vestments may also include projects that are so-
cially desirable but not profitable from the isolat-
ed	investor’s	point	of	view	(e.g.	facilities	ensuring	
security of supplies without their capacity being 
booked	over	 the	 long-term).	In	these	cases,	 the	
regulator can set extra incentives. 
•	 The	 timeliness	 of	 investments	 is	 of	 utmost	 im-
portance,	 too.	 It	 takes	 several	 years	 before	 a	
planned infrastructure finally is constructed and 
starts operation. Delays due to inefficiencies in 
the permit granting process hamper adequate 
investments. Also the presence of uncertainties 
will motivate potential investors to post-pone 
projects to benefit from further information and 
thus less uncertainty at a later moment in time. 
2 - Avoid any distortions in competition: If the reg-
ulation	of	TSO	revenues	 is	badly	designed	with	 the	
allowed	 revenue	 being	 too	high,	 this	will	mirror	 in	
unreasonably	high	 tariffs	 for	 grid	users	 and	 restrict	
their production and consumption activities accord-
ingly.	An	unjustified	RoR	 in	one	country	could	not	
only distort the short-term behavior of electricity 
generators	or	natural	gas	suppliers,	but	also	competi-
tion	among	players	from	different	Member	States.	
3.2 Current regulatory practice
To	date,	the	regulation	of	electricity	and	natural	gas	
grids is under national responsibility. The decentral-
ized decision making and development of national 
regulatory regimes (dependent on individual sector 
characteristics,	historical	evolution	of	the	regulatory	
design,	 national	 policy	 priorities,	 regulatory	 capa-
bilities,	 etc.)	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	 wide	 heterogeneity	
innovate,	and	if	they	do	innovate,	they	are	confronted	with	grid	
users that have disincentives to participate in the ongoing innova-
tion.	Therefore,	the	authors	recommend	a	harmonization	of	the	
regulation of transmission and distribution grids in the form of 
coherence requirements and that regulators could be mandated 
to enable the transition towards a sustainable energy system.
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in	current	regulatory	practices.	 In	the	following,	we	
describe key parameters regarding the current regu-
lation	 of	 electricity	 and	 natural	 gas	 TSOs’	 revenues	
and	 highlight	 differences	 among	 national	 practices;	
for	more	details	see	e.g.	Kema/Rekk	(2009),	Laprise	
(2009),	Hadush	(2009),	as	well	as	national	regulators’	
websites	 and	 documentation.	We	 analyze	 heteroge-
neity regarding two aspects: (a) general price control 
mechanisms and their implementation as well as (b) 
instruments used to promote investments.
3.2.1 General price control mechanisms 
and their implementation
First,	we	observe	 that	various forms of general price 
control mechanisms co-exist,	 including	 cost-plus,	
rate-of-return,	 price-cap	 and	 revenue-cap	 regula-
tion.	ERGEG	(2007)	provides	some	principles	for	the	
regulation	of	TSO	revenues,	i.e.	the	recovery	of	costs	
of transmission investments. These include amongst 
others that a reasonable return on capital shall be 
provided,	depreciation	should	be	oriented	on	the	ex-
pected	economic	 lifetime	of	 assets,	 and	 the	as	basis	
for the risk-free interest rate conventional long-term 
government	 bonds	 (5-10	 years)	 are	 recommended.	
However,	these	still	leave	much	room	for	diversity.
Real-world	regulation	typically	deviates	from	the	sim-
ple standard textbook cases and a number of modules 
are	 combined	 to	 address	different	policy	objectives.	
For	 example,	 the	UK	RIIO	model	will	 be	 based	 on	
an ex-ante price control combined with investment 
incentives,	an	innovation	stimulus	package,	a	strong	
output orientation and also a longer regulatory pe-
riod	(see	Box	2	for	more	details).	Italy	uses	a	rate-of-
return	 approach	 for	 the	 allowed	 return	 on	 assets,	 a	
price	cap	for	OPEX	and	depreciation	and	a	separate	
price cap for the commodity charge. 
Second,	there	is	wide	heterogeneity regarding the cal-
culation of the allowed revenue. The calculation of the 
Regulated	Asset	Base	(RAB)	differs	in	both	(i)	compo-
nents	included	[e.g.	fixed	assets	are	always	included;	
working capital might be included at varying levels; 
‘assets	under	construction’	might	be	included	or	not]	
and	(ii)	and	their	evaluation	[using	historic	costs,	re-
placement	 value,	 indexed	historic	 costs	 or	 standard	
cost;	treatment	of	fully	amortized	assets,	treatment	of	
assets partly financed by third parties or public sub-
sidies].	There	is	cross-country	variation	regarding	the	
numerous	parameters	applied,	such	as	risk-free	inter-
est	 rates,	 debt-	 and	market	premiums,	 the	 assumed	
capital	gearing	share,	beta	factors,	etc.	and	thus	also	
variation	in	the	calculation	of	CAPEX,	OPEX,	or	the	
WACC.	Taxes	might	be	included	or	not;	the	calcula-
tion of the allowed rate-of-return might be based on 
nominal or real values. 
Third,	the	regulatory period,	as	one	of	the	major	fac-
tors	signaling	regulatory	stability,	varies	considerably	
among	Member	 States	 (e.g.	 one	 year	 in	 Slovenia	 in	
the	 past,	 four	 to	 five	 years	 in	many	Member	 States	
(e.g.	 Belgium,	 Germany,	 Italy),	 eight	 years	 for	 the	
RIIO	model).	It	should	be	noted	that	regulatory	sta-
bility is crucial to incentivize capital-intensive long-
term	investments,	typically	undertaken	by	risk-averse	
market actors. “Investors want a durable pathway 
rather	than	a	perfect	or	uniform	one”	(ECF,	2011,	p.	
18);	stakeholders	concordantly	agree	that	regulatory	
stability is one major pre-condition for adequate in-
vestments	(see	e.g.	ERGEG,	2007;	ENTSO-E,	2011c).	
Changes	 in	 regulation	 can	 have	 substantial	 effects	
on the profitability of a project; ex-ante uncertainty 
about possible future adaptations will be incorporat-
ed	in	private	investors’	decision	making8.		Long-term	
8	 The	significant	deviation	between	economic	lifetime	of	
TSOs’	assets	(about	40	years)	and	the	duration	of	regulatory	pe-
riods	(about	1/10)	indeed	creates	substantial	uncertainty	for	grid	
operators.	Unexpected	changes	in	regulatory	practice	do	not	only	
have a direct impact on the profitability of existing and planned 
investments,	but	also	have	severe	consequences	on	the	trust	pri-
vate	 investors	will	 give	 to	 future	 regulatory	 decisions,	which	 is	
highly consequential since the political risk is one of the few that 
cannot be controlled by investors. E.g. the decision by the Spanish 
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commitments to future remuneration are required to 
attract investors and allow them to secure the nec-
essary	financing;	 thus,	extending	regulatory	periods	
above the currently common three to five years as has 
been	proposed	in	the	UK,	can	help	to	improve	inves-
tors’	expectance	of	reasonable	remuneration.
Though,	“adequate	investments”	–	as	discussed	above	
– do not only refer to the level of investments but also 
to	 their	 scope,	or	quality.	One	worrying	 fact	 is	 that	
current regulations mainly incentivize cost reduc-
tions; little attention is paid to innovation and cost 
minimization	 over	 the	 long-term	 (see	 e.g.	 ENTSO-
E,	2011b).	Pioneers	actively	 taking	 into	account	 the	
growing	 importance	 of	RD&D	are	 few:	 In	 the	 pro-
posed	 UK	 RIIO	 model,	 technical	 and	 commercial	
innovation is encouraged through an innovation 
stimulus	package	giving	support	and	rewards,	incen-
tives within the price control system and the option 
to give the responsibility for delivery to third parties. 
This issue is especially relevant for distribution grids; 
government	to	cut	solar	subsidies	retro-actively,	or	the	decision	
by	the	German	authorities	regarding	nuclear	phase-out,	will	have	
long-lasting	implications	(see	also	ECF,	2011).
in transmission – the focus of our report – technical 
innovation is of less importance since these invest-
ments are few in number and one can expect that 
these will be assessed and realized on a case-by-case 
basis including innovation aspects explicitly. How-
ever,	 innovation	 also	might	 target	 the	 development	
and	 implementation	 of	 new	 operational	 processes,	
adapted	business	structures,	or	novel	commercial	ar-
rangements.
In	summary,	the	heterogeneity	in	general	price	con-
trol mechanisms and their implementation results in 
varying	 incentives	 to	 invest	 in	 grid	 infrastructures,	
to	 enhance	operating	 efficiency,	 to	 invest	 in	RD&D	
and	to	be	able	to	support	the	achievement	of	EU	en-
ergy policy targets. It also makes cross-country com-
parisons	extremely	difficult,	 at	 a	 time	where	 ‘multi-
national’	 TSOs	 (TenneT,	 Elia)	 need	 to	 choose	 the	
region to invest and new financial sources need to be 
attracted.
Box 1: The UK “RIIO” model 
The UK was the first country to introduce an RPI-X 
regulation with a strong focus on the maximization of 
economic (both productive and allocative) efficiency. 
The model actually was successful in reducing opera-
tional cost and has been adapted continuously during 
the last 15 years (see also Bartle et al., 2003). 
To respond to the investment needs in the short-term 
and to the challenges originating from the ambitious 
climate and energy policy targets, Ofgem decided to 
alter its regulatory scheme again. Activities of the regu-
lated companies should focus on (i) outputs to improve 
services to grid users, (ii) innovation targeting new ser-
vices and long-run cost reductions, and (iii) incentives 
for productive efficiency. The proposed RIIO model, to 
be implemented in 2013, resembles more a further evo-
lution rather than a complete revolution in the regula-
tion of grid operators (Frontier, 2010; Glachant et al., 
2011) and several open questions remain (see e.g. Pol-
litt, 2010). 
“RIIO” stands for “setting Revenue using Incentives to 
deliver Innovation and Outputs” (Ofgem, 2010). This 
model of regulating electricity and natural gas trans-
mission owners and DSOs incorporates three basic ele-
ments: (1) an ex-ante price control that sets the outputs 
that network companies are required to deliver and 
the revenue they are able to earn for delivering these 
outputs efficiently, (2) the option to leave the realiza-
tion of infrastructure projects to third parties, and (3) a 
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3.2.2 Instruments to promote invest-
ments
There is also strong heterogeneity regarding the in-
struments used to explicitly promote new invest-
ments.	Different	 instruments	 are	 available	 (see	 also	
Annex	1	for	case	studies):	
•	 Adaptation of the regulation of TSO revenues: A 
(temporary)	enhanced	allowed	RoR	can	encour-
age the timely delivery of investments. This is ap-
plied	for	example	in	Italy,	where	extra	returns	of	2	
to	3%	are	provided	for	a	specified	period	of	time	
for	different	types	of	investment.	This	instrument	
has also been recognized as being a tool highly 
conducive	 to	 promote	 investments	 (ENTSO-E,	
2011c).	 Moreover,	 the	 reduction	 of	 the	 depre-
ciation period below the common 40 years for 
transmission cables or natural gas pipelines or 
the inclusion of assets under construction into 
the	RAB	(with	an	increasing	share	the	closer	the	
project is to completion) can be conducive to 
promote	 investments	 (e.g.	 East-West	 Intercon-
nector	from	Ireland	to	UK	where	the	Irish	regu-
lator adapted its regulation accordingly).
•	 Exemptions: Providing an exemption does not 
mean	leaving	an	infrastructure	‘unregulated’	but	
rather	“regulate	it	to	the	extent	necessary”	in	or-
der to encourage planned investments (see also 
Kessel	et	al.,	2011).	This	could	include	an	exemp-
tion from regulated third party access (rTPA) 
or	granting	the	regulated	TSO	the	right	to	keep	
(in	addition	to	the	regulated	tariffs)	a	portion	of	
congestion rents a new interconnector generates. 
Numerous inter-regional projects have been 
built	with	partial	or	full	exemptions,	for	example	
the	 BBL	 gas	 interconnector	 between	 the	Neth-
erlands	 and	 the	 UK,	 many	 new-built	 liquefied	
natural	gas	(LNG)	import	capacities	that	became	
operational	during	 the	 last	decade,	or	 the	 elec-
tricity cables Estlink between Finland and Esto-
nia,	 BritNed	 between	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 the	
UK,	 the	East-West	 Interconnector	between	Ire-
land	and	the	UK,	or	the	AC	cable	between	Italy	
and Austria.
•	 Use of congestion revenues for new investments: 
According	 to	 Regulation	 714/2009	 Art.	 16(6),	
revenues from congestion management mecha-
nisms applied to interconnectors can be used to 
re-invest them into new interconnection capaci-
ties.9 
9	 Two	other	possible	uses	are	 specified:	 (1)	 to	guarantee	
time-limited innovation stimulus. At the beginning of 
each price control period, Ofgem will establish outputs 
to be delivered and the companies will have to present 
a detailed business plan on how to deliver them. The 
regulatory period was extended from 5 to 8 years with 
a possibility of a partial review after 4 years. 
Innovation – which might include not only technologi-
cal developments but also the implementation of new 
operational processes or commercial arrangements, 
etc. – will be supported through two mechanisms. 
First, the longer-term, output-led, incentive-based, 
ex-ante price controls committing to companies the 
potential rewards that they could earn from success-
ful innovations and committing not to penalize for 
unsuccessful innovations. Second, partial financing for 
innovation projects will be provided, awarded based 
on competitive processes. Required funds are planned 
to be raised from use-of-system charges which in turn 
are recouped from consumers. They will be treated as 
a pass-through cost in the price controls of the regulat-
ed companies. For more information see Ofgem (2010, 
2011).
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•	 Long-term capacity reservation: The regulator 
might allow the investor to cover a substantial 
share of the new capacity through long-term 
contracts or even reserve a part for the project 
sponsors	 themselves.	 In	 the	 natural	 gas	 sector,	
open season procedures are a prominent tool to 
determine	capacity	needs.	At	many	LNG	termi-
nals,	80-90%	of	the	import	capacity	is	dedicated	
to the investors.
•	 Public (co-)funding: Public money can be used to 
directly finance transmission projects as has been 
done	 for	 example	 for	 a	 bi-directional	 Belgian	
natural gas pipeline connecting Eynatten and 
Opwijk	(co-funded	through	EEPR	means)	or	the	
HVDC	underground	cable	between	France	and	
Spain which has been financed using amongst 
others	TEN-E	funds	of	€	225mn	and	EIB	loans.	
The new Energy Infrastructure Package as pro-
posed	in	October	2011	will	set	the	legal	basis	for	
financial support in the form of grants for “pro-
jects	of	 common	 interest”;	 €	9.1bn	are	planned	
to be made available for energy infrastructures 
via	a	so	called	“Connecting	Europe	Facility”	for	
the coming multi-annual financial framework 
(2014-2020).	
When	discussing	instruments	that	can	be	used	to	ex-
plicitly	promote	infrastructure	investments,	it	should	
be	noted	that	an	adequate	rate-of-return,	though	be-
ing	a	key	parameter	regarding	investment	decisions,	
is not the only factor having an impact on the attrac-
tiveness of an infrastructure project from the inves-
tor’s	perspective.	As	already	mentioned	above,	regula-
tory stability and the predictability of future revenues 
are	key,	 too.	Furthermore,	 stakeholder	 surveys	have	
shown that current practices regarding permit grant-
ing	 cause	 non-negligible	 transaction	 costs	 (Yang,	
the actual availability of the allocated capacity; and (2) to reduce 
transmission	 tariffs.	The	past	has	 shown	 that	national	 regulators	
pre-dominantly	 chose	 this	 last	 option.	 According	 to	 Kapff	 and	
Pelkmans	(2010),	€	11mn	have	been	used	for	(1),	the	majority	of	€	
1387mn	for	(2)	and	only	€	270mn	have	been	re-invested	in	2007.
2009;	Roland	Berger,	2011;	2011b)	and	typically	last	
for	more	than	5-10	years,	going	even	up	to	20	years	
in	 some	 cases	 (Realisegrid,	 2010,	 for	 the	 electricity	
sector).	Local	opposition	clearly	is	one	relevant	factor	
here; authorization processes not following schedules 
set by law or the complete absence of any rules re-
garding their timing are others. This issue has been 
recognized by policymakers: The new Infrastructure 
Package will provide guidelines regarding the permit 
granting	procedure	for	“projects	of	common	interest”	
including the maximum duration of pre-application 
and	statutory	permit	granting	procedures,	responsi-
bilities of involved stakeholders and institutions and 
the	requirement	for	NRAs	to	cooperate	when	multi-
national projects are involved. 
3.3 Current EU involvement and har-
monization
The	 current	 EU	 involvement	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	
TSOs’	allowed	revenues	is	rather	limited	(see	Table	1	
for further details). It basically includes some forms 
of	harmonization	in	regulatory	practice,	namely	the	
rules on the unbundling of transmission systems and 
grid	 operators,	 rules	 on	 the	 use	 of	 congestion	 rev-
enues resulting from the market-based allocation of 
(electricity)	interconnection	capacities,	which	might	
be	 taken	 into	 account	when	 approving	 tariff	 levels,	
and the possibility to grant exemptions from rTPA. 
Furthermore,	some	funds	provided	by	European	in-
stitutions are available to co-finance infrastructure 
projects	(see	also	Hirschhausen,	2011,	for	an	in-depth	
overview).	The	European	Investment	Bank	supports	
infrastructure investments with low-interest loans-
with a total expected contribution in the period 2007-
2013	of	€	28bn	(EIB,	2009)10.		Furthermore,	the	Com-
10	 Besides	 low-interest	 loans,	 the	EIB	uses	 a	 number	 of	
other means to support the financing of infrastructure projects: 
the Trans-European Network Investment Facility (TIF) provides 
funding	for	priority	TEN	projects,	the	Structured	Finance	Facility	
(SFF)	provides	funding	to	projects	having	a	high-risk	profile,	and	
some money has flown also into equity funds.
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munity budget includes funds for “trans-European 
networks”	which	covers	both	TEN-T	(transport)	and	
TEN-E (energy). TEN-E funds amounted to € 70mn 
in	 the	 period	 2007-2009	 and	 were	 mainly	 used	 to	
co-finance	 feasibility	 studies	 (up	 to	 50%).	However,	
this TEN-E co-financing only represented a very 
minor	share	(>	1%)	of	total	investments	(EC,	2010c;	
Cambridge	Econometrics,	2010).	Another	 source	of	
public	 money	 is	 the	 European	 Economic	 Recovery	
Plan	 (EERP,	 Regulation	 663/2009)	 based	 on	 which	
€ 2.37bn have been made available for electricity 
and natural gas infrastructure projects. It was a very 
successful initiative in the sense of having leveraged 
substantial private funding. The new Infrastructure 
Package	(EC,	2011)	will	contain	€	9.1bn	dedicated	to	
energy projects.
 3.4 Recommendations regarding the 
future role of the EU
1// Does the current heterogeneity regarding gen-
eral price control mechanisms hamper adequate 
investments? 
Probably yes. The observed heterogeneity in general 
regulatory principles and the methodologies used 
to	calculate	 the	allowed	revenue	of	 individual	TSOs	
probably does not hamper adequate investments in 
national infrastructures without a strong cross-border 
impact11.		First,	different	regulations	have	their	justifi-
cation	in	individual	sector	characteristics,	the	histori-
11	 In	the	electricity	sector,	every	new	line	will	to	some	ex-
tent impact electricity flows within the whole (interconnected) 
grid.	However,	there	are	clearly	differences	among	projects	with	
a pre-dominantly national versus a regional (or even European 
impact).	For	natural	gas,	this	distinction	is	even	more	clear.
Table 1: Current EU involvement regarding the regulation of TSOs’ revenues 
Form Rules regarding Details
Definition of general 
underlying principles
- / -
Harmonization with 
respect to the choice 
of regulatory instru-
ments
Unbundling of TSOs D2009/72/EC, Art. 9 [electricity] and D2009/73/EC, Art. 9 [gas]
Use of congestion rev-
enues
R714/2009 Art. 16(6): 
“… shall be used for the following purposes: (a) guaranteeing the actual availability 
of the allocated capacity; and/or (b) maintaining or increasing interconnection 
capacities through network investments, in particular in new interconnectors. If 
the revenues cannot be efficiently used for the purposes set out in points (a) and/
or (b) […], they may be used […] as income to be taken into account […] when 
approving the methodology for calculating network tariffs and/or fixing network 
tariffs.”
Exemptions for major 
new infrastructures
R714/2009, Art. 17 [electricity] and D2009/73/EC, Art. 36 [gas]: 
Major new infrastructures (interconnectors, LNG, gas storage facilities) may be 
exempted for a defined period of time from: rules on use of congestion revenues 
[electricity only]; unbundling as specified in D2009/72/EC, Art. 9 and D2009/73/
EC, Art. 9; third party access; and tariff control through NRAs 
EU instruments
Public funds TEN-E, EIB loans, EERP, etc. used to (co-)finance infrastructure projects
Proposed European 
Infrastructure Package 
Proposed regulation [COM(2011) 658 final]
Priority to 12 strategic trans-European energy infrastructure corridors and areas; 
rules to identify “projects of common interest” (PCIs) – regional expert groups 
and ACER will be responsible for monitoring their implementation; acceleration of 
permit granting process for these PCIs; rules for a harmonized energy system wide 
cost-benefit analysis based on which cost allocation shall be determined; some 
public funds available under Connecting Europe Facility
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cal	evolution	of	the	regulatory	design,	national	policy	
priorities,	or	national	regulators’	responsibilities	and	
capabilities.	Second,	key	parameters	determining	in-
vestment incentives are an adequate risk-reward ratio 
with the rate-of-return reflecting the risks borne by 
the investors and associated cost of capital (and also 
recent increases in financing costs as a result of the 
financial	crisis),	regulatory	stability	and	transparency,	
all issues national regulators can properly address.
Cross-country	 comparability,	 however,	 has	 shown	
to be difficult due to the observed heterogeneity in 
national regulatory practices in terms of determining 
asset base and level of remuneration. This could make 
it difficult to attract funds from external investors 
needed to meet the substantial financing needs in the 
coming	decades.	Various	studies	have	shown	that	the	
move towards decarbonization is technically possible 
and	financially	affordable	 for	 the	 society	as	a	whole	
(e.g.	ECF,	2010);	but	that	the	question	of	implementa-
bility in the sense of making necessary funding avail-
able still is not clear. Huge investment needs have to 
be	satisfied	if	“2014”,	“2020”	and	“2050”	shall	be	taken	
for serious and investment volumes for the coming 
decade	will	have	 to	 increase	by	30%	 for	natural	gas	
and	by	100%	for	electricity	transmission	compared	to	
current	 levels	(EC,	2011)12.	Moreover,	 the	economic	
climate during the current financial crisis still is hard-
ly conducive to large investments. Every investment 
will	have	a	lasting	impact	on	a	TSO’s	capital	structure	
and credit rating13	and	internal	equity	from	the	TSOs’	
12	 A	recent	 study	prepared	by	Roland	Berger	 (2011)	 for	
the EC reports that about €200bn are required only for energy 
transmission	 projects	 ‘of	 European	 interest’,	 i.e.	 international	
lines,	in	order	to	meet	2020	climate	and	energy	policy	objectives.	
Half of this amount might not be realized due to delays in permit-
ting procedures and general ‘difficult access to finance and lack 
of	adequate	risk	mitigation	mechanisms’.	See	also	EC	(2011b)	or	
Baker	and	Gottstein	(2011)	for	further	details.
13 The prevalent form of financing transmission projects 
is corporate financing (only some merchant interconnectors are 
realized	via	project	finance);	thus,	new	assets	appear	in	the	TSO’s	
balance	sheet.	TSOs	have	to	raise	both	additional	equity	and	debt	
operating cash flows might be insufficient to meet 
the high financial requirements in the future. Even 
though	 TSOs	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 face	 financing	 chal-
lenges	up	to	date,	external	investors	might	become	an	
important source of funds in the mid-term future and 
will ask for attractive rates of return-on-equity.
Regarding	 projects that have a regional (i.e. cross-
border) impact,	however,	differing	national	practices	
regarding	the	regulation	of	TSO	revenues	could	actu-
ally hamper adequate investments. Given the fact that 
especially in the electricity sector we face an increas-
ing	 need	 to	 build	 long-distance	 transmission	 lines,	
alternative possible transit projects might be in com-
petition. This competition between corridors (and 
thus	 between	 TSOs	 from	 different	 Member	 States)	
can imply that the grid might be expanded where an 
investor gets a more favorable return instead of where 
it would be optimal from a social welfare perspec-
tive,	 i.e.	where	 total	 costs	 are	 lowest.	This	 potential	
problem is less severe in the natural gas sector. The 
decision on alternative supply routes is to a major ex-
tent influenced by non-economic (e.g. (geo-) political 
or supply security oriented) considerations – the re-
cently opened Nord Stream pipeline is an illustrative 
example. 
Moreover,	national	regulation	providing	solely	incen-
tives to reduce internal congestion might discourage 
cross-border investments. Diverging national re-
gimes on the two sides of an interconnector may re-
sult in asymmetric interests for the investors involved 
in	the	shared	interconnector	project	(see	also	Ofgem	
and	CREG,	2011)	and	there	also	is	the	risk	that	in	the	
in order to maintain their credit ratings. Illustrative example: A 
typical	TSO	might	have	a	debt-equity	ratio	of	70:30.	If	new	funds	
do	solely	originate	from	the	debt	market,	his	leverage	might	in-
crease	 to	 80:20,	 which	 at	 the	 same	 time	 implies	 higher	 risk	 of	
credit	 default,	which	 at	 the	 same	 time	 results	 in	 a	 lower	 credit	
rating.	Thus,	to	maintain	the	credit	rating	and	favorable	financing	
conditions,	additional	equity	is	required,	too.
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case where the realization of a new interconnection 
project requires the reinforcement of national core 
networks,	 too	 many	 costs	 might	 be	 allocated	 to	 a	
new interconnector in order to reduce the costs to be 
borne by national end consumers.
Thus, what could be the possible future role for the 
EU?
•	 Regarding	general	price	control	mechanisms we 
do see neither the need nor a sound justifica-
tion for an EU-wide harmonization. Heteroge-
neity among national regulatory practices does 
not hamper adequate investments into national 
infrastructures but might cause inefficiencies 
regarding long-distance transmission projects 
with	cross-national	impact.	Any	obligatory	EU-
wide harmonization in methodologies used to 
calculate	allowed	revenues,	however,	would	have	
far-reaching implications and the cost of harmo-
nization probably substantially exceed benefits14. 
Different	regulations	also	have	their	justification	
in	 individual	 sector	 characteristics,	 the	 histori-
cal	 evolution	of	 the	 regulatory	design,	 national	
policy	priorities,	or	national	regulators’	respon-
sibilities	and	capabilities,	etc.	
•	 We	 recommend	 only	 for	 projects	 with	 a	 clear	
pan-European focus that decisions on the EU 
level should be taken to avoid that higher-cost 
projects are built as a reaction to a more favora-
ble	RoR.	Where	a	region-specific	solution	has	to	
be	found	(e.g.	offshore	grid),	decentral	coopera-
tion	 and	 coordination	 are	 appropriate.	Besides,	
the	 ENTSOs’	 ten-year	 network	 development	
14	 A	 sudden	 change	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	 TSOs	 will	 di-
rectly	be	 reflected	 in	 these	 companies’	 value	on	 the	market;	 an	
agreement	 among	 27	 Member	 States	 on	 common	 accounting	
procedures	and	methodologies	to	value	assets,	etc.	could	not	be	
reached	easily	and	NRAs	will	 try	 to	protect	 the	 interests	of	na-
tional consumers challenging successful cooperation; etc.
plans still do resemble more a collection of na-
tional investment projects rather than a portfo-
lio including explicitly those new infrastructures 
that	would	be	best	from	an	EU	perspective	(see	
also	 Baker	 and	 Gottstein,	 2011).	 The	 recently	
proposed	 Infrastructure	 Package	 (EC,	 2011)	 is	
a basis specifying rules on the identification of 
“projects	of	common	interest”	(PCIs)	and	differ-
ent measures easing and accelerating their suc-
cessful	implementation.	It	needs	to	be	made	sure,	
though,	that	ACER,	when	submitting	its	opinion	
on	proposed	PCIs	to	the	Commission,	follows	a	
truly pan-European perspective and takes into 
account expected costs of proposed projects and 
identifies those of higher overall social value in 
case that there are alternative possible projects 
supporting the same strategic energy corridors. 
It also needs to be made sure that any discrimi-
nation among alternative projects is avoided.15  
•	 Furthermore,	it	has	to	be	underlined	again	that	
transparency is of utmost importance,	not	only	
to	develop	a	level	playing	field,	but	also	–	if	need-
ed – to attract funds from external investors. 
ACER	 could	play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 formulating	
“good	 practice	 guidelines”	 regarding	 the	 regu-
lation	 of	 transmission	 grids,	 thus,	 to	 promote	
sound regulatory practices that try to minimize 
the	risks	for	investors	and	to	share	‘best	practice’;	
and in extending transparency (i.e. reporting) 
standards. Any convergence of the method-
ologies	of	 regulating	TSO	revenues	 in	 terms	of	
building the regulated asset base and determin-
ing	rates-of-return	will	also	help	NRAs	to	evalu-
15 A conflict of this kind recently occurred regarding 
a	new	gas	 interconnector	between	Spain	 and	France	 (MidCat),	
competing	with	an	LNG	terminal	on	the	French	side.	Both	pro-
jects	would	require	a	reinforcement	of	the	Rhone	axis.	Whereas	
no	costs	of	this	reinforcement	would	be	allocated	to	the	new	LNG	
terminal,	the	MidCat	project	would	have	to	bear	50%	of	this	ad-
ditional	€500mn	investment.
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ate	individual	TSO	performance.	A	second	issue	
of transparency concerns the communication of 
policy makers vis-à-vis end consumers. It has to 
be	made	clear	that	the	achievement	of	EU	energy	
policy goals will imply – besides benefits from 
downstream demand response measures and 
increased energy efficiency – substantial infra-
structure investments that will have to mirror in 
increasing	transmission	tariffs.	
2// Does the current heterogeneity regarding in-
struments used to promote investments hamper 
adequate investments? 
Probably not. Diversity of approaches to promote 
those investments that have a net positive value for 
the society as a whole can even be conducive to re-
spond to the new challenges related to transmission 
grids.	We	are	in	a	dynamic	period,	where	neither	the	
future	energy	mix,	nor	the	availability	of	all	techno-
logical	 solutions,	 cost	 structures,	 etc.	 are	 clear.	 Fur-
thermore,	every	region	differs	 in	 its	specific	charac-
teristics and history of regulation and there is not 
the	 perfect	 ‘one-size-fits-all’	 solution.	 Innovation	 in	
technologies,	grid	operation	and	market	design	needs	
innovation	 in	regulatory	 tools.	Thus,	 some	diversity	
in regulatory practices can provide valuable insights 
into	‘functioning’	models	and	might	allow	to	discover	
‘best	practice’	for	specific	situations.	Thus,	we	do	not	
see any need to harmonize instruments used to pro-
mote investments.
Also the observed heterogeneity regarding the use of 
congestion revenues resulting from the allocation of 
(electricity) interconnection capacities does not nec-
essarily jeopardize adequate investments. There are 
some economic rationales for using congestion reve-
nues	to	reduce	tariffs.	This	will	compensate	those	who	
suffered	from	congestion	and	avoid	subsidies	to	third	
parties benefiting from an investment in the future. 
It also avoids the risk of funds being spent on uneco-
nomic	projects.	However,	other	industry	experts	ar-
gue,	 in	 contrast,	 that	 a	 long-term	 increase	 in	 social	
welfare requires new infrastructure investments (see 
e.g.	Kapff	 and	Pelkmans,	 2010;	Glachant	 and	Khal-
fallah,	2011).	Supponen	 (2011)	 identified	an	overall	
social	welfare	potential	of	about	€	1bn/a	when	inter-
connectors are optimally expanded. He also finds that 
especially for small transit countries that are situated 
in	 a	high	price	gradient	 (Switzerland,	 Slovenia,	 and	
Denmark) a considerable share of transmission infra-
structure could actually be financed through conges-
tion	rents.	Accordingly,	one	might	argue	that	–	given	
the actual situation where the vast majority of con-
gestion	rents	are	used	to	reduce	tariffs	–	it	should	be	
made sure that the rules as formulated in the Third 
Package are enforced16.  
Exemptions from rTPA and the limitation of TSO rev-
enues should only be used as an instrument of last 
resort. There are many examples of successful realiza-
tion	of	fully	regulated	projects	where	NRAs	provide	
an	appropriate	return	and	involved	TSOs	could	agree	
on a cost sharing rule that ensures that every party 
enjoys	a	net	benefit.	An	example	is	the	700	MW	Sk-
agerrak	4	project,	the	forth	DC	electricity	cable	cur-
rently built by Statnett and Energinet.dk. The project 
will allow for an increased wind power production 
in Denmark and at the same time a higher export 
potential for hydro power from Norway in times of 
low wind potential. The investment costs of about 
€	 400mn	 are	 shared	 among	 the	 two	TSOs	with	 the	
16	 The	new	Regulation	explicitly	puts	more	emphasis	on	
new	 infrastructure	 investments	 than	 its	predecessor	Regulation	
1228/2003;	only	in	case	congestion	revenues	cannot	be	used	for	
options (a) and (b) it is envisaged to use them to reduce network 
tariffs.	It	has	to	be	recognized,	though,	that	TSOs	will	have	little	
incentive to use congestion revenues to finance new infrastruc-
tures if national regulation does not allow for an inclusion of the 
respective	assets	into	the	RAB.	Then,	the	companies	face	expens-
es (e.g. administrative cost during permit granting) but do not 
realize any corresponding profits from the investment.
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Danish	party	bearing	a	bit	more	than	50%.	Merchant	
gas and electricity lines can also only be a partial so-
lution	for	promoting	new	investment.	First,	they	are	
only	an	option	where	substantial	price	differences	be-
tween zones appear (thus on the borders among a few 
Member	States);	and	second,	they	will	result	in	sub-
optimal investment levels. It has to be avoided that 
exemptions are granted to projects that would also 
have been realized without this relaxed regulation. 
National regulators might be influenced by other than 
purely	objective	economic	considerations	and,	in	the	
case	of	LNG	terminals,	there	might	further	be	the	risk	
that	NRAs	compete	to	attract	merchant	investments.	
Thus,	 the	 required	approval	by	 the	European	Com-
mission	and	 the	possibility	 for	ACER	to	provide	an	
opinion on applications for exemptions are important 
institutional features. 
In	view	of	the	predicted	investment	needs,	innovative	
solutions to trigger investments should be considered 
to	 become	 common	 tools,	 too.	 The	 proposed	 ‘cap 
and floor’ model	 for	the	planned	subsea	line	NEMO	
connecting	Belgium	and	the	UK	can	be	an	interest-
ing alternative to the exemption regime where at 
the	 same	 time	risks	 for	 investors	are	 limited,	which	
brings	down	cost	of	capital.	Returns	above	a	pre-de-
fined	 cap	will	 be	 passed	 back	 to	 the	 national	TSOs	
and	will	be	offset	against	national	transmission	tariffs	
whereas for periods where returns are below the floor 
level,	the	interconnector	owners	will	be	compensated	
by	the	TSOs,	who	will	recover	the	cost	 through	na-
tional	transmission	tariffs.	Moreover,	the	competitive 
tendering of infrastructure projects with incumbent 
TSOs	and	other	investors	competing	for	the	develop-
ment of identified priority projects by bidding a regu-
lated income stream can be an interesting solution 
to minimize costs and thus consumer prices and to 
trigger an economically sound transmission expan-
sion.	This	tool,	introducing	competition	for	the	mar-
ket	where	there	cannot	be	competition	in	the	market,	
has actually already proven to work in real world set-
tings17.	 See	 also	THINK	 (2012)	 for	 further	 elabora-
tions thereon. 
A European tariff component might be an interest-
ing option to collect money from grid users that than 
could be re-invested into infrastructure projects of 
European	value	 that	 suffer	 from	strong	externalities	
(i.e. building up a kind of regulated asset base paid 
for	by	an	EU	tariff	component).	The	use	of	such	an	
instrument has several advantages as compared to 
‘traditional’	public	funds:	first,	cross-subsidization	is	
reduced since grid users instead of general tax payers 
are	 charged;	 second,	 demand	 elasticity	 for	 electric-
ity	and	gas	is	considered	to	be	relatively	low.	On	the	
other	hand,	however,	this	instrument	probably	would	
be very difficult to implement and may lack public 
acceptance.	Different	 levels	 of	 purchasing	 power	 in	
different	countries	will	make	the	determination	of	a	
‘fair’	rate	problematic;	in	addition,	the	collection	and	
redistribution of a big amount of money might lead to 
actors focusing on rent-seeking rather than trying to 
internalize	 the	 external	 effects	 through	an	adequate	
cost	allocation.	Furthermore,	 infrastructure	projects	
will probably benefit certain regions more than oth-
ers,	 and	consequently,	 a	European	 tariff	component	
still	 implies	 cross-subsidizations	 between	 different	
regions. 
3// Does current heterogeneity regarding the regu-
lation of TSOs’ revenues distort competition?
Probably	 yes.	 Discussions	 with	 different	 industry	
experts and stakeholders have shown that the issue 
of heterogeneity in tariff levels,	 even	 though	not	be-
17	 	 See	 e.g.	Baker	 and	Gottstein	 (2011).	The	UK	regime	
regarding	the	development	of	an	offshore	electricity	grid	allows	
interested parties to compete for the development of connection 
lines,	 and	has,	 according	 to	Ofgem	 (2011b),	 been	 successful	 in	
supporting market entry and the sourcing of funds. The regulator 
also	estimates	savings	to	be	in	the	range	of	350mn	GBP	for	the	
first	tender	which	had	an	overall	value	of	about	1.1bn	GBP.
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ing regarded as the most critical issue since trans-
mission	tariffs	only	represent	a	minor	cost	 factor	 in	
the consumer bill when compared to the value of the 
commodity itself18,	 is	 a	 relevant	 topic.	 Montero	 et	
al.	 (2001)	 and	 in	 a	 following	more	 extensive	 report	
Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2002) provide a study of elec-
tricity transmission tariffs in	the	EU	15	plus	Norway	
and	Switzerland.	For	a	representative	grid	usage	case,	
tariffs	range	between	2.97	(Sweden)	and	8.84	€/MWh	
(Belgium).	 In-depth	 analyses	 of	 the	 data	 show	 that	
the volume of physical transmission assets can be sat-
isfactorily explained by a number of parameters (i.e. 
total	electricity	consumption,	country	size,	consump-
tion	 per	 capita).	 However,	 the	 authors	 only	 found	
a poor correlation between the physical volume of 
transmission	assets	and	transmission	tariffs	and	con-
clude that unidentified explanatory factors must be of 
regulatory	 nature,	 namely	 employed	methodologies	
to value the asset base and procedures of allocating 
transmission	charges	to	different	classes	of	grid	users.	
A	study	conducted	by	ERGEG	(2007)	benchmarking	
gas transmission tariffs	of	 six	European	TSOs	 led	 to	
similar	results.	Substantial	differences	have	not	only	
been	identified	regarding	tariff	levels	but	also	in	the	
way	how	different	customers	are	charged.	Exogenous	
factors including geographical and geological cir-
cumstances,	physical	specificities,	market	conditions,	
etc.	 can	 explain	 differences	 in	 tariff	 levels	 to	 some	
extent.	 Besides	 the	 above	 discussed	 exogenous	 pa-
rameters,	transmission	system	operator	efficiency	of	
course	also	has	an	impact	on	tariff	levels19. 
18	 In	Germany	for	example,	for	industrial	customers	the	
share	 of	 transmission	 costs	 is	 about	 7-8%	 for	 natural	 gas	 and	
about	12.5%	for	electricity	(BNetzA,	2010).
19	 Benchmarking	 the	 efficiency	 of	 transmission	 system	
operators,	being	a	pre-condition	for	setting	efficiency	targets,	 is	
not a trivial task due to the small number of available observa-
tions.	Cadena	et	al.	(2009)	discuss	the	suitability	of	standard	ef-
ficiency analysis methodologies to determine efficient frontiers 
for	electricity	TSOs.	Jamasb	et	al.	(2007)	develop	a	framework	for	
the	benchmarking	of	European	gas	TSOs.	They	argue	that	a	com-
parison	with	US	companies	can	produces	robust	results	for	rela-
tive	efficiency	across	European	operators,	but	that	a	common	Eu-
Thus, what could be the possible future role for the 
EU?
•	 In	 summary,	besides	 various	 exogenous	 factors	
that	are	beyond	the	control	of	TSOs	and	differ-
ences	 in	 internal	operating	efficiency,	heteroge-
neity in national regulatory practices leads to a 
situation where for the same volume of assets 
differing	authorized	revenues	will	be	calculated,	
which in turn results in varying transmission 
costs	and	tariff	levels.	This	can	distort	competi-
tion	 among	 generators	 from	 different	Member	
States and might also have some impact on the 
competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. 
However,	 as	 already	 discussed	 above,	 it	 is	 very	
difficult	 for	 the	EU	to	 intervene	and	we	do	not	
see the need and/or justification of harmonizing 
the	regulation	of	TSOs	in	the	short-	to	medium-
term.	We	recommend	that	ACER	should	take	the	
responsibility for benchmarking national prac-
tices and formulate an opinion about the appro-
priateness of various methodologies employed.   
4. Transmission grid tarification 
in the electricity sector 
This	 chapter	 addresses	 the	 future	 role	 of	 the	EU	 in	
electricity transmission grid tarification. National 
tariffs	are	a	prerogative	of	Member	States.	However,	
electricity is a commodity that is traded internation-
ally	and,	thus,	a	part	of	the	costs	originate	from	trans-
regional flows and there is a second layer beyond 
national	 tarification	 to	 compensate	 TSOs	 for	 costs	
incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows of 
electricity	on	their	networks,	the	so	called	inter-TSO	
ropean strategy for data standardization would be an important 
step towards a valuable European benchmarking. For another 
proposed	methodology	of	benchmarking	gas	TSOs	considering	
explicitly the drawback of a small dataset see also Angenendt et 
al.	(2007).	Even	though	the	share	of	controllable	costs	for	TSOs	
is	relatively	small	(CIEP,	2009)	and	efficiency	improvements	will	
only	have	a	minor	impact	on	the	end	consumer	bill,	benchmark-
ing	of	TSOs	is	a	promising	measure	bringing	net	social	benefits.
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compensation	mechanism.	We	will	also	put	empha-
sis on the need to find a sound mechanism based on 
which costs of major new infrastructures of European 
interest can be allocated to benefiting countries and 
TSOs.
4.1 Introduction
The role of transmission charges is to recover regu-
lated	 network	 costs,	 which	 include	 an	 appropriate	
return on investment. Costs related to electricity 
transmission include (i) infrastructure costs (sunk 
investment costs as well as costs for operation and 
maintenance) and (ii) costs of using the infrastruc-
ture	(losses,	network	constraints,	ancillary	services).	
In	 principle,	 costs	 related	 to	 infrastructure	 use	 can	
be recovered using market mechanisms (e.g. via auc-
tions	allocating	limited	line	capacity).	However,	these	
revenues are not high enough to allow for complete 
cost recovery and residual network cost for a typical 
well-developed transmission network usually account 
for	significantly	more	than	50%	(Pérez-Arriaga	et	al.,	
1995).	The	same	is	true	for	market	settings	in	which	
the	difference	in	locational	marginal	prices	is	used	to	
recover the cost of transportation20.	Thus,	 transmis-
sion	tariffs	need	to	cover	these	residual	network	costs	
and at the same time should provide the right long-
term	investment	signals	(Rious	et	al.,	2008).	
20	 Locational	marginal	(or	nodal)	pricing	is	a	method	of	
determining electricity prices with prices being calculated for 
a number of physical locations on the transmission grid called 
nodes. The nodal price is the marginal cost of supplying electricity 
at	that	node	and	represents	the	locational	value	of	energy,	which	
includes	the	cost	of	the	energy,	losses	and	congestion	(Schweppe	
et	 al.,	 1988).	The	difference	 among	nodal	 prices	 represents	 the	
short-run marginal cost of transporting electricity between the 
two	 nodes	 (Hogan,	 1992).	However,	 in	 actual	 reasonably	well-
developed	 networks	 as	 they	 exist	 in	 most	 countries,	 revenues	
from nodal prices will fall very short from recovering the total 
network costs due to strong economies of scale in transmission 
networks	expansion,	the	discrete	nature	of	investment,	planning	
deviations	and	errors,	and	technical	constraints	such	as	reliability,	
etc.	(Pérez-Arriaga	et	al.,	1995).
It is important to clearly distinguish between short-
run and long-run costs (Pérez-Arriaga et al. 2003). 
Short-run costs are mostly related to the use of the 
existing	infrastructure;	the	parts	of	the	tariff	aimed	at	
their recovery should send a signal for the efficient use 
of existing capacities (i.e. congestion management). 
Long-run	 costs,	 instead,	 are	 related	 to	 the	 invest-
ment	 in	 new	 infrastructure,	 and	 tariff	 components	
dedicated to long-run costs should provide a long-
term signal for the location of supply and demand. 
The	focus	of	our	report	is	on	the	last,	i.e.	tarification	
in	the	narrow	sense,	excluding	implicit	(short-term)	
revenues	for	TSOs.	We	do	not	address	the	design	of	
all mechanisms used to recover the cost for using the 
infrastructure. This is coupled with the design of the 
power market and an adequate analysis would require 
a	detailed	analysis	of	overall	market	design,	which	is	
beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 report.	We	 focus	 on	 tariff 
structures,	rather	than	tariff	levels,	which	are	already	
treated in Chapter 3. 
The following aspects are relevant for the design of 
electricity	transmission	tariffs	in	order	to	achieve	the	
above introduced efficiency-related objectives:
1	-	Ensure adequate investments:
•	 Although	the	tariff	structure	itself	does	not	have	
any	direct	 impact	on	TSOs’	 incentives	to	 invest	
(into	 the	 grid	 or	 into	 e.g.	 RD&D),	 since	 these	
are determined through the regulatory scheme 
discussed	 above,	 it	 can	 directly	 influence	 (a)	
decisions regarding investments into upstream 
generation or downstream load if locational or 
power/energy	signals	are	provided,	or	 (b)	deci-
sions	regarding	facilities’	operation	if	tariffs	dif-
fer	by	season	and/or	between	peak	and	off-peak	
periods,	and,	hence,	can	have	an	important	im-
pact	 on	network	 development,	 the	 cost	 of	 new	
infrastructure,	 or	 consumer	 behavior	 and	 their	
choices regarding connection capacity. The in-
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creasing deployment of intermittent generation 
as well as increasing flexibility in demand are im-
portant factors to be considered when designing 
an appropriate regulation of transmission grids.
•	 With	the	ongoing	integration	of	energy	markets,	
an efficient trans-regional cost allocation sup-
porting adequate investments plays a more and 
more important role.
2 - Avoid any distortions in competition:
•	 In	view	of	the	creation	of	an	efficient	single	EU	
energy	market,	it	is	of	utmost	importance	to	de-
sign	transmission	tariffs	in	such	a	way	that	dis-
tortions in competition in the commodity mar-
ket are minimized. This includes also that the 
part	of	tariffs	recovering	infrastructure	cost,	and	
thus not being related to the actual short-term 
use	 of	 the	 grid,	 shall	 not	 interfere	with	market	
actors’	short-term	decisions	and	bidding	behav-
ior in the power market. 
•	 Furthermore,	 differences	 among	 national	 tariff	
structures should not distort competition among 
generators	located	in	different	Member	States.
In	the	following,	we	assess	whether	the	current	reg-
ulatory practice regarding electricity transmission 
tarification,	including	both	national	tariffs	as	well	as	
inter-regional	compensation,	is	suitable	to	meet	these	
objectives.	In	particular,	we	will	 investigate	whether	
(i)	the	current	heterogeneity	in	tariff	structures	does	
hamper adequate investments or distort competition 
and	whether	(ii)	further	EU	involvement	and	harmo-
nization beyond existing legislation are required.
4.2 Current regulatory practice
Numerous	 principles	 for	 tarification	 are	 discussed,	
including	 amongst	 others	 cost-causality,	 equity,	 or	
transparency. There are several conflicts among those 
principles;	a	perfect	 tariff	system	does	not	exist	and	
real-world	 settings	 ask	 for	 trade-offs	 based	 on	 pri-
orities among economic and political objectives (see 
Annex	2).	Consequently,	it	 is	not	surprising	that	we	
observe a wide heterogeneity in the current regula-
tory practice regarding electricity transmission tari-
fication. A good overview on national transmission 
tariff	structures	can	be	found	in	ENTSO-E	(2011)21,	
for	further	details	see	also	the	TSO	websites.
Table	 1	 shows	 the	 main	 characteristics	 of	 national	
electricity	 transmission	 tariffs.	The	 largest share is 
paid by consumers;	the	L-component	accounts	even	
for	100%	in	the	majority	of	Member	States.	Only	a	few	
countries	apply	also	a	non-negligible	G-component,	
namely	 Austria,	 Finland,	 the	 UK,	 Ireland,	 Norway,	
and	Sweden.	Thus,	many	countries	tend	simply	to	so-
cialize transmission costs among consumers. This is 
in part due to historical reasons (when transmission 
was still part of national vertically integrated utili-
ties,	transmission	costs	were	in	general	simply	social-
ized	over	all	consumers,	since	under	cost-of-service	
regulation and centralized planning it does not make 
sense to charge generators anything). The absence of 
any G-component obviously implies that there is no 
possibility to send any signal to generators regarding 
their impact on the cost of transmission.
Some countries give locational and/or time signals 
to	grid	users.	 In	 the	UK,	 for	example,	 the	G-charge	
ranges	 between	 25.59	 €/kW	 in	 West	 Scotland	 and	
-7.20	€/kW	 in	Central	London	with	 a	weighted	 av-
erage	‘transmission	network	use	of	system’	(TNUoS)	
tariff	of	4.56	€/kW.	The	L-charge	ranges	between	6.59	
€/kW	in	North	Scotland	and	30.05	€/kW	in	Central	
London	 zone	 with	 a	 weighted	 average	 TNUoS	 de-
mand	 tariff	 of	 23.50	 €/kW.	 Furthermore,	 Balancing	
21	 The	 ENTSO-E	 comparison	 takes	 into	 account	 tariffs	
that	cover	all	cost	of	energy	transmission	and,	given	the	large	dif-
ference	in	tariff	structures,	data	are	provided	for	a	basic	scenario	
corresponding	to:	5000	h	utilization	time	that	includes	day	hours	
of working days; the typical load considered is eligible and has a 
maximum	power	demand	of	40	MW	when	connected	at	extra-
high	 voltage	 and	 a	maximum	power	demand	of	 10	MW	when	
connected	at	high	voltage;	for	countries	with	location	signals,	an	
average value has been taken.
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System	Use	 of	 the	 System	 (BSUoS)	 charges	 change	
daily.
Regulatory	 practice	 regarding	 connection charges 
varies	 widely	 among	 Member	 States.	 Connection	
charges	might	cover	shallow	or	deep	costs.	Regarding	
shallow	costs,	which	include	the	costs	related	to	those	
network	facilities	needed	to	connect	a	single	user,	the	
beneficiary	 is	 clearly	 identified.	 For	 deep	 costs,	 in-
cluding	also	the	reinforcement	of	the	core	grid,	 this	
becomes	more	difficult.	On	the	one	hand,	deep	con-
nection	costs	may	be	very	high,	on	the	other,	benefi-
ciaries typically include numerous (if not all) grid us-
ers.	See	also	THINK	(2012)	discussing	offshore	grids.	
Whereas	in	some	countries	a	new	grid	user	only	pays	
shallow	costs,	he	has	to	bear	also	(all	or	some	part	of)	
costs related to the reinforcement of the core grid in 
other	countries.	There	 is,	however,	also	 some	varia-
tion regarding to which user groups these are allo-
cated.	 Furthermore,	 renewable	 generators	 may	 be	
exempted from paying a deep connection charge (e.g. 
Lithuania,	partially	also	Hungary).		
Table 2: Main characteristics of national electricity transmission tariffs
Sharing of network operator 
charges Price signal Connection charge**
Generation Load Locational Time*
Austria 15% 85% - - Deep
Bosnia Herzegovina 100% - - Shallow
Belgium 100% Yes Shallow
Bulgaria 100% - - Shallow
Croatia 100% - Yes Deep
Czech Republic 100% - - Shallow
Denmark 4% 96% - - Shallow
Estonia 100% - Yes Deep
Finland 11% 89% - Yes Partially deep
France 2% 98% - - Shallow
Germany 100% - - Shallow (generators)
Deep (consumers)
Great Britain [TNUoS tariff] 27% 73% Yes Yes Shallow
Greece 100% - Yes Shallow
Hungary 100% - - Partially deep
Ireland 25% 75% Yes - Partially deep
Italy 100% - - Shallow
Latvia 100% - - Deep
Lithuania 100% - - Deep
Luxembourg 100% - - Shallow
Northern Ireland 25% 75% - Yes Shallow
Norway 35% 65% Yes Yes Shallow
Poland 0.6% 99.4% - - Shallow
Portugal 100% - Yes Shallow
Romania [refers to system 
services]
100% Yes - Deep
Serbia 100% - Yes Shallow (generators, distrib.)
Deep (industrial consumers)
Slovak Rep. 100% - - Partially deep
Slovenia 100% - Yes Deep
Spain 6% 94% - Yes Shallow
Sweden 25% 75% Yes - Deep
Switzerland 100% - - -
Source: ENTSO-E (2011) 
[Notes: *time signals include seasonal and/or time-of-day variations; ** see the source document for more detailed specifications on which cost 
components are included]
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Figure 3: Energy- versus power-related components of transmission tariffs
Source: ENTSO-E (2011)
Furthermore,	tariffs	do	not	cover	the	same	cost com-
ponents in all countries (see Figure 2). Costs from 
losses	might	be	included	in	the	tariffs	or	not,	the	same	
is	 true	 for	 system	 services,	 which	 also	 include	 the	
costs	 for	 balancing.	Tariffs	might	 also	 include	 costs	
not directly related to infrastructure such as other 
regulatory charges (e.g. support to renewable energy). 
This heterogeneity makes cross-country comparisons 
difficult and hampers transparency.
Figure 2: Components of transmission tariffs [€/MWh]
                                       
Source: ENTSO-E (2011) 
Figure	3	shows	the	ratio	in	which	tariffs	are	paid	based	
on energy- and power-related components. There is 
wide	diversity	among	national	practices.	Whereas	in	
some	 countries	 the	 transmission	 tariff	 is	 fully	 paid	
based	 on	 energy	 transported	 (Denmark,	 Estonia,	
Finland,	Hungary,	Italy,	Romania),	the	power-related	
component	can	go	up	to	more	than	75%	(Germany,	
Slovenia).	 Tariffs	 paid	 per	 €/MWh,	 however,	 could	
distort the short-term behavior of market participants 
in the commodity market if not reflecting short-run 
costs related to actual infrastructure use. 
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 4.3 Current EU involvement and har-
monization
The	 current	 EU	 involvement	 regarding	 electricity	
transmission tarification in the narrow sense includes 
the	definition	of	general	underlying	principles,	some	
harmonization regarding the range of G-components 
as	well	as	the	inter-TSO	compensation	mechanism	as	
an	existing	EU-wide	instrument	(Table	2).	The	Euro-
pean	Commission	recently	also	proposed	a	new	Reg-
ulation in order to accelerate the realization of “pro-
jects	of	common	interest”.	The	following	paragraphs	
will describe those in more detail.
Table 3: Current EU involvement regarding transmission charges on electricity
Form Rules regarding Details
Definition of general under-
lying principles
Charges for network 
access
R714/2009 Art. 14: 
“… shall be transparent, take into account the need for network security 
and reflect actual costs incurred […] shall not be distance-related”
“Where appropriate […] shall provide locational signals at Community 
level, and take into account the amount of network losses and congestion 
caused, and investment costs for infrastructure”
“There shall be no specific network charge on individual transactions for 
declared transits of electricity”
Voluntary guidelines of 
good practice
E.g. on grid connection and access
[Developed by NRAs (through CEER and ERGEG) to assist in practical 
implementation of principles set out in legislation; NRAs monitor and 
report on MS’s compliance]
Harmonization with respect 
to the choice of regulatory 
instruments
Average charges paid by 
generators 
R838/2010, Annex Part B : Range between zero and 0.5 €/MWh with ex-
emptions for: (i) DK, SE, FI (0-1.2 €/MWh), (ii) RO (0-2.0 €/MWh), (iii) IR, 
UK, Northern IR (0-2.5 €/MWh)
Exemptions for major 
new infrastructures from 
tariff control
R714/2009, Art. 17: New DC interconnectors may be exempted, for a lim-
ited period of time, from tariff control through NRAs (as well as from other 
provisions, not directly related to tarification, see above)
EU instrument
Inter-TSO compensation 
mechanism
R714/2009 Art. 13: An ITC shall compensate for costs incurred as a result 
of hosting cross-border flows of electricity 
R838/2010: Methodology to be used 
Proposed European In-
frastructure Package
Proposed Regulation [COM(2011) 658 final]
Priority to 12 strategic trans-European energy infrastructure corridors and 
areas; rules to identify “projects of common interest” (PCIs) – regional 
expert groups and ACER will be responsible for monitoring their imple-
mentation; acceleration of permit granting process for these PCIs; rules 
for an energy system wide cost-benefit analysis based on which cost allo-
cation shall be determined; some public funds available under Connecting 
Europe Facility
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4.3.1 EU involvement regarding tariff 
structures
Regulation	714/2009	defines	 the	main	principles	 for	
tarification. Charges shall be transparent and non-
discriminatory. Even if cost-recovery is not explicitly 
mentioned,	charges	shall	take	into	account	“the	need	
for	network	security	and	reflect	actual	costs	incurred”.	
Furthermore,	 “where	 appropriate,	 the	 level	 of	 the	
tariffs	applied	[…]	shall	provide	locational	signals	at	
Community	level,	and	take	into	account	the	amount	of	
network	losses	and	congestion	caused,	and	investment	
costs	for	infrastructure.”	Tariffs	shall	not	be	distance-
related and any charges on individual transaction for 
the declared transit of electricity are precluded.
With	 the	 liberalization,	 an	 active	 debate	 among	 all	
European	 stakeholders	 regarding	 the	need	 for	 tariff	
harmonization began. This brought as a first meas-
ure some harmonization of transmission charges to 
be paid by producers. Asymmetric G-charges would 
favor electricity export from countries with a lower 
G-charge (given that a substantial part of the charg-
es	 is	 paid	 based	 on	 €/MWh	 of	 production),	 thus,	
hamper a level playing field for competition among 
generators	 across	 the	EU.	The	harmonization	of	G-
charges has been considered to be more important 
than	a	harmonization	of	the	L-component	since	pro-
duction from and the location of generation facilities 
are	more	responsive	to	price	signals	(ERGEG,	2005).	
Regulation	 838/2010	 fixes	 nominal	 upper	 levels	 for	
the	G-component	in	national	tariffs;	the	annual	aver-
age transmission charge paid by producers shall be 
between	zero	and	0.5	€/MWh.	For	Denmark,	Sweden	
and	Finland	this	range	is	extended	up	to	1.2	€/MWh;	
for	Romania	up	to	2	€/MWh;	and	for	Ireland,	the	UK	
and	Northern	Ireland	up	to	2.5	€/MWh.	ACER	shall	
monitor “the appropriateness of the ranges of allowa-
ble	transmission	charges,	taking	particular	account	of	
their impact on the financing of transmission capac-
ity	needed	for	Member	States	to	achieve	their	targets	
under	the	Directive	2009/28/EC”	(Annex,	Part	B).	
4.3.2 The inter-TSO compensation 
mechanism (ITC)
Before	 the	 liberalization	of	 the	European	 electricity	
sector,	new	cross-border	 infrastructures	were	devel-
oped through bilateral contracts while costs due to 
trans-national flows of electricity were recovered 
using	 a	 system	 of	 transit	 fees.	The	 resulting	 “tariff	
pancaking”	and	the	 large	difference	 in	the	structure	
and	level	of	tariffs	among	Member	States	were	soon	
considered main impediments for the implementa-
tion	of	a	single	EU	electricity	market	(ERGEG,	2005).	
To	 abolish	 these	 cross-border	 tariffs,	 an	 inter-TSO	
compensation mechanism (ITC) was introduced in 
2002	when	eight	European	TSOs	voluntarily	 signed	
a	first	ITC	agreement.	Since	then,	ETSO	has	contin-
ued to develop the mechanism and the regional scope 
quickly	 expanded	 (ETSO,	 2009).	 With	 the	 Third	
Package	and	subsequent	legislation,	the	ITC	has	been	
formalized	as	an	EU-wide	instrument.	It	is	based	on	
a	hierarchical	 system:	first,	 payments	 compensating	
for costs originating from cross-border flows of elec-
tricity	are	allocated	among	TSOs;	second,	TSOs	take	
into account their net payments when determining 
national transmission charges based on national rules 
regarding tarification. 
Regulation	 714/2009	 sets	 the	 legal	 basis	 for	 an	 ob-
ligatory	 inter-TSO	 compensation	 mechanism	 ac-
cording	 to	which	TSOs	are	 compensated	 for	 all	 the	
costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border 
flows	of	electricity	on	their	networks	by	those	TSOs	
from whose systems cross-border flows originate or 
where they end. The costs shall be established “on the 
basis of the forward-looking long-run average incre-
mental costs, taking into account losses, investment in 
new infrastructure, and an appropriate proportion of 
the cost of existing infrastructure […]”. The concrete 
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methodology	currently	applied	is	laid	down	in	Regu-
lation	 838/2010.	 Its	 central	 element	 is	 an	 ITC	 fund	
which shall provide (separately calculated) compen-
sation	payments	for	(1) the costs of losses incurred in 
national transmission systems as a result of hosting 
cross-border flows of electricity; and (2) the costs of 
making infrastructure available to host cross-border 
flows.
The ITC is a zero-sum game with the fund being cal-
culated and distributed annually based on an ex-post 
analysis. Contributions into the fund are determined 
based	on	TSOs’	“proportion to the absolute value of net 
flows onto and from their national transmission system 
as a share of the sum of the absolute value of net flows 
onto and from all national transmission systems”. Thus 
the larger the imbalance between import and export 
flows	of	a	country,	the	larger	will	be	its	payment	into	
the fund. Perimeter flows contribute to the fund pay-
ing	an	annually,	ex-ante	defined	fee	for	their	imports	
and exports of electricity into the ITC area22. 
Figure 4: Current European ITC mechanism 
Annual    
ITC Fund
(incl. 
infrastructure-
and losses 
funds)
Perimeter flows
Fee per MWh 
exported/ imported
ITC member countries
Payments in proportion 
to the absolute value 
of net flows
Costs of infrastructure
Compensation based on 
- Transit factor (75%)
- Load factor (25%)
Costs of losses
Compensation based on “with-
and-without-transit” method
Contribution payments Compensation payments
Source: Own depiction
22	 	The	perimeter	fee	for	2011	has	been	set	at	€	0.8/MWh	
(ENTSO-E	website).
Regarding	 compensation	 payments	 a	 distinction	 is	
made between the above introduced cost compo-
nents. A so called framework fund is established to 
manage compensation for the cost for making infra-
structure	available.	ACER	shall	make	a	proposal	on	
the annual sum based on a “technical and economic 
assessment of the forward-looking long-run average 
incremental costs […] of making such electricity trans-
mission infrastructure available.”	Until	this	assessment	
has	been	carried	out,	the	fund	is	fixed	at	€	100mn.	The	
fund	is	distributed	among	TSOs	according	to	a	transit	
factor	(75%	weight)	and	a	load	factor	(25%)23. For the 
cost	of	losses,	the	size	of	the	fund	is	given	by	the	sum	
of the costs of losses incurred in the national systems. 
Historical numbers show that it typically has been at 
a	level	of	about	€	120mn.	Losses	are	estimated	using	
a	“with-and-without-transit”	method	 for	72	defined	
snapshots during year. The base scenario refers to the 
real network flows in the relevant period; the other 
scenario refers to the flows that would have occurred 
if no transits of electricity had taken place. Costs due 
to losses are calculated at national level using the 
methodology	approved	by	the	NRA.
23 The transit factor refers to transits on that national 
transmission system state as a proportion of total transits on all 
national transmission systems; the load factor refers to the square 
of	transits	of	electricity,	in	proportion	to	load	plus	transits	on	that	
national transmission system relative to the square of transits of 
electricity in proportion to load plus transit for all national trans-
mission systems.
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Figure	 5	 shows	 data	 on	 the	 ITC	 settlements	 for	
2008/2009	(most	recent	data	currently	publicly	avail-
able). Even if the mechanism has changed with the 
new	Regulation,	these	numbers	provide	valuable	in-
sights	since,	to	our	knowledge,	the	underlying	meth-
odology remained similar. Countries being net pay-
ers are those that are major importers or exporters of 
electricity,	such	as	France,	Italy,	or	Norway.	Countries	
receiving net payments are typical transit countries 
such	 as	 Switzerland,	 Austria,	 or	 Germany.
Figure 5: ITC settlements in 2008/2009 [M€]
Data source: EC (2008) 
[Negative values indicate net contributions into the fund; positive values net payments out of the fund]
4.3.3 The proposed European Infra-
structure Package
In	 October	 2011,	 the	 European	 Commission	 pro-
posed	 a	 new	 Regulation	 aiming	 at	 improving	 the	
coordination of network development and accelerat-
ing	electricity,	natural	gas,	oil	and	CO2 infrastructure 
investments	 in	 12	 “strategic	 trans-European	 energy	
infrastructure	corridors	and	areas”.	The	new	Regula-
tion,	 replacing	 the	 existing	 TEN-E	 framework,	 will	
set rules on how to identify “projects of common in-
terest”	(PCIs),	whose	timely	implementation	is	essen-
tial	to	support	the	achievement	of	EU	energy	policy	
objectives. These projects will typically involve more 
than	 one	 Member	 State	 via	 physical	 location	 and/
or via a significant cross-border impact. PCIs will 
be	 selected	 in	 a	 two-stage	 process:	 first,	 the	 project	
promoter(s) submit a proposal to the relevant “re-
gional	expert	group”	(being	composed	of	representa-
tives	of	Member	States,	NRAs	and	TSOs),	which	will	
prepare	an	initial	list.	Then,	the	Commission	will	take	
the	final	decision.	ACER	will	be	responsible	for	mon-
itoring and evaluating project implementation. 
A “harmonized energy system-wide cost-benefit 
analysis”	 for	 PCIs,	 taking	 into	 account	 social,	 eco-
nomic	and	environmental	costs	and	benefits,	is	a	core	
element of this proposal. Concrete methodologies 
will	have	to	be	developed	by	ENTSO-E	and	ENTSO-
G,	respectively,	and	have	to	be	approved	by	the	Com-
mission	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 opinion	 of	 ACER.	
Based	on	this,	the	costs	for	PCIs	shall	be	allocated	ac-
cording to the (direct and indirect) benefits occurring 
in	 different	Member	 States	 and	 will	 be	 paid	 for	 by	
grid	users	through	national	tariffs	for	network	access.	
NRAs	shall	take	a	joint	decision	on	the	allocation	of	
investment costs to be borne by each system operator. 
If	they	do	not	reach	an	agreement,	“the	decision	on	
the investment request including cross-border cost 
allocation	[…]	as	well	as	the	way	the	cost	of	the	in-
vestments	are	reflected	in	the	tariffs	shall	be	taken	by	
ACER.”	
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If	a	PCI	suffers	from	higher	risks	for	the	development,	
construction	or	operation,	national	regulators	“shall	
ensure that appropriate incentives are granted to that 
project”.	In	case	a	PCI	encounters	“significant	imple-
mentation	 difficulties”	 the	 Commission	may	 nomi-
nate a European coordinator. If the commissioning 
of a PCI is delayed by more than two years without 
sufficient	 justification,	 the	Commission	may	 launch	
a call for proposals open to third parties to build the 
project according to certain conditions. The proposed 
Regulation	 furthermore	 sets	 minimum	 standards	
for transparency and public participation and fixes 
a maximum allowed duration for the permit grant-
ing process in order to accelerate project realization. 
Finally,	the	proposed	Regulation	specifies	the	condi-
tions under which PCIs might be eligible for financial 
support	in	the	form	of	grants.	Public	funds	of	€	9.1bn	
will be available for the energy sector under the Con-
necting	Europe	facility	for	the	period	2014-2020.
4.4 Recommendations regarding the 
future role of the EU
1// Does the current heterogeneity in tariff struc-
tures hamper adequate investments or distort com-
petition?
Probably yes. 
Transmission	tariffs	should	be	allocated	as	far	as	pos-
sible based on the principle of cost causality. This is 
important	not	only	for	the	reason	of	fairness	but,	in	
a	 context	 of	 liberalized	markets,	 also	 for	 economic	
efficiency.	 In	 fact,	 under	 the	 economic	 assumptions	
of the absence of any market power and perfect in-
formation,	the	maximization	of	global	surplus	can	be	
achieved	by	 a	 tariff	 system	where	 the	 costs	 for	net-
work infrastructure are allocated to those who cause 
them	or	benefit	from	the	assets	(Pérez-Arriaga	et	al.,	
2003).	It	also	implies	that	transmission	tariffs	should	
be able to transfer a locational signal; network costs 
depend on the location of generators and load24.  
With	the	liberalization	of	the	electricity	sector,	a	de-
bate about a possible introduction of locational sig-
nals at European level through the harmonization of 
G-	and	L-charges	was	initiated.	At	this	time,	however,	
this was not considered appropriate for two reasons 
(ERGEG,	2005):	first,	because	of	uncertainty	related	
to how efficient and accurate this signal could be; and 
second,	because	of	the	risk	that	a	locational	signal	can	
distort short-term signals and thus distort competi-
tion	in	the	power	market.	We	think	that	now,	given	
the	context	of	the	2014/2020	targets,	these	two	objec-
tions to locational signals are not justified anymore. 
The scale of investments needed in the coming dec-
ades	and	their	correlation	with	generators’	siting	de-
cisions	is	such	that,	even	if	there	is	no	consensus	on	
what	 is	 the	best	methodology	 to	 apply,	 the	 effort	 is	
justified.	Regarding	 the	 second	point,	 all	 tariffs	 that	
cover	the	cost	of	infrastructure,	and	not	only	the	loca-
tional	component,	should	not	distort	the	short-term	
behavior of grid users.
The cost causality principle should be applied using 
a sound cost-benefit analysis that takes into account 
all	 relevant	 costs	 and	benefits,	 including	 also	 exter-
nalities	(Baldick	et	al.,	2007;	Hogan,	2011).	In	prac-
tice,	however,	it	will	be	technically	difficult	to	allocate	
network cost in an exact manner to beneficiaries and 
some proxy may have to be used (e.g. power flows). 
Olmos	 (2006)	 provides	 an	 overview	 on	 alternative	
algorithms and their suitability depending on spe-
cific characteristics of the power systems. There are 
increasing returns to scale and because lines cannot 
24	 In	addition	to	tariff	for	recover	the	cost	of	infrastruc-
ture,	a	locational	signal	may	also	be	sent	with	mechanisms	used	
to	recover	the	cost	for	using	infrastructure,	as	congestion	man-
agement,	loss	factor	or	nodal	pricing	(CEER,	2003;	CESI,	2003).	
For	 example,	 the	 expectation	of	 a	 poor	 energy	price	 in	 a	node	
where a potential investor is considering locating is an impor-
tant	locational	signal	for	the	siting	decision.	Thus,	both	locational	
transmission charges and expected nodal prices (when they ex-
ist),	are	valid	and	comparable	locational	signals.
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be	expanded	incrementally	but	only	in	discrete	steps,	
a new transmission line will typically only be used at 
a part of its capacity during the initial years of opera-
tion.	Furthermore,	some	infrastructures	are	built	for	
security	 and	 reliability	 reasons	 (such	 as	N	 1	 condi-
tion).	Moreover,	the	quantification	of	benefits	can	be-
come very complex and a too sophisticated approach 
might not always be justified. These residual costs 
then	need	to	be	socialized	(Olmos	et	al.,	2009).
In	 many	 countries,	 transmission	 tariffs	 are	 com-
pletely paid by consumers and only a few countries 
have	introduced	locational	signals,	even	though	their	
importance	has	also	been	highlighted	 in	Regulation	
714/2009.	This	can	actually	result	in	inefficient	invest-
ments.	In	the	coming	years,	Europe	needs	a	lot	of	in-
vestments into the network in order to allow for the 
connection of renewable energy sources and support 
the completion of the internal market. The cost for 
network reinforcement will also critically depend on 
the location of new generation (and load). It is impor-
tant that investors when deciding on the location of 
new generation take into account transmission costs 
and there are strong arguments in favor of introduc-
ing	locational	signals	EU-wide.	Otherwise,	they	will	
tend to ignore incurred transmission in the siting de-
cision,	with	the	risk	of	overall	high	costs	for	the	so-
ciety. 
Locational	signals	should	be	sent	at	least	to	new gen-
erators. The signals will not have any impact on in-
cumbent generators with respect to ‘adequate invest-
ments’	 since	 the	 respective	 production	 facility	 and	
grid investments already have been realized and are 
sunk	in	nature.	They	neither	can	be	undone,	nor	can	
assets	be	moved.	However,	they	will	have	an	impact	
also on existing generators once they approach the 
end of their economic lifetime and can incentivize 
a	relocation	of	utilities’	power	plant	portfolio	 in	the	
long-run.	Locational	 signals	 can	also	be	 introduced	
for	 downstream	 players,	 even	 though	 their	 impact	
would mainly be limited to large consumers. Trans-
mission	tariffs	have	little	influence	on	consumer	be-
havior since transmission costs represent only a small 
share of the total electricity bill and demand elasticity 
is considered to be low. 
The long-term locational signals need to be efficient 
and accurate.	This	 implies	 that	TSOs	 should	 imple-
ment a sound methodology respecting as far as pos-
sible the principle of cost-causality (or ‘beneficiary 
pays’)	 as	 discussed	 above.	 Tariffs	 also	 should	 send	
predictable and reliable signals such that the inves-
tors	do	not	suffer	from	another	source	of	uncertainty,	
i.e.	the	tariff trajectory should be defined ex-ante for a 
period of a few years. 
A	low,	or	completely	absent,	G-component has often 
been justified by the argument that all cost paid by the 
generator will be passed through to consumers any-
way.	This	is	only	partially	true.	When	making	a	deci-
sion	whether	to	invest	or	not,	a	generator	will	estimate	
his	 expected	 rate-of-return,	 including	 the	 transmis-
sion	 charge	 as	 an	 additional	 cost.	 If,	 even	with	 the	
transmission	charge,	the	RoR	is	favorable	because	the	
generator	has	some	advantages	over	competitors,	he	
will	absorb	the	transmission	charge.	Thus,	if	genera-
tors can absorb a part of the costs it is neither fair nor 
economically efficient to charge consumers alone. In 
order	 to	have	a	 locational	 signal	 for	generators,	ob-
viously	a	certain	share	of	the	tariff	needs	to	be	paid	
by	generators.	To	avoid	a	distortion	 in	competition,	
some degree of harmonization regarding the G-com-
ponent is needed. If some countries apply a charge 
to	their	generators	but	others	not,	the	former	weaken	
the position of their utilities in the European electric-
ity	market.	Differing	principles	of	calculating	the	G-
component	will	hamper	competition,	not	the	magni-
tude of a G-component itself. Current harmonization 
on	 EU-level	 regarding	 the	 G-component	 concerns	
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only its average maximum level that countries can 
apply.	We	think	that,	in	addition,	the	EU	should	also	
fix	an	average	share	of	the	G/L	components,	thus,	in-
troduce	a	minimum	G-component,	too25. 
Tariffs	could	also	send	an	ex-ante time signal to bet-
ter	 account	 for	 the	 utilization	 pattern	 of	 different	
kinds	of	users,	reduce	overall	peak	demand	and	thus	
overall capacity needs and system costs. This would 
imply that the time-distribution of power produced 
by the generator (or respectively electricity consumed 
by	load)	are	taken	into	account	for	tariff	calculation26. 
Whereas	 locational	 signals	 do	matter	 more	 for	 the	
location	of	new	generators	than	for	load,	a	time	vari-
ation	 in	 transmission	 tariffs	will	have	a	direct	effect	
on the consumption behavior of downstream users 
and can have an impact on the optimal dimension-
ing of the transmission network. Generators will not 
respond to time signals (given the absence of storage) 
since electricity generation will have to meet what-
ever demand there finally is. 
25	 	Of	 course,	 the	 locational	 signal	will	 not	 be	 the	 only	
factor	determining	the	siting	of	new	facilities.	Other	key	drivers	
include	resource	availability,	land	costs,	or	also	public	opposition	
that can hamper the construction of power plants near consump-
tion centers where locational signals will be low (or even nega-
tive).	Moreover,	heterogeneity	in	the	level	of	connection	charges,	
the duration of the permit granting process or renewable support 
has	 shown	 to	 drive	 investors’	 decisions	 about	 where	 to	 locate	
generation	and	which	national	network	to	connect	into	(CEER,	
2011b).	See	also	CESI	(2003).
One	 also	 has	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 impact	 of	 locational	
signals on conventional and renewable generation. Especially re-
newable energy generators are not completely free in their siting 
decisions.	 However,	 transmission	 charges	 can	 represent	 a	 sub-
stantial	part	of	overall	cost	(e.g.	offshore	wind)	and	a	locational	
signal will support that decarbonization is achieved in the most 
cost-efficient manner; any reduction in transmission charges will 
reduce the need for public subsidies. 
26	 Short-term	 time	 signals	 (e.g.	 differentiation	 depend-
ing on the time-of-the-day) will be less important for investment 
recovery or planning but instead are more relevant for the short-
term	 efficiency	 of	 the	 use	 of	 the	 existing	 network.	One	 should	
equally note that short-term signals can also be introduced 
through short-term mechanisms for efficient usage of the grid 
(e.g. congestion and losses arrangement).
There is wide heterogeneity also regarding the pay-
ment	structure	of	tariffs.	In	many	countries,	network	
charges are to a large part recovered via energy-re-
lated	tariffs	(e.g.	€/MWh).	However,	tariffs	that	cov-
er the cost of infrastructure should not distort the 
short-term behavior of grid users. The costs of infra-
structure	 are	 long-term	costs.	Thus,	 the	way	 a	TSO	
recovers those should only influence the long-term 
decision of grid users and should not interfere with 
their short-term behavior in the energy market (Pé-
rez-Arriaga,	2003;	Pérez-Arriaga	and	Smeers,	2003).	
Consequently,	 transmission	 tariffs	 covering	 infra-
structure costs should not be charged in the form of 
€/MWh.	This	would	influence	the	merit	order	since	
network users will internalize these charges in their 
energy bids to power exchanges or in their bilateral 
contracts	 (Olmos	 and	 Pérez-Arriaga,	 2009).	 Tariffs	
for the cost of infrastructure instead should be paid 
based	on	booked	capacity	(€/kW	per	year)	or	lump-
sum	 (€	per	 year),	 computed	 separately	 for	 different	
types	 of	 grid	 users	 in	 different	 areas	 reflecting	 the	
impact	 on	 grid	 capacity	 requirements,	 and	 so	 that	
charges duly reflect the diverse characteristics of each 
power plant27. 
Transparency is an important principle for tarifi-
cation,	 also	 required	 by	 EU	 legislation	 (Regulation	
714/2009),	and	will	become	even	more	important	as	
the European energy market gets more integrated. 
However,	we	observe	a	lack	of	transparency	regarding	
the	elements	included	in	network	tariffs	(Sakhrani	et	
al.,	2010).	It	should	be	clearly	distinguished	between	
network	tariffs	(i.e.	costs	for	building	and	operating	
the grid) and other regulatory charges (e.g. including 
27	 In	fact,	charging	in	the	form	of	uniform	€/MW,	even	if	
it	does	not	distort	short-term	signals	in	the	commodity	market,	
runs	into	the	problem	of	charging	a	peak	load	plant,	which	oper-
ates	 only	 few	hundred	hours	per	 year,	 the	 same	 as	 a	 base	 load	
plant.	However,	charges	should	be	calculated	taking	into	account	
the	grid	user’s	characteristics;	i.e.	a	‘per-MW’	charge	for	a	genera-
tor	operating	a	nuclear	power	plant	would	differ	from	the	one	of	
a peak unit (i.e. low load-factor generator).
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renewable	 support,	 costs	 of	 regulatory	 authorities,	
etc.) with the last to be charged for independently 
from	 transmission	 tariffs	 in	 a	 clear	 and	 transparent	
manner. Costs covering e.g. balancing should be al-
located to the costs of electricity generation. Trans-
parency	in	tariff	composition	is	also	a	precondition	to	
undertake an analysis of the impact of heterogeneity 
and	 to	apply	necessary	regulation,	both	on	national	
and	EU	level.	
Thus, what could be the possible future role of the 
EU?
•	 A	 first	 area	 of	 harmonization	 concerning	 elec-
tricity	 transmission	 tariff	 structures	 shall	 be	 to	
increase	transparency,	i.e.	to	clearly	define	which	
cost	 components	 transmission	 tariffs	 should	
contain. They should only include cost related to 
transmission network infrastructure and exclude 
any other regulatory charges. This is a precondi-
tion to establish a level playing field for the grid 
users	in	different	countries.
•	 Second,	 it	 should	be	 ensured	 that	 the	 behavior	
of grid users in the competitive sector is not dis-
torted	 due	 to	 tarification,	 i.e.	 transmission	 tar-
iffs	 covering	 infrastructure	 costs	 should	not	 be	
charged based on energy transported but instead 
be	paid	based	on	booked	capacity	or	lump-sum,	
computed	 separately	 for	 different	 types	 of	 grid	
users	in	different	areas	so	that	charges	properly	
reflect the network-related relevant characteris-
tics of the network users.
•	 Third,	transmission	tariffs	should	be	allocated	as	
far as possible based on the principle of cost cau-
sality28.	Locational	signals	should	be	introduced.	
28  This applies also for the connection of new grid users. 
If	 the	distance	 to	 the	existing	grid	 is	 small,	 shallow	connection	
costs should be directly paid by the new user. If it is large and/
or if the new facility serves supply security or is e.g. a large-scale 
renewable	plant,	the	same	cost	allocation	as	for	the	existing	trans-
mission grid should be used.
Given	that	no	‘best	method’	to	be	used	has	been	
identified	yet,	we	do	not	recommend	a	harmo-
nization of the methodology applied to calculate 
locational	 signals.	 Instead,	 it	 is	 important	 that	
decentralized solutions applied consider the na-
tional system specificities and follow the above 
discussed principles (i.e. sound methodology 
based	 as	 far	 as	 possible	 on	 cost-causality,	 with	
ex-ante signals to especially new generators). The 
provision of time signals to improve the short-
term efficiency of the use of the existing grid 
should	be	considered,	too.	
•	 Finally,	in	order	to	give	economic	signals	to	gen-
erators,	 obviously	 a	 certain	 share	 of	 the	 tariff	
needs to be paid by generators. In order to avoid 
distortion	of	competition,	we	recommend	some	
further harmonization regarding the G-compo-
nent.	The	 EU	 should	 also	 fix	 an	 average	 share	
of	the	G/L	components;	thus,	introduce	a	mini-
mum	G-component,	too.
2// Are the existing EU instruments targeting cost 
allocation well designed to support adequate in-
vestment and competition? 
Probably not. 
The ITC is a well-established mechanism with a 
transparent methodology that has been applied for 
about	 ten	 years;	 it	 is	 a	 binding	 EU	 instrument	 ap-
plying	to	all	Member	States.	Its	major	success	was	to	
eliminate	“tariff	pancaking”	which	facilitates	efficient	
cross-border trade – and thus is an important step to-
wards	“2014”	–	whilst	simultaneously	 introducing	a	
financial	mechanism	for	compensating	TSOs	for	the	
costs incurred from cross-border flows. Neverthe-
less the current design of the ITC mechanism has a 
number of weaknesses that	hamper	the	effectiveness	
of the instrument. 
First,	the	methodologies used to calculate the cost of 
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losses and of making the existing infrastructure avail-
able have several limitations:
•	 The	“with-and-without	transit”	methodology	ap-
plied to determine costs of losses has a drawback 
in	the	definition	of	the	“without	scenarios”.	In	a	
hypothetic scenario without any transit the na-
tional	infrastructure	would	be	different	from	the	
one	 actually	 in	 place,	 which	 is	 not	 considered.	
Moreover,	given	 that	 the	definition	of	 transit	 is	
arbitrary,	the	“without	transit”	scenario	could	re-
sult	in	an	impossible	flow	pattern,	with	disastrous	
implications for the ITC calculation. And in ad-
dition,	 the	 algorithm	 to	 calculate	 the	 scenario	
without any transit depends on the location of 
political borders. This is somewhat problemati-
cal as power flows solely obey the laws of physics 
and	do	not	relate	to	administrative	borders	(FSR,	
2005;	Olmos	and	Pérez-Arriaga,	2007).
•	 According	 to	 Regulation	 714/2009,	 the	 inter-
TSO	mechanism	 should	 compensate	 TSOs	 for	
cost incurred for hosting cross-border flows,	but	
the methodology is based only on cross-border 
transaction.29	 While	 a	 cross-border	 flow	 is	 the	
measured	power	flow	that	crosses	the	borders,	a	
cross-border transaction is the power flow that 
affects	a	nation’s	grid	and	that	originates	or	ends	
in	 other	 grids.	Using	 the	 cross-border	 transac-
tionis	problematic	because	it	is	technically	hard,	
if	not	 impossible,	 to	 identify	 transit	 (while	 it	 is	
easy to calculate cross-border flows). There is 
not an indisputable method in order to define if 
the flows caused by a national or by international 
agents and several definitions of transit are pos-
29	 There	is	some	ambiguity	in	the	EU	regulation	between	
‘flow’	 and	 the	 ‘transaction’;	 in	 fact	 there	 is	 not	 a	 definition	 for	
‘hosting	cross-border	flows’.	Regulation	1228/2003	states	that	“the	
compensation shall be paid by the operators of national trans-
mission systems from which cross-border flows originate and the 
systems	where	those	flows	end”.
sible	(Stoilov	et	al.,	2011;	FSR,	2005).	
•	 The	 current	 ITC	 covers	 only	 selected	 network	
costs	(i.e.	infrastructure	and	losses),	e.g.	costs	for	
system	 services	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 scheme,	
although some stakeholders have provided ar-
guments for the inclusion of other types of costs 
(ETSO,	2006).
•	 Cost	allocation	is	determined	based	on	the	‘user-
pays	principle’.	The	implicit	assumption,	howev-
er,	that	those	who	use	the	new	transmission	asset	
are always the beneficiaries has to be proven.
•	 Methodologies	 used	 to	 calculate	 contributions	
into the fund and compensation payments are 
not	 coherent	 and,	 therefore,	 even	 though	 the	
individual	calculation	methods	are	 transparent,	
the link between who causes cost and who pays 
for	it	is	not	clear	(Stoilov	et	al.,	2011).	
Second,	the	ITC	has	been	designed	as	an	ex-post	in-
strument compensating for the costs incurred as a re-
sult of hosting cross-border flows. It does not take into 
account investments in new infrastructure. The ITC 
methodology is based on an analysis of past transit 
flows and does neither include any cost-benefit analy-
sis	for	new	projects,	nor	does	it	take	into	account	im-
portant	benefits	such	as	international	trade,	conges-
tion rents and reduced costs associated with security 
of	supply	or	maintenance	(Androcec	et	al.,	2011).	It	
does	not	have	any	link	with	the	EU	network	planning	
process (i.e. the ten-year network development plans 
published	every	two	years	by	ENTSO-E	based	on	na-
tional	investment	plans).	Besides,	the	current	size	of	
the	fund	with	€	100mn	is	very	small	compared	to	the	
expected cost necessary to support the development 
of	the	EU	electricity	network,	and	actually	also	com-
pared to the costs of existing infrastructure. 
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The allocation of cost for new infrastructures with 
cross-national	 impact,	 however,	 is	 a	 key	 aspect	 in	
the	context	of	the	2014/2020	targets,	where	interde-
pendence between regions is increasing. The more 
the	 energy	 sector	 is	 integrated,	 the	 larger	 will	 be	
externalities generated by new infrastructures. A 
trans-regional cost allocation mechanism that does 
not internalize them in a reasonable way will fail to 
generate adequate investment incentives in the net-
work on national level and can disturb competition 
among	agents	in	different	Member	States.	Still	today	
TSOs	basically	rely	on	bilateral	agreements	for	invest-
ments	in	new	cross-border	lines,	with	the	cost	in	gen-
eral	divided	equally	between	the	two	TSOs	involved	
(Supponen,	2011).	Bilateral	contracts	work	well	if	the	
main beneficiaries of the project are within the two 
countries,	which	historically	has	often	been	the	case	
for	interconnectors.	However,	with	the	creation	of	the	
internal	European	market,	 highly	meshed	networks	
and the integration of large-scale renewable genera-
tion,	 beneficiaries	 of	 transmission	 investments	 are	
increasingly located in several countries and projects 
are not equally desirable for all concerned parties. If 
more	than	two	stakeholders	are	involved	in	a	project,	
contracts	 become	 very	 complex.	 Thus, a common 
mechanism to determine cross-border payments 
for new investment is required where benefits are 
spread	 across	 regions	 (or	 even	 the	EU	 as	 a	whole).	
This mechanism should be linked to a planning pro-
cedure and allocate costs to beneficiaries taking into 
account	different	stakeholder	groups	and	also	exter-
nal	effects	(Hogan,	2011;	Riechmann,	2011).	See	also	
Box	 3	 for	 international	 experience	 regarding	 inter-
regional compensation mechanisms.
The proposed infrastructure package will address 
several of these issues; it actually has many good fea-
tures: The regulation asks for an ex-ante cost-allo-
cation method for new infrastructures “of common 
interest”.	It	is	worth	noting	that	these	infrastructures	
do	not	only	comprise	cross-border	lines,	but	also	na-
tional facilities that have an indirect impact on third 
Member	States.	The	underlying	 ex-ante	 cost-benefit	
analysis shall take into account possible externali-
ties.	 TSOs	 shall	 cooperate	 to	 develop	 the	 planning	
strategy while national regulators shall cooperate to 
allocate costs for PCIs. Network cost shall be paid 
through	 tariffs	 for	 network	 access	 and	 EU	 funding	
only be used for projects that are “commercially not 
viable”.	However,	besides	 the	 fact	 that	especially	 the	
quantification of benefits of grid expansions is not a 
trivial	exercise,	there	are	uncertainties	about	the	im-
plementation	and	effectiveness	of	 the	 infrastructure	
package. Several issues need to be addressed in order 
to remove eventual barriers for the successful imple-
mentation of PCIs: 
First,	 there	 is	 a	 legal barrier. National regulation 
does	not	allow	TSOs	to	include	investments	realized	
in	third	countries	 in	the	own	asset	base	(Supponen,	
2011).	An	illustrative	example	could	be	a	new	cable	
within Germany that might benefit mainly e.g. Po-
land	and	the	Netherlands.	However,	Polish	or	Dutch	
TSOs	might	first	not	be	allowed	to	invest	in	Germany	
and	second,	their	national	regulations	do	not	foresee	
the inclusion of any assets on foreign territory into 
their	 RAB.	One	 possible	 solution	 solving	 this	 issue	
could be the financing of respective infrastructures 
through	 a	 European	 tariff	 component.	 Supponen	
(2011)	also	proposes	an	alternative	solution,	namely	
the bundling of projects with trans-national interest 
into packages,	 which	 also	 will	 explicitly	 be	 allowed	
by	the	new	Regulation30.	 	Building	packages	of	pro-
jects that benefit all concerned stakeholders might 
30	 Southwest	Power	Pool	in	the	US	already	has	some	ex-
perience with a similar approach. Portfolios of grid investments 
are built such that they benefit each zone within the SPP region. 
Costs are recovered on a postage stamp basis. If a particular zone 
does	 not	 directly	 benefit	 from	 a	 portfolio,	 a	 proportion	 of	 its	
transmission cost responsibility is fold into the portfolio to en-
sure	that	benefits	exceed	overall	costs	for	all	zones.	See	also	Baker	
and	Gottstein	(2011)	for	more	details.	
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facilitate agreements for cost allocation. It is always 
easier	 to	allocate	 ‘positive	money’	 to	people	 than	to	
ask people to take money out of their pocket; the im-
plementability seems more promising in a win-win 
game.	However,	the	package	conception	itself	will	not	
allow us to completely by-pass the dispute over the 
individual	projects,	especially	given	the	fact	that	the	
projects	should	be	different	 in	scale,	 timing,	welfare	
distribution	 effect,	 etc.;	 the	key	 issue	will	 still	 lie	 in	
the implementation of sound cost-benefit analysis 
and allocation methods. There might also be the risk 
that projects are chosen such to find the ‘right bal-
ance’	among	different	TSOs	instead	of	looking	at	the	
maximized	overall	EU	benefit.
Second,	 the	 proposed	 Regulation	 specifies	 that	 in	
case the concerned national regulators do not reach 
an	agreement	on	an	investment	request,	ACER	“shall	
take	 decisions”	 regarding	 the	 allocation	 of	 costs	 as	
well as the on how these costs are reflected in the na-
tional	 tariffs.	This	decision	will	 be	 submitted	 to	 the	
Commission.	However,	it	is	not	clear	if	ACER	or	the	
Commission have the legal power to step over na-
tional regulators and to enforce decisions regarding 
cost	allocation,	the	regulation	of	national	TSOs,	and	
tariff	setting.
Third,	even	though	the	proposed	Regulation	says	that	
“national regulatory authorities shall ensure that ap-
propriate	incentives	are	granted”,	it	does	not	provide	
any stimulus to national regulators themselves to do 
it.	In	other	words,	if	the	regulators	do	not want to pro-
vide	 incentives	 to	TSOs	 to	 expand	 their	 grids,	 they	
are	not	forced	to	do	so,	and	if	they	want	to	give	incen-
tives,	 existing	 legislation	already	allows	 them	 to	do.	
In	 fact,	 the	 allocation	of	 costs	 is	 always	 prerogative	
of national regulators and it remains to be doubted 
whether national regulators will fully cooperate vol-
untarily	for	increasing	total	EU	welfare,	especially	in	
those cases where increasing interconnection capaci-
ty will have a substantial impact on consumer surplus 
due	to	rising	energy	prices.	Therefore,	an	important	
role	for	the	EU	could	be	to	incentivize	NRAs	rather	
than going into details about how regulators should 
incentivize	TSOs.	
Forth,	 congestion rents are not mentioned at all in 
the	proposed	 regulation.	However,	 congestion	 rents	
emerge	 due	 to	 bottlenecks	 at	 cross-border	 lines,	
which constitute a major reason for developing new 
infrastructure to accommodate cross-border ex-
change to the maximization of the total welfare for 
the	interconnected	countries.	Therefore,	these	should	
be taken into account in the cost-benefit allocation 
mechanism,	either	being	used	directly	to	pay	the	new	
infrastructure,	 as	 suggested	 by	 existing	 legislation,	
or	to	reduce	national	tariffs,	to	compensate	the	least	
benefitting	 Member	 States	 for	 contributing	 in	 the	
construction of the new infrastructure. 
Finally,	 the	 incremental cost allocation as proposed 
in the infrastructure package is not economically 
sustainable	 in	 the	 long-term.	With	 every	 new	 asset	
the impact of former investment projects on stake-
holders	will	 change,	which	 is	especially	 true	 for	 the	
electricity sector. If we would like to make a compre-
hensive	 optimal	 planning	 for	 the	EU	grid,	we	need	
to have a vision of the optimal plan in terms of both 
space (regardless geographical boundaries) and time 
(regardless the order of the investment). A portfolio 
of	 investment	projects,	as	already	mentioned	above,	
actually could avoid the cost-benefit analysis on sin-
gle	projects,	which	can	be	seriously	biased	by	the	se-
quence of the investment projects. 
Thus, what could be the possible future role of the 
EU?
The current ITC mechanism only allocates cost re-
sulting from hosting cross-border flows of electricity. 
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It	was	successful	in	abolishing	‘tariff	pancaking’,	but	it	
was not designed and it is not adequate to allocate the 
costs for new and expensive large transmission infra-
structure	projects.	However,	to	ensure	market	integra-
tion	and	the	move	towards	a	decarbonized	economy,	
the timely realization of projects of regional interest 
is key. A sound cost allocation method is needed. The 
proposed infrastructure package is an important step 
into this direction; nevertheless we identified poten-
tial barriers for its successful implementation. There-
fore,	we	provide	the	following	recommendations:
•	 The role of ACER and the Commission regard-
ing the enforcement of the development of PCIs 
and in the inclusion of the respective costs into 
the	national	tariffs	needs to be clarified. In ad-
dition,	given	the	uneven	distribution	of	benefits	
among stakeholders arising from increased in-
terconnection capacities and the concern that 
national regulators tend to protect consumers 
from	 rising	 prices,	 effective	 means	 have	 to	 be	
found to incentivize NRAs to support the de-
velopment	 of	 identified	 priority	 projects.	 One	
option could be the harmonization of regulatory 
decision	making	by	forcing	NRAs	to	strictly	con-
sider pan-European (instead of national) ben-
efits.	However,	 this	very	strong	solution	will	be	
difficult to implement. Similar outcomes can be 
achieved by ensuring the definition and applica-
tion of sound ex-ante cost-benefit analysis and 
allocation methods overcoming the problems 
identified above and supporting the implemen-
tation	 of	 an	 EU-wide	 transmission	 expansion	
plan. 
•	 The	EU	should	call	for	the	removal of the legal 
barriers that might impede grid investments 
where strong geographical asymmetries in costs 
(i.e. investment needs) and benefits occur. It is 
necessary that third parties can invest where in-
cumbent	 TSOs	 do	 not	 show	 interest	 to	 realize	
identified priority projects (see also the above 
notice on competitive tendering in Chapter 3.4). 
Those who wish to take action should not be 
forbidden	 to	do	so.	Actually,	as	a	positive	 side-
effect	of	such	a	regime,	the	need	for	ex-ante	cost-
benefit allocation arrangements for such projects 
would be reduced. 
•	 Regarding	the	existing ITC,	the	EU	should	con-
sider adaptations of the methodology applied 
to	 compensate	 TSOs	 for	 the	 costs	 occurring	
from hosting cross-border flows of electricity in 
order to overcome drawbacks identified above. 
Box 2: International experience with inter-regional compensation mechanisms 
US practice in a nutshell
The US electricity market is separated into three non-
synchronized zones: the Western and Eastern Inter-
connection and the Electricity Reliability Council in 
Texas. Within the Interconnections, there are several 
electricity markets operated by Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Opera-
tors (ISOs). To facilitate the comparison with the EU, 
the Eastern Interconnection is electrically of the same 
order of magnitude as the EU-27 and RTOs can be lik-
ened to large EU Member States. The US has not yet 
developed cost allocation rules or planning proce-
dures at interconnection level. A recent 
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MIT study (MIT, 2011) advocates for interconnection-
level planning and cost allocation, and stronger fed-
eral siting powers. The network belongs to several 
transmission owners (TOs) for each market. FERC regu-
lates the wholesale market and interstate transmission 
while retail markets, intrastate transmission and cost 
approval of new transmission infrastructure are with 
individual state regulation.
Most ISOs and RTOs use a hybrid approach for inter-
state cost allocation, spreading some cost over peak 
MW to load while other costs are allocated to benefi-
ciaries using flow-based methods. Individual practices 
vary widely across the country. Costs might – at least 
in part – be allocated based on the principle of cost 
causality (e.g. New York ISO, Midwest ISO) or social-
ized among a larger consumer group (e.g. Southwest 
Power Pool, where projects that benefit customers on 
a regional basis are combined to a portfolio and the 
respective costs of an implemented balanced port-
folio are recovered through a postage stamp kind of 
tariff; see Baker and Gottstein (2011) for more details). 
FERC Order 1000, issued in July 2011, supports cost 
allocation to actual beneficiaries; it requires transmis-
sion providers to participate in a regional transmission 
planning process that has a regional cost allocation 
method for the cost of new transmission facilities se-
lected in a regional transmission plan. Cost allocation 
methods can be developed decentrally in the indi-
vidual regions, but have to satisfy a number of cost-
causality-related principles (FERC, 2011). 
PJM as a case study
PJM Interconnection is an RTO in the Eastern Intercon-
nection for the area from Chicago to the east coast (in-
cluding 13 States and D.C.) and covers a market with 
58 million people and a peak demand of about 158 
GW. Its responsibility is to ensure reliability within the 
control zone, the operation of the wholesale market, 
planning of generation and transmission for reliability, 
and independent and neutral system operation (PJM, 
2011). TOs cooperate with PJM in the planning process 
(Regional Transmission Expansion Plan - RTEP). The 
interstate system planning is regulated by FERC but 
transmission tariffs are recovered on state level. This 
requires a sound set of rules for cost allocation among 
states as the investment costs have to be approved by 
state regulators. 
For the interstate cost allocation, PJM distinguishes 
reliability from economic upgrades. For reliability up-
grades the costs of line upgrades are allocated to load:
• For lines 500 kV and above, costs are socialized 
with each state paying according to its share in 
peak load;
•	 For	lines	below	500	kV,	a	flow-based	method	once	
determines a cost distribution factor for each state 
which considers the contribution to flows on the 
constrained facilities;
•	 Cross-border	investments	between	PJM	and	MISO	
(two RTOs) are also allocated regarding their con-
tribution to flows on the line.
For economic upgrades, other methods like monetary 
metrics can be applied. However if the benefit-to-cost 
ratio exceeds a certain value (e.g. 1.25) the upgrade 
is included in the RTEP and is treated like reliability 
upgrades. Thus, in the PJM market cost allocation be-
tween states is connected to the transmission plan-
ning and its methodology decided based on the char-
acteristics of the transmission line (PJM, 2010). 
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5. Transmission grid tarification 
in the natural gas sector
This chapter addresses transmission grid tarifica-
tion in the natural gas sector. Similar questions will 
be asked as in the previous discussion on transmis-
sion	 tariff	 design	 for	 electricity.	 However,	 answers	
might	differ	 since	 these	 two	commodities	 and	 their	
markets,	besides	many	similarities,	show	a	number	of	
substantial	differences	as	has	been	pointed	out	also	in	
Chapter	1.	When	investigating	concrete	issues	related	
to	 gas	 transmission	 tariff	 structures	 and	 the	 poten-
tial	need	for	EU	involvement	and	harmonization	we	
highlight these factors explicitly. 
5.1   Introduction 
As	 already	 introduced	 above,	 (regulated)	 transmis-
sion	tariffs	have	the	role	to	recover	the	TSOs’	regulat-
ed costs and to allocate costs to grid users. Entry- and 
exit charges thus need to be designed such that the 
sum	of	ex-ante	set	tariffs	applied	to	transported	vol-
umes and auction revenues originating from the allo-
cation of interconnector capacities approach as much 
as	possible	the	expected,	allowed	revenue.	Tariffs	can	
further be used to provide valuable economic signals. 
Our	analysis	again	focuses	on	the	design	of	tarifica-
tion in the sense of tariff structures,	rather	than	tariff	
levels,	which	are	treated	in	Chapter	3.	
The following aspects are relevant for the design of 
natural	gas	transmission	tariffs	in	order	to	achieve	the	
above introduced efficiency-related objectives:
1 - Ensure adequate investments:
•	 The	key	 factor	determining	TSOs’	 incentives	 to	
invest	 in	 the	 grid	 is	 the	 allowed	 rate-of-return,	
as has been discussed in-depth above. The tar-
iff structure,	in	turn,	can	have	an	impact	on	grid	
investments in the sense that locational signals 
to grid users can support efficient up- and down-
stream investments and thus are a relevant factor 
for the minimization of overall system cost.
2 - Avoid any distortions in competition:
•	 A	bad	design	of	 transmission	 tariffs	 and	diver-
gent regulatory practices might hamper com-
petition	 and	 efficient	 (cross-border)	 trade,	 e.g.	
due to the incompatibility of capacity products 
offered	 in	 neighboring	 countries,	 charges	 that	
are designed such that they distort the market 
behavior	in	the	commodity	market,	etc.
Analogously	to	the	previous	chapters,	we	investigate	
whether (i) the current heterogeneity in regulatory 
practices regarding natural gas transmission tarifica-
tion hampers adequate investments into the grid or 
distorts	competition	and,	if	yes,	(ii)	whether	further	
EU	involvement	and	harmonization	beyond	current	
legislation are required.
5.2 Current regulatory practice
The regulation of tarification in the natural gas sec-
tor is under national responsibility and a certain de-
cision	power	also	is	with	TSOs	themselves.	This	de-
centralized decision making has resulted in a wide 
heterogeneity	 in	 current	practices.	 In	 the	 following,	
we summarize key parameters of the current regu-
lation of natural gas transmission grid tarification 
and	highlight	differences	among	Member	States.	For	
more	details	 see	Kema/Rekk	(2009),	and	TSOs’	and	
regulators’	websites.
The	Third	 Package	 sets	 the	 rules	 for	 an	 obligatory,	
EU-wide,	decoupled	entry-exit	system.	Shippers	can	
book entry- and/or exit capacities independently and 
pay separate entry- and exit charges for grid usage. 
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Trade within one entry-exit zone (i.e. a zone of a sin-
gle price for the commodity) shall be completely flex-
ible. The calculation of network charges on the basis 
of	contractual	paths	(point-to-point	model)	won’t	be	
allowed	anymore.	Nevertheless,	persisting	heteroge-
neity regarding the stage of implementation and the 
concrete design of this model of tarification for natu-
ral gas transmission grid access can still create some 
obstacles to efficient (cross-border) trade and func-
tioning competition: 
First, flexibility of the decoupled entry-exit system 
in some Member States is reduced due to several 
reasons. Some countries still distinguish between 
domestic transport (applying the entry-exit model) 
and transit flows (applying distance-related point-
to-point models where entry- and exit capacities are 
coupled,	 which	 in	 turn	 reduces	market	 liquidity	 as	
compared to a system concentrated around a single 
(virtual) hub). This problem will disappear since with 
the	implementation	of	the	Third	Package,	the	calcula-
tion	of	network	tariffs	based	on	contractual	paths	will	
not	be	foreseen	anymore	(see	R715/2009	Art.	13(1)).	
Flexibility is further reduced if regions (or even 
Member	States)	are	divided	into	several	market	areas	
even	though	the	absence	of	any	technical	reasons,	i.e.	
where the networks are connected with each other 
and	also	gas	quality	does	not	differ.	The	recent	past	
has already seen a move towards a reduction in the 
number of sub-national market areas; e.g. in Germa-
ny,	their	number	has	fallen	from	19	in	2006	to	two	in	
2011.	In	France,	the	gas	market	has	seen	a	reduction	
of	zones	from	seven	(2003)	to	three	(2009).	And	also	
for	Belgium,	where	currently	four	prize	zones	exist,	a	
merger to a single entry-exit zone covering the whole 
country is under consideration. 
Second,	only a part of the countries have introduced 
transmission tariffs that are differentiated by loca-
tion	 via	 distinct	 entry-	 and	 exit	 charges	 (e.g.	 UK).	
The	 absence	 of	 locational	 signals,	 however,	 implies	
that	transmission	tariffs	do	not	adequately	reflect	the	
costs caused by grid users and that instead costs are 
socialized. This in turn results in an inefficient infra-
structure use and the possibility of actively providing 
locational signals for feed-in and/or load is missed. 
This will be less consequential for small price zones; 
however,	 a	 well-interconnected	 system	with	 several	
alternative sources of supply and maybe even some 
flexibility in flow directions could clearly benefit from 
locational signals.  
Third,	there	is	heterogeneity regarding the splitting 
of costs (allowed revenue) between entry- and exit 
points. A number of countries apply a sharing rate 
of	50:50	(e.g.	Italy,	UK)31.		In	Portugal,	tariffs	are	cal-
culated based on long-run average incremental costs 
using a simplified model of the transmission system 
with	a	resulting	entry-exit	split	of	26:74.	Belgium	al-
locates	 only	 fixed	 costs,	 equaling	 about	 15%	 of	 the	
total	allowed	revenue,	to	entry	points	using	a	system	
‘km-equivalents’	where	an	average	distance	of	136km	
is taken into account for domestic trade and actual 
distances for transit flows32.	The	Czech	Republic	ac-
tively wants to promote imports and market entry 
and therefore applies a cost split between border en-
try-	and	exit	points	of	22:78.	
31	 A	part	of	the	entry-	and	exit	capacities	 in	the	UK	are	
allocated	via	auctions.	Reserve	prices	are	calculated	based	on	the	
long-run marginal costs of transporting the gas from and to these 
points at peak conditions (using the distance from each entry 
point to the system reference node and respectively from the ref-
erence	node	to	the	exit	point).	Revenues	are	adjusted	through	an	
additional (transmission owner) commodity charge to (i) main-
tain	 the	50:50	split	and	(ii)	 to	ensure	a	minimum	reserve	price	
and cost-recovery.
32 The allowed revenue is divided by the total amount of 
capacity	and	the	km-network-length,	resulting	in	a	‘basic	cost	per	
unit	of	transmission’	of	0.147	€/(m³/h)/km.	There	is	one	unified	
tariff	 for	 all	 entry	 points	 representing	 15%	of	 the	 total	 budget,	
or	41	km-equivalents,	of	6	€/m³/h.	For	entry/exit	between	zones,	
the transported distance is multiplied by the per-unit-costs. For 
border	exit	points,	a	charge	of	2	€/m³/h	and	for	domestic	supply	
exit	points	a	charge	of	14	€/m³/h	apply.
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The breakdown of costs between entry- and exit 
points mainly has an impact on the possibility to use 
those charges to set locational signals through grid 
use	tariffs,	i.e.	in	an	extreme	situation	where	the	full	
costs are recovered through exit charges (similar to a 
zero-G-charge	system	in	the	electricity	sector),	there	
is no room for any incentive setting on the supply 
side.	However,	 in	 contrast	 to	 electricity,	 natural	 gas	
production to a much larger extent takes place far 
from	the	consumption	centers	(the	EU-27	incl.	Nor-
way	and	Switzerland	faced	40%	import	dependency	
on	a	Member	State	level	in	2010;	see	BP,	2011);	on	av-
erage,	a	cubic	meter	of	gas	passes	two	borders	before	
final	consumption.	Thus,	congestion	at	entry	points	
can be a very relevant issue. 
Fourth,	similar	to	the	electricity	sector,	varying im-
portance is given to capacity- and commodity-
based tariff components (see Figure 6). These shares 
also vary within countries by consumer type (e.g. for 
Hungary	between	60-80%),	depending	on	contracted	
volume,	maximum	capacity	use	and	load	factor	(see	
ERGEG	 (2007)	 for	 some	 numeric	 examples).	 Fur-
thermore,	it	is	not obvious which cost components 
are included in the commodity charge.	In	Italy,	for	
example,	the	capacity	charge	shall	cover	capital	costs	
(depreciation and remuneration on invested capital) 
while the commodity charge shall cover operating 
costs;	 fuel	 gas	 is	 provided	 by	 shippers.	 Some	TSOs	
require the network users to compensate for the cor-
responding volumes of fuel gas and/or shrinkage (e.g. 
UK)	whereas	others	apply	separate	charges	(e.g.	Ire-
land).	Only	for	a	number	of	countries,	these	costs	are	
part	 of	 the	 basic	 transmission	 tariffs	 (e.g.	 Belgium,	
where	 the	 commodity	 charge	 of	 around	 5%	 covers	
the fuel gas).
Figure 7: Split between capacity- and commodity-based components in gas transmission tariffs
Source: Kema/Rekk (2009)
Finally,	 there	 is	 wide heterogeneity regarding the 
capacity products offered	and	their	pricing.	Besides	
conventional	 longer-term	 capacity	 products,	 inter-
ruptible capacity	 is	 offered	 by	most	TSOs;	 however,	
mainly applied to inter-zonal trade and natural gas 
storage and production sites. Prices depend on the 
probability of interruption with a typical discount of 
about	10-30%	(even	much	larger	variance).	Non-phys-
ical backhaul capacity33	is	only	offered	by	the	minority	
of	TSOs.	It	may	be	offered	for	firm	and/or	interrupt-
33	 	Backhaul	capacity	=	capacity	into	the	opposite	than	the	
physical flow direction.
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ible products; pricing mechanisms vary considerably 
including e.g. a discount on the price of the respective 
physical	product,	auctioning	(UK),	or	no	charge	at	all	
(Portugal).	Inefficient	pricing,	contractual	congestion	
and a lack of non-physical backhaul capacities ham-
per efficient cross-border trade and the completion 
of the internal market. The heterogeneity in capacity 
products	offered	also	has	several	implications	for	the	
functioning	of	the	market.	Besides	increased	transac-
tion	costs,	a	mismatch	of	capacities	available	on	both	
sides of a zonal border might result in additional ‘ca-
pacity	hoarding’	since	shippers	need	to	contract	more	
capacity than they physically need. This obviously be-
comes even more consequential as congestion (physi-
cal but also contractual) is a problem at many cross-
border points.
5.3 Current EU involvement and har-
monization
The	 current	 EU	 involvement	 in	 the	 tarification	 of	
natural gas transmission infrastructures includes the 
specification	of	general,	qualitative,	underlying	prin-
ciples	for	grid	tariffs	and	third	party	access,	the	obli-
gation	to	apply	decoupled	entry-exit	systems,	as	well	
as the possibility to grant exemptions for major new 
infrastructures	from	tariff	control.	See	Table	4	for	fur-
ther details. 
Table 4: Current EU involvement regarding the tarification of natural gas transmission infrastructure
Form Rules regarding: Details
Definition of general 
underlying principles
Tariffs for network ac-
cess
R715/2009, Art 13(1): 
“… shall be transparent, take into account need for system integrity and its im-
provement and reflect the actual costs incurred, insofar as such costs correspond 
to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator, whilst 
including an appropriate return on investments, and, where appropriate, taking 
account of the benchmarking of tariffs […] … shall be applied in a non-discrimina-
tory manner […] … tariffs may also be determined through market-based arrange-
ments, such as auctions […] … shall facilitate efficient gas trade and competition, 
while at the same time avoiding cross-subsidies between network users and 
providing incentives for investment and maintaining or creating interoperability 
for transmission networks”
Capacity products of-
fered
R715/2009, Art. 14(1): TSOs shall provide both firm and interruptible TPA; both 
short- and long-term services
R715/2009, Art. 14(2): Transport contracts signed with non-standard start dates 
or a shorter duration than a standard annual transport contract shall not result in 
arbitrarily higher or lower tariffs 
Voluntary guidelines of 
good practice
E.g. on use of exemptions, balancing, or open season procedures
[Developed by NRAs (through CEER and ERGEG) to assist in practical implementa-
tion of principles set out in legislation; NRAs monitor and report on MS’s compli-
ance]
Harmonization with 
respect to the choice 
of regulatory instru-
ments
Decoupled entry-exit 
system
R715/2009, Art. 13(1): 
“Tariffs for network users shall be non-discriminatory and set separately for every 
entry point into or exit point out of the transmission system […] By 3 September 
2011, the MS shall ensure that, after a transitional period, network charges shall 
not be calculated on the basis of contract paths”
Exemptions for major 
new infrastructures 
from tariff control
D2009/73/EC, Art. 36: 
Major new infrastructures (interconnectors, LNG, gas storage facilities) may be 
exempted for a defined period of time from tariff control through NRAs (as well 
as from other provisions, not directly related to tarification, see above)
EU instrument - / -
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5.4 Recommendations regarding the 
future role of the EU
1// Does the current heterogeneity in tariff struc-
tures hamper adequate investments? 
Probably not. Adequate investments into transporta-
tion	 infrastructures	 might	 be	 challenged,	 however,	
by the substantial uncertainty regarding the future 
role of natural gas in a decarbonized economy and 
thus about demand and infrastructure needs. See e.g. 
EC	 (2010b)	 illustrating	 alternative	 gas	demand	 sce-
narios	up	to	2030.	Hence,	getting	downstream	utili-
ties involved in the realization of large-scale supply 
infrastructures to make them financeable is one key 
issue.	 Yet,	 we	 do	 not	 see	 any	 active	 role	 of	 the	 EU	
here.	Required	expansions	of	the	European	network	
– both national grids and cross-border infrastruc-
tures	–	should	be	less	problematic:	First,	measures	to	
reduce	and	prevent	contractual	congestion,	which	is	
much more relevant for most interconnection points 
than	physical	congestion	(see	also	CIEP,	2009),	need	
to	be	fostered.	Second,	an	adequate	regulation	of	TSO	
revenues as discussed in Chapter 3 will provide the 
right incentives to reinforce the grid and invest in 
new	supply	infrastructures.	Third,	the	complexity	of	
projects	involving	more	than	one	TSO	is	much	lower	
than in the electricity sector since commodity flows 
can	be	measured	and	controlled.	This	makes	regional,	
multi-lateral agreements regarding the allocation of 
costs	 feasible.	 In	 addition,	 the	 issue	of	 supply	 secu-
rity seems to be treated quite well through bilateral 
agreements	 and	Regulation	994/2010,	 and	 investors	
are compensated for those investments that show 
substantial	positive	externalities.	The	role	of	 the	EU	
here should be limited to monitor and accelerate the 
implementation	and	enforcement	of	 this	Regulation	
and to support regional cooperation via e.g. mediat-
ing	between	NRAs’	with	diverging	(i.e.	national)	in-
terests.
One	issue,	however,	might	become	more	relevant	in	
the longer-term perspective when market areas are 
further merged into larger prize zones and the num-
ber of bi-directional pipelines rises. In well inter-
connected	 systems	 with	 liquid	 markets,	 alternative	
supply	 sources	 and	 well-functioning	 competition,	
price	differentiation	among	entry-	and	exit	points	re-
flecting the costs caused by system users can provide 
valuable locational signals and reduce the share of 
costs socialized among all customers. Two issues have 
to	be	noted,	however:	First,	the	impact	of	locational	
signals	 will	 be	 quite	 limited.	 For	 upstream	 players,	
other factors (such as the geographical location of gas 
sources	or	the	availability	of	potential	new	LNG	sites)	
in	many	 situations	might	 be	more	 decisive.	On	 the	
downstream	side,	only	a	small	sub-set	of	consumers	
has some flexibility regarding the siting decision. Sec-
ond,	efficient	economic	signals	indicating	bottlenecks	
can be derived also from allocating cross-border 
transmission	capacity	through	auctions,	as	has	been	
proposed	by	ENTSO-G	recently	in	the	draft	network	
code on capacity allocation mechanisms. 
2// Does the current heterogeneity of regulatory 
practices distort competition? 
(2-1)  From (sub-) national entry-exit zones to a 
pan-European price zone?
There are more than 30 entry-exit zones whose size 
tends to be based on administrative borders rather 
than	technical	or	economic	considerations.	Typically,	
a	price	zone	coincides	with	an	‘operating	zone’	man-
aged	by	a	certain	TSO	and	reflecting	the	historically	
developed market structure with national (or even 
sub-national)	 grid	 operators.	Thus,	 they	 are	 not	 all	
of an ‘optimal size’	and	the	process	of	merging	mar-
ket areas continues to be an issue. Given the policy 
goal	of	achieving	a	single	European	gas	market,	larger	
zones	have	some	obvious	advantages,	such	as	an	in-
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crease	 in	market	 liquidity	 and	possibilities	 to	 trade,	
increased	short-term	trade	and	price	alignment,	and	
the reduction of price distortions due to contractual 
(and	price)	pancaking	(see	also	Glachant,	2011).
Of	course,	one	single	pan-European	price	zone	theo-
retically	is	possible,	though	not	necessarily	desirable	
since an increase in the size of market areas entails 
various	 drawbacks,	 too.	The	 creation	 of	 large	 price	
zones,	leads	to	economic	inefficiencies:	(i)	first, intra-
zonal constraints are not subject to different prices any-
more and re-dispatching and/or countertrading man-
aged	 by	 the	 TSO	 are	 required	 instead.	Thus,	 prices	
become less cost-reflective; the costs of congestion 
are socialized among a larger number of grid users 
and;	 cross-subsidies	 increase.	 With	 an	 increase	 in	
the	size	of	a	price	zone,	less	locational	signals	reveal-
ing capacity constraints will therefore be provided. 
See	LECG	(2011)	 for	an	 in-depth	discussion	of	 this	
phenomenon as well as of further market distortions 
resulting from persistent intra-zonal constraints; (ii) 
second,	within	the	new	price	zone,	the free allocation 
of capacities shall still be sustained at the same time 
that supply security and system stability are main-
tained.	There	are	technical	constraints	for	offering	de-
coupled entry- and exit capacities; an increase in the 
size of the market area means that further bottlenecks 
and	possible	flow	scenarios	will	be	included,	which	in	
turn reduces available firm transport capacities. Past 
mergers	 actually	 have	 led	 to	 a	 reduction	 of	 offered	
capacities	 at	 entry-	 or	 exit	 points	 (see	Thyssengas,	
2011)	or	 the	 transfer	of	 former	firm	 into	 interrupt-
ible capacities34;	 	 (iii)	 and	 third,	 combining	market	
areas	operated	by	different	TSOs	probably	will	result	
in additional costs resulting from an increased need 
of cooperation. 
34	 See	ICIS/Heren	(2011)	 for	recent	experiences	 in	Ger-
many	after	 the	merger	of	 the	Thyssengas	H-Gas,	Thyssengas	L-
Gas,	Open	Grid	Europe	L-Gas	and	the	NCG	market	areas	in	April	
2011.
Therefore,	 the	 further	merging	of	market	areas	 into	
regional zones has to be evaluated with care and on a 
case-by-case basis to see whether the economic ben-
efits	 in	the	form	of	 increased	market	 liquidity,	trad-
ing	flexibility,	etc.	–	which	might	be	quite	difficult	to	
quantify	(see	also	CIEP,	2011)	–	outweigh	the	above	
listed	 drawbacks.	 Since	 system	 architecture,	 supply	
and demand patters as well as contracting practices 
and	institutional	design	differ	across	Europe,	there	is	
not one optimal size in terms of geographic dimen-
sions	or	other	descriptive	factors.	In	any	case,	bound-
aries of price zones should reflect the technical and 
economic conditions rather than political borders. 
Besides,	further	emphasis	needs	to	be	put	on	comple-
mentary	means	fostering	the	internal	market,	namely	
an efficient design of capacity allocation mechanisms 
and congestion management procedures at intercon-
nection points.  
Merging price zones will obviously result in fewer 
available entry- and exit points. System operation 
has to be managed either under the lead of one inde-
pendent regional system operator or in close coopera-
tion	between	the	respective	TSOs.	Once	market	areas	
are	combined,	there	are	alternative	ways,	how	system	
operation	and	tarification	can	be	organized,	namely	
maintaining	 individual	TSOs’	 tarification	autonomy	
or moving to a new system of common tarification: 
(1)	 Maintaining	 individual	 TSOs’	 tarification	 au-
tonomy	 (“German	 model”): The German experi-
ence of merging market areas has not resulted in any 
harmonization of tarification among the concerned 
TSOs	but	instead	left	them	full	autonomy	in	tariff	set-
ting within the boundaries of the national regulatory 
scheme.	Each	TSO	collects	charges	to	recover	his	reg-
ulated costs from his remaining points; no monetary 
transfer occurs. The regulatory authority did not keep 
a fixed entry-exit split which allows for a more flex-
ible	tariff	allocation.	This	model	has	developed	out	of	
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the	historical	situation	with	TSOs	being	responsible	
for	 tariff	 setting.	Actually,	minimizing	 the	 need	 for	
inter-TSO	cooperation	and	coordination,	and	avoid-
ing	any	harmonization	of	tariff	design,	this	solution	
has been the easiest to implement. 
This	approach	has	two	basic	 implications.	First,	 tar-
iff	values	in	concrete	interconnection	points	may	be	
considerably	different	depending	on	 the	underlying	
tarification	systems	which	might	differ	 in	entry-exit	
split,	relevance	of	capacity-	and	commodity	charges,	
etc.	Second,	due	to	the	necessity	to	recover	the	costs	
from	 the	 smaller	 number	 of	 points	 post-merger,	 it	
results in substantial price increases at some entry 
and/or	 exit	 points.	Hence,	 there	might	 be	 points	 at	
which	different	TSOs	hold	capacities	and	the	level	of	
charges	differs	among	these	TSOs.	This	is	less	conse-
quential as long as there is some congestion at these 
points.	However,	 as	 soon	 as	TSOs	 actively	 compete	
for	customers,	those	who	have	to	allocate	higher	costs	
to specific points are in a competitive disadvantage. 
Second,	 shippers	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 gain	 access	 to	 a	
larger	market	area;	on	the	other,	however,	they	have	
to pay higher prices. This is especially unattractive 
for	those	shippers	who	only	transport	gas	to	specific,	
near-to-the-border destinations. A re-distribution of 
cost bearing occurs.
(2) System of common tarification: An alternative op-
tion involves a complete restructuring of the system 
of	 tarification.	 In	 a	 first	 step,	 involved	TSOs	would	
aggregate	 their	 allowed	 revenues.	Then,	 based	 on	 a	
common	system	of	tarification,	these	would	be	allo-
cated	to	the	remaining	entry-	and	exit	points.	Obvi-
ously,	this	procedure	involves	an	agreement	regarding	
a	common	design	of	 tariff	structures	and	principles	
of capacity allocation and congestion management. 
Tariffs	could	either	be	centrally	collected	by	one	re-
sponsible	party	(e.g.	a	selected	TSO	or	a	trustee)	and	
redistributed	to	all	TSOs	according	to	ex-ante	speci-
fied rules (i.e. in proportion to their share in the to-
tal allowed revenue) or they could be collected by all 
individual	TSOs	 for	 their	 respective	entry-	and	exit	
points	and,	based	on	periodical	comparisons	of	target	
and actual revenues monetary transfers would make 
sure	that	each	TSO	achieves	cost	recovery35. 
The implementation of such a new pricing scheme 
would	 lead	 to	 certain	 price	 shifts	 among	 different	
points;	some	customers	might	be	worse	off	(e.g.	they	
might have benefitted from amortized infrastructures 
within their original smaller area but after a merger 
might have to pay for new grids now part of the en-
larged price zone). The major challenge of introduc-
ing	 a	 system	 of	 common	 tarification,	 which	 would	
be desirable in order to avoid the above presented 
drawbacks	of	a	system	of	individual	TSOs	with	tari-
fication	autonomy,	is	to	find	an	agreement	regarding	
a common method. Such a harmonization apparently 
implies	that	the	concerned	TSOs	have	to	find	a	com-
promise on the most suited approach and it can be 
expected	 that	 this	won’t	be	an	easy-to-treat	 ‘all-win’	
situation.	In	addition,	the	common	tariff	setting	will	
abolish	the	possibility	for	single	TSOs	to	compete	for	
customers	 through	 offering	more	 attractive	 pricing	
arrangements.    
Thus, what could be the possible future role for the 
EU?
•	 The	EU should set principles for determining 
the ideal size of entry-exit zones, but let con-
cerned NRAs and TSOs agree on the result. As 
discussed	above,	the	optimal	model	will	involve	
35	 Remark:	This	mechanism	 should	 not	 be	 called	 inter-
TSO	compensation	mechanism	(ITC)	 since	 this	 term	 is	 closely	
related to the existing instrument used in the electricity sector 
to	compensate	TSOs	for	costs	related	to	cross-border	flows.	The	
here	described	procedure	is	much	less	complex,	involving	mainly	
the collection and re-distribution of money according to rules 
that can much more easily be specified and agreed on ex-ante.
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a number of regional (not one single pan-Euro-
pean)	price	zones,	with	the	efficient	boundaries	
being dependent on regional specifics (system 
architecture,	supply-	and	demand	patterns,	etc.).	
In	 any	 case,	 boundaries	 of	 price	 zones	 should	
reflect the technical and economic conditions 
rather than political borders; mergers of market 
areas shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
based on expected economic benefits and costs. 
This	can	best	be	done	by	the	concerned	NRAs	in	
close	cooperation	with	the	respective	TSOs	since	
these are endued with the required deep under-
standing of system functioning. 
•	 Once	market	 areas	 are	merged,	 there	 are	 good	
economic reasons to implement a system of 
common	 tarification,	 thus,	 to	 harmonize	 tariff	
design within the enlarged price zone. The role 
for	 the	EU	should	be	 limited	 to	 support	 sound	
agreements between the respective stakeholders 
(e.g. as a kind of mediator during negotiations 
on which tarification system to implement) and 
to formulate principles of coordination. The ac-
tual implementation of harmonization of tar-
iff	 structures	 and	definition	of	 a	mechanism	 to	
compensate	 TSOs	 can	 be	 managed	 at	 regional	
level. A European-wide harmonization goes too 
far with costs (e.g. non-consideration of regional 
specifics,	 transaction	costs	of	negotiations,	etc.)	
probably	exceeding	the	benefits.	It	shall	be	noted,	
however,	that	this	approach	where	all	customers	
of a market area pay for the aggregated costs of 
the	TSOs	evokes	the	question	of	a	need	to	har-
monize	 also	 the	 underlying	 regulation	 of	 TSO	
revenues. 
(2-2) Barriers to efficient competition
There are some probable barriers to efficient com-
petition.	First,	 the	existence	of	 this	 large	number	of	
entry-exit	 zones	 implies	 tariff	 pancaking.	 It	 has	 to	
be reminded that in contrast to the electricity sec-
tor,	where	 the	 ‘copper	plate	paradigm’	has	 been	 ac-
cepted	as	a	basis	for	transmission	pricing	in	Europe,	
natural gas is transported over long distances and the 
commodity typically passes several entry-exit zones 
before being delivered to final consumers as already 
mentioned	above.	Furthermore,	 the	grid	 is	substan-
tially less meshed with mainly uni-directional flows 
that are well controllable and assignable to shippers. 
Hence,	 transmission	 tariffs	 completely	 independent	
of the transported distance are not legitimated here 
and instead the pancaking in principle does make 
sense to reflect the cost of transportation that increas-
es with distance. 
Regarding	 ‘price pancaking’,	 the	conclusion	of	 suc-
cessive contracts would be unproblematic from an 
economic perspective as long as charges are cost-
reflective	and	theoretically,	the	sum	of	all	entry-	and	
exit charges would equal the transmission charge that 
would have to be paid if there was one pan-European 
price	 zone.	However,	 this	 is	 not	 fully	 given	 in	 real-
ity	 since	 tariffs	might	 be	 slightly	 above	 true	 cost	 to	
ensure cost recovery; they might include socialized 
costs	not	reflecting	the	shipper’s	actual	grid	use	and	
the need to enter a large number of contracts also 
implies high transaction costs for shippers (see also 
GTE,	 2005;	 LECG,	 2011).	 Furthermore,	 the	 prob-
lematic of ‘contractual pancaking’	for	long-distance	
transmission	persists,	i.e.	shippers	are	typically	inter-
ested in booking capacity from a specific source to 
specific destination without being particularly inter-
ested in intermediate interconnections.36 
36 A multitude of auctions would be necessary to ad-
dress all possible combinations grid users might be interested 
in. This issue is treated in-depth within the ongoing ‘gas target 
model’	discussions	 (see	also	Ascari,	2011;	CIEP,	2011;	Frontier,	
2011;	Glachant,	2011;	LECG,	2011).	Since	this	is	out	of	the	scope	
of	 this	report,	we	will	not	go	 into	any	further	detail	here;	how-
ever,	we	agree	that	a	coordinated	capacity	booking	procedure	for	
long-term long-distance capacity bookings should be established. 
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Second,	in	entry-exit	systems	of	grid	tarification	there	
is often a systematic bias in the form of a cross-sub-
sidization between short-distance transmission and 
long-distance	 (cross-border)	 transportation	 (GTE,	
2005;	Kronfuss,	2009;	CIEP,	2009).	Tariffs	at	a	specific	
entry	point	are	equal	for	all	grid	users,	independent	
on whether the gas is transported only a few km to 
the next local consumption center or a few hundred 
km	across	the	whole	entry-exit	zone.	Thus, domestic 
consumers tend to cross-subsidize transit flows and 
transmission over some hundreds of km can even be 
cheaper	than	transmission	over	50km	depending	on	
the	 pricing	 at	 individual	 exit	 points.	This	 effect	 be-
comes	more	severe	the	bigger	the	price	zone;	hence,	
is another factor limiting the optimal size of market 
areas due to economic inefficiencies and should be 
taken into consideration when evaluating mergers. 
Some	 countries	 (e.g.	 Italy,	 France,	 or	 the	UK)	 have	
introduced	 so	 called	 ‘short-haul	 tariffs’	 in	 order	 to	
adjust	 tariffs	 for	 short-distance	 transportation	 and	
to mitigate this distortion in competition (see also 
Kema/Rekk,	 2009).	 In	 Italy,	 for	 example,	 there	 is	 a	
discount for gas transportation over distances of less 
than	15km;	 shippers	pay	1/15	 times	 the	distance	 in	
km	times	the	standard	tariff.			
Third,	as	discussed	above,	there	are	various other ob-
stacles to efficient competition,	 including	 contrac-
tual	 congestion,	 inefficient	 pricing	 of	 non-standard	
products	 such	 as	 interruptible	 capacity,	 a	 persisting	
lack	of	backhaul	capacities,	or	the	limited	compatibil-
ity	of	capacity	products	offered.	Furthermore,	regard-
ing short-term capacities (for natural gas this means a 
duration of less than one year) which need to play an 
even more vital role in the future to allow for short-
term arbitrage between markets and to approach the 
completion	 of	 the	 internal	market,	 there	 are	 inten-
Ascari	(2011),	for	example,	describes	an	‘open	subscription	pro-
cedure’,	which	is	basically	an	extension	and	generalization	of	the	
open season process based on a common grid- and flow model.
sive	 discussions	 about	 efficient	 pricing	 (see	 Box	 4).	
On	the	one	hand,	too	high	tariffs	represent	a	penalty	
on	short-term	trade,	may	hamper	market	entry	and	
reinforce capacity hoarding and (contractual) con-
gestion.	On	the	other,	 target	 revenues	should	be	at-
tained regardless of the booking behavior of network 
users.	Current	UK	practice,	where	 the	reserve	price	
for short-term capacity auctions has a discount com-
pared	to	the	long-term	products,	has	actually	shown	
a shift from long-term towards short-term bookings. 
The	resulting	under-recovery	of	TSO	revenues	is	cor-
rected through an extra commodity charge applying 
on	all	entry	tariffs.	This	causes	additional	distortions	
in natural gas trade since the commodity charge does 
not reflect any short-run marginal cost of system op-
eration.
Thus, what could be the possible future role for the 
EU?
•	 Existing rules defined in the Third Package vis-
à-vis TPA	 regarding	 capacity	 products	 offered	
and the harmonization of contracts and related 
procedures	 (Annex	I	of	R715/2009)	need	 to be 
enforced.	Accordingly,	TSOs	shall	amongst	oth-
ers	 offer	 firm	 and	 interruptible	 services	 down	
to a minimum period of one day; harmonized 
transport contracts and common network codes 
shall be designed in a manner that facilitates 
trading and re-utilization of capacity contracted 
without	hampering	capacity	release;	TSOs	shall	
implement standardized nomination and re-
nomination	procedures,	and	harmonize	formal-
ized request procedures and response times. 
•	 The	implementation of the proposed Network 
Code on capacity allocation mechanisms at in-
terconnection	points	(ENTSO-G,	2011;	see	also	
Appendix	 1)	 needs	 to be fostered. It proposes 
amongst others to allocate all firm and inter-
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ruptible capacities using standardized auction 
procedures for standardized capacity products 
at	 defined	 points	 in	 time,	 with	 reserve	 prices	
reflecting	regulated	tariffs.	Introducing	‘revenue 
equivalence of booking profiles’	will	ensure	long-
term signals for investments and avoid a shift 
from	long-	to	short-term	bookings.	We	further-
more want to stress that mechanisms used to 
correct	 for	 a	 potential	 under-recovery	 of	 TSO	
revenues resulting from the auctioning of capac-
ities,	 should	be	designed	 such	 that	 they	do	not	
distort	grid	users’	behavior	in	the	market.	
•	 We	 recommend	 some	 harmonization	 in	 natu-
ral gas transmission tarification to ensure that 
the breakdown of costs among grid users and 
among entry- and exit points is designed such 
that as far as possible the principle of cost-reflec-
tiveness is respected. It has to be avoided that 
national end users cross-subsidies long-distance 
transportation.	On	the	one	hand,	there	should	be	
adequate discounts on short-haul transports; on 
the	 other,	 an	 asymmetric	 re-allocation	 of	 costs	
such	 that	 ‘captive’	 domestic	 consumers	 inten-
tionally have to bear a disproportionately high 
share	of	overall	costs,	shall	be	prohibited.	
•	 Furthermore,	 the	 EU,	 through	 ACER,	 should	
formulate a set of ‘good practice guidelines’ 
regarding natural gas transmission tarifica-
tion. Entry- and exit charges should be actively 
used to provide locational signals to grid users 
wherever this is economically reasonable. Fur-
thermore,	similar	to	the	discussions	above	con-
cerning	tariff	structures	in	the	electricity	sector,	
commodity-related components should reflect 
short-run marginal costs in order to avoid dis-
tortions in the behavior of shippers in the com-
modity	market	and	network	tariffs	should	clearly	
be	identified,	containing	only	those	cost	elements	
that are related to the transmission activity (i.e. 
infrastructure investment and operation). 
Box 3: Pricing of short-term products – Too high? Too low? 
Regulation 715 Article 14(2) contains principles re-
garding the pricing of short-term products: “Trans-
port contracts signed with […] a shorter duration than 
a standard annual transport contract shall not result in 
arbitrarily higher or lower tariffs that do not reflect the 
market value of the service…”
Indeed, vital discussions about this issue are ongo-
ing, also in response to the recent debates concern-
ing adequate auction reserve prices for the different 
standard capacity products. If a resource is scarce, it 
is sufficient to define the bottom line price such that 
the market can be cleared (i.e. p < MC). The problem 
lies in off-peak periods. If the reserve price is at a too 
high level, it would impede traders to participate in 
short-term trade; if it is too low, cost recovery cannot 
be ensured and under-recovery has to be corrected 
ex-post (e.g. via an additional commodity- or capacity 
charge, a lump-sum payment, or the implementation 
of regulatory accounts for the TSOs).
Current practice in many Member States involves sub-
stantially higher prices for short-term products (see 
Kema/Rekk, 2009; ERGEG, 2011b) and there actually 
is some economic reasoning for a certain premium. 
Though, too high tariffs represent a penalty on short-
term trade, may hamper market entry and reinforce 
capacity hoarding and (contractual) congestion; and 
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obviously, prices not reflecting marginal cost will not 
deliver correct signals. Thus, some stakeholders argue 
in favor of low reserve prices based on the argument 
of possible welfare gains through the facilitation of 
short-term transactions, a more efficient use of the 
system and resulting price alignment between mar-
kets.
The draft network code on capacity allocation mecha-
nisms pleads for the concept of ‘revenue equivalence 
of booking profiles’ [i.e. regardless of the booking be-
havior of network users, the target revenues should 
be attained] and thus multipliers higher than one to 
a tariff determined from an annual accounting basis 
[i.e. reserve price for any shorter-term product shall 
aim to compensate for shortfall in sales volume]. This 
will ensure long-term signals for investments and 
avoid cross-subsidies from those grid users with rath-
er flat transmission patterns from those with highly 
variable ones, since any discount on short-term prod-
ucts would result in a shift from long-term to short-
term commitments. This effect will be even more 
consequential in systems being endued with planned 
overcapacities for reasons of supply security and/or 
where existing long-term contracts can be quit with-
out strong penalty payments (as is the case both for 
e.g. Spain). There might be other system-specific fac-
tors that have to be taken into account when discuss-
ing optimal reserve prices for short-term products; 
e.g. UK regulation includes mechanisms that allow 
the transfer of unbooked capacity of one entry point 
to another one that faces excess demand; thus, grid 
users will have an extra incentive to secure capacity 
rights over the long-term. 
Current UK practice allows for a discount in reserve 
prices for short-term capacity auctions compared to 
long-term products (33% for day-ahead and 100% for 
within-day auctions). This discount is supposed to re-
flect the relationship between short-run and long-run 
marginal costs grid users incur on the system. Howev-
er, demand for longer-term capacity is indeed elastic 
and, thus, the UK saw a shift from long-term towards 
short-term bookings (which in this case also has been 
fostered due to the fact that the UK system has sub-
stantially higher total entry capacity [> 9000 GWh/d] 
than peak demand levels [~ 5000 GWh/d] what may 
encourage grid users to delay capacity bookings). 
This resulted in non-negligible under-recovery of 
TSO revenues which in turn is corrected by adding an 
extra commodity charge to all entry tariffs. The addi-
tional distortions in natural gas trade due to this com-
modity charge not reflecting any short-run marginal 
cost of system operation obviously are an obstacle re-
garding the achievement of “2014”. In Germany, Thys-
sengas recently had to adapt its pricing structure as 
a reaction to decreasing long-term bookings at entry 
points. Entry charges have been reduced; charges at 
national exit points – where no zero-reserve-prices 
exist – substantially increased. This actually penalizes 
‘captive’ domestic consumers and benefits shippers 
transporting gas across the market area.  
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6. Conclusions and       
recommendations
In	this	report,	we	have	analyzed	the	possible	future	EU	
involvement regarding the regulation of TSO revenues 
and transmission grid tarification in the electricity and 
natural gas sectors. European transmission grids are 
facing	new	challenges	that	come	from	EU	energy	and	
climate policy. The two key objectives that any frame 
of	 regulation	 of	 TSOs	 and	 grid	 tarification	 should	
address in this context are to ensure adequate invest-
ments and to promote efficient competition. Analyzing 
current	regulatory	practices	and	EU	involvement,	we	
found a wide heterogeneity in regulation and tarifi-
cation	among	the	different	Member	States	while	the	
current	EU	involvement	 is	rather	 limited.	We	asked	
(1)	 whether	 these	 heterogeneities	 hamper	 adequate	
investments or impede efficient competition and (2) 
whether	new	EU	legislation	in	place	and	new	EU	in-
struments notably from the Third Package – once en-
forced – are suitable to support adequate investments 
and efficient competition. From the answers to those 
questions we derived our recommendations for fu-
ture	EU	involvement	and	need	for	harmonization.	In	
the	following,	we	briefly	summarize	our	main	results	
and recommendations.
(1) Regulation of TSO revenues
Does the current heterogeneity regarding the regu-
lation of TSO revenues hamper adequate invest-
ments or impede efficient competition?
Probably yes. 
The observed heterogeneity in general regulatory 
principles and the methodologies used to calculate 
the	allowed	revenue	of	individual	TSOs	as	well	as	in-
struments used to promote new investments probably 
does not hamper adequate investments in national 
infrastructures without a strong cross-border impact. 
Different	regulations	have	their	 justification	in	indi-
vidual	sector	characteristics,	the	historical	evolution	
of	 the	 regulatory	 design,	 national	 policy	 priorities,	
or	 national	 regulators’	 responsibilities	 and	 capabili-
ties. Key parameters determining investment incen-
tives are an adequate risk-reward ratio with the rate-
of-return reflecting the risks borne by the investors 
and	associated	cost	of	capital,	regulatory	stability	and	
transparency,	all	issues	national	regulators	can	prop-
erly	 address.	 In	 addition,	 the	 current	 heterogeneity	
regarding instruments used to promote investments 
can actually provide valuable insights into ‘function-
ing’	models	and	might	allow	 to	discover	 ‘best	prac-
tice’	for	specific	situations.
Cross-country	 comparability,	 however,	 has	 shown	
to be difficult due to the observed heterogeneity in 
national regulatory practices in terms of determin-
ing asset base and level of remuneration. This could 
make it difficult to attract funds from external inves-
tors needed to meet the substantial financing needs in 
the	coming	decades.	Furthermore,	differing	national	
practices	 regarding	 the	 regulation	 of	 TSO	 revenues	
could actually hamper adequate investments regard-
ing projects that have a regional (i.e. cross-border) 
impact. Competition between corridors (and thus 
between	TSOs	from	different	Member	States)	can	im-
ply that the grid might be expanded where an inves-
tor gets a more favorable return instead of where it 
would	be	optimal	 from	a	social	welfare	perspective,	
i.e. where total costs are lowest.
Finally,	besides	various	exogenous	factors	that	are	be-
yond	the	control	of	TSOs	and	differences	in	internal	
operating	efficiency,	heterogeneity	in	national	regula-
tory practices leads to a situation where for the same 
volume	of	assets	differing	authorized	revenues	will	be	
calculated,	which	in	turn	results	in	varying	transmis-
sion	costs	and	tariff	levels.	This	can	distort	competi-
http://think.eui.eu 49
EU Involvement in Electricity and Natural Gas Transmission Grid Tarification 
tion	among	generators	from	different	Member	States	
and might also have some impact on the competitive-
ness of energy-intensive industries.
Are legislation in place and existing EU instru-
ments, once enforced, suitable to support adequate 
investments and efficient competition?
Probably not. 
The	current	EU	involvement	in	the	regulation	of	TSO	
revenues is limited to some forms of harmoniza-
tion	 in	 regulatory	practice,	namely	 the	 rules	on	 the	
unbundling of transmission systems and grid op-
erators,	rules	on	the	use	of	congestion	revenues	and	
the possibility to grant exemptions from regulatory 
tariff	 control.	 Furthermore,	 the	EU	has	 some	 funds	
available to co-finance infrastructure projects. The 
recently proposed European Infrastructure Package – 
once enforced – will be a good basis to identify “pro-
jects	of	common	interest”	and	specifies	also	different	
measures easing and accelerating their successful im-
plementation.	However,	existing	legislation	does	not	
solve all the problems listed above. 
Thus, we recommend for future EU involvement:
•	 We	do	see	neither	the	need	nor	a	sound	justifica-
tion	for	an	EU-wide	harmonization	of	the	regu-
lation	 of	 TSO	 revenues.	 Such	 a	 harmonization	
would have far-reaching implications and the 
cost	might	substantially	exceed	the	benefits.	We	
recommend nonetheless that regarding projects 
with	 an	 important	 cross-national	 impact,	 deci-
sions	on	the	EU	level	–	taking	into	consideration	
a truly pan-European perspective – should be 
taken to avoid that higher-cost projects are built 
as	a	reaction	to	a	more	favorable	RoR.	Where	a	
regionally specific solution has to be found (e.g. 
offshore	grid),	decentral	 cooperation	and	coor-
dination are appropriate.
•	 ACER	should	play	an	active	role	in	formulating	
“good	 practice	 guidelines”	 regarding	 the	 regu-
lation	 of	 transmission	 grids,	 thus,	 to	 promote	
sound regulatory practices that try to minimize 
the risks for investors; and in extending trans-
parency	(i.e.	reporting)	standards.	ACER	should	
also take the responsibility for benchmarking na-
tional practices and formulate an opinion about 
the appropriateness of various methodologies 
employed.   
•	 In	view	of	the	huge	amount	of	predicted	invest-
ment	 needs,	 innovative	 solutions	 to	 trigger	 in-
vestments should be considered to become com-
mon	 tools,	 too,	 and	 legal	 barriers	 be	 removed.	
Competitive tendering for infrastructure projects 
can be an interesting solution. Also a European 
tariff	component	to	collect	money	from	grid	us-
ers that than could be re-invested into projects 
of	European	value	that	suffer	from	strong	exter-
nalities	should	be	considered.	Using	public	funds	
to (co-) finance infrastructure projects should be 
considered carefully.
(2) Transmission grid tarification in the electric-
ity sector
Does the current heterogeneity regarding tarifica-
tion hamper adequate investments or impede effi-
cient competition?
Probably yes. 
There is large heterogeneity in the tarification of elec-
tricity	 transmission	grids.	 In	many	countries,	 trans-
mission	tariffs	are	completely	paid	by	consumers	and	
only a few countries have introduced locational or 
time	 signals.	Energy-related	 tariffs	 are	predominant	
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which	distorts	grid	users’	short-term	behavior	in	the	
commodity	market.	Tariffs	 do	not	 target	 to	 recover	
the	 same	 costs	 in	 all	 countries	 and,	 in	 some	 cases,	
they also include costs not directly related to trans-
mission infrastructure but targeting other regulatory 
objectives. The resulting lack of transparency makes 
cross-country comparisons difficult.
Are legislation in place and existing EU instru-
ments, once enforced, suitable to support adequate 
investments and efficient competition?
Probably not. 
While	the	EU	has	defined	general	principles	of	tari-
fication,	 there	 is	 little	 EU	 involvement	with	 respect	
to	tariff	design	except	for	some	harmonization	of	the	
maximal average G-component. The existing ITC 
mechanism is an ex-post instrument that intends to 
compensate	TSOs	for	the	costs	resulting	from	hosting	
cross-border	flows	of	electricity.	Besides	some	meth-
odological	weaknesses,	it	has	not	been	designed	to	in-
centivize the timely realization of grid investments or 
to allocate costs of new infrastructures. The proposed 
European Infrastructure Package will address these 
issues for projects of pan-European interest; howev-
er,	we	identified	some	factors	that	might	hamper	the	
successful	 implementation	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 this	
new	Regulation.
Thus, we recommend for future EU involvement:
•	 A	 first	 area	 of	 harmonization	 concerning	 tariff	
structure	 shall	 be	 to	 increase	 transparency,	 i.e.	
to clearly define which cost components trans-
mission	tariffs	should	contain.	They	should	only	
include cost related to transmission network in-
frastructure,	 but	 exclude	 any	 charges	 related	 to	
other regulatory objectives. 
•	 It	 should	 be	 ensured	 that	 the	 behavior	 of	 grid	
users in the competitive sector is not distorted 
due	 to	 tarification,	 i.e.	 transmission	 tariffs	 for	
the long-term infrastructure cost should not be 
charged based on energy transported (i.e. in €/
MWh)	but	instead	be	paid	based	on	booked	ca-
pacity	 or	 lump-sum,	 computed	 separately	 for	
different	types	of	grid	users	in	different	areas	so	
that charges properly reflect the network-related 
relevant characteristics of the network users.
•	 Transmission	tariffs	should	be	allocated	as	far	as	
possible based on the principle of cost causality. 
Locational	 signals	 should	 be	 introduced,	 being	
calculated decentrally taking into account na-
tional system specificities based on sound meth-
odologies and providing reliable ex-ante signals. 
The provision of time signals to improve effi-
cient short-term use of the existing grid should 
be	considered,	too.	To	give	economic	signals	to	
generators,	obviously	a	certain	share	of	the	tariff	
needs to be paid by them. In order to avoid a dis-
tortion	of	competition,	the	EU	might	fix	an	aver-
age	share	of	the	G/L	component;	thus,	introduce	
a	minimum	G-component,	too.
•	 The	EU	should	call	 for	the	removal	of	 the	 legal	
barriers that might impede grid investments 
where strong geographical asymmetries in costs 
(i.e. investment needs) and benefits occur. It is 
necessary that third parties can invest where in-
cumbent	 TSOs	 do	 not	 show	 interest	 to	 realize	
identified priority projects. 
•	 Given	the	uneven	distribution	of	benefits	among	
stakeholders arising from increased interconnec-
tion capacities and the concern that national reg-
ulators tend to protect domestic consumers from 
rising	prices,	effective	means	have	to	be	found	to	
incentivize	NRAs	to	support	the	development	of	
identified priority projects. 
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(3) Transmission grid tarification in the natural 
gas sector
Does the current heterogeneity regarding tarifica-
tion hamper adequate investments or impede effi-
cient competition?
Probably yes. 
Heterogeneity	in	tariff	structures	itself	does	not	ham-
per adequate investments while it might certainly 
hamper	 efficient	 competition.	 First,	 there	 are	more	
than 30 entry-exit zones with mainly administratively 
determined	borders.	Thus,	they	are	not	all	of	an	‘op-
timal	 size’	 and	 the	process	of	merging	market	areas	
continues to be an issue. The existence of this large 
number	of	entry-exit	zones	also	implies	tariff	pancak-
ing.	Second,	in	entry-exit	systems	of	grid	tarification	
there is often a systematic bias in the form of a cross-
subsidization between short-distance transmission 
and long-distance (cross-border) transportation and 
domestic consumers tend to cross-subsidize transit 
flows.	Third,	other	obstacles	to	functioning	competi-
tion	include	contractual	congestion,	 inefficient	pric-
ing of non-standard products such as interruptible- 
or	short-term	capacity,	a	persisting	lack	of	backhaul	
capacities,	 or	 the	 limited	 compatibility	 of	 capacity	
products	offered.	
Are legislation in place and existing EU instru-
ments, once enforced, suitable to support adequate 
investments and efficient competition?
Probably not. 
The Third Package defines rules regarding capacity 
products	offered	and	the	harmonization	of	contracts	
and related procedures and a draft Network Code on 
capacity allocation mechanisms has recently been 
proposed. These measures substantially will increase 
transparency	 and	 compatibility,	 reduce	 therefore	
transaction costs and will facilitate natural gas trade 
and	 competition.	 However,	 they	 do	 not	 completely	
address all obstacles discussed above.       
Thus, we recommend for future EU involvement:
•	 The	EU	should	set	principles	for	determining	the	
ideal	size	of	entry-exit	zones,	but	 let	concerned	
NRAs	 and	 TSOs	 agree	 on	 the	 result.	 Bounda-
ries of price zones should reflect the technical 
and economic conditions rather than political 
borders; mergers of market areas shall be evalu-
ated on a case-by-case basis based on expected 
economic benefits and costs. This can best be 
done	by	the	concerned	NRAs	in	close	coopera-
tion	with	the	respective	TSOs.	Once	market	ar-
eas	are	merged,	there	are	good	economic	reasons	
to implement a system of common tarification. 
The	 role	 for	 the	 EU	 should	 be	 limited	 to	 sup-
port sound agreements between the respective 
stakeholders; the actual implementation of har-
monization	of	tariff	structures	and	definition	of	
a	mechanism	to	compensate	TSOs	can	be	man-
aged at regional level. 
•	 The	 enforcement	 of	 legislation	 in	 place	 (Third	
Package),	 and	 respectively	 the	 implementation	
of	recent	proposals	(draft	Network	Code	CAM),	
are necessary steps into the right direction to re-
move barriers to efficient competition.     
•	 We	recommend	some	harmonization	in	natural	
gas transmission tarification to ensure that the 
breakdown of costs among grid users and among 
entry- and exit points is designed such that as far 
as possible the principle of cost-reflectiveness is 
respected. There should be adequate discounts 
on short-haul transports and an asymmetric re-
allocation	 of	 costs	 such	 that	 ‘captive’	 domestic	
consumers intentionally have to bear a dispro-
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portionately	high	share	of	overall	costs,	shall	be	
prohibited. 
•	 Furthermore,	 the	 EU,	 through	 ACER,	 should	
formulate	a	 set	of	 ‘good	practice	guidelines’	 re-
garding natural gas transmission tarification. En-
try- and exit charges should be actively used to 
provide locational signals to grid users wherever 
this	 is	 economically	 reasonable.	 Furthermore,	
similar to the discussions above concerning tar-
iff	structures	 in	 the	electricity	sector,	commod-
ity-related components should reflect short-run 
marginal costs in order to avoid distortions in 
the behavior of shippers in the commodity mar-
ket	and	network	tariffs	should	clearly	be	identi-
fied,	containing	only	those	cost	elements	that	are	
related to the transmission activity (i.e. infra-
structure investment and operation).
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Annex 1: Supplementary information
(a) Transmission network tariffs
Figure	8	shows	data	on	natural	gas	transmission	tar-
iffs	 for	various	 transported	distances.	The	data	have	
to	be	regarded	with	care,	since	they	have	been	calcu-
lated	in	2007;	thus,	levels	and	also	employed	method-
ologies might have changed in the meantime. How-
ever,	what	becomes	clear	is	that	there	are	substantial	
differences	regarding	both	tariff	levels	as	well	as	tariff	
design.	ERGEG	 (2007)	 reports	 tariffs,	 calculated	by	
the	respective	NRAs,	for	a	selected	number	of	TSOs,	
which at this time applied an entry-exit system and 
could make the required data available for ten dif-
ferent grid user standard profiles. The figure below is 
based on the following assumptions: Standard profile 
#5	 (i.e.	 transported	 volume	 of	 500mn	 m³/a;	 maxi-
mum	capacity	of	80,000	m³/h/a;	load	factor	of	0.71);	
the underlying contract covers firm capacity over one 
year. 
Figure 8: Natural gas transmission tariffs for various transported distances
Source: Own depiction using data from ERGEG (2007)
 
Table	 5	 provides	 some	 exemplary	 data	 on	 electric-
ity	 transmission	tariffs	 for	 the	German	high	voltage	
grid. These capacity and energy-related components 
add up to a total charge to be paid for a hypothetical 
customer	 (2,500mn	 kWh/a;	maximum	 capacity	 use	
of	500	MW;	yearly	usage	during	5000	h/a)	as	summa-
rized in the last columns. Again it becomes clear that 
there	are	substantial	differences	regarding	both	tariff	
levels	as	well	as	tariff	design.
Table 5: German electricity transmission tariffs (high voltage grid)
< 2500h/a ≥ 2500 h/a Hypothetical grid user
TSO €/kW €ct/kWh €/kW €ct/
kWh
€ €ct/kWh
50 Hertz 6.31 1.476 35.27 0.318 25,585,000 1.023
Amprion 3.38 0.846 20.85 0.147 14,100,000 0.564
EnBW 2.15 0.784 20.89 0.034 11,295,000 0.452
TenneT 3.01 0.950 25.50 0.050 14,000,000 0.560
Source: Own calculation based on data from company websites
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This	 heterogeneity	 among	 tariff	 levels	 of	 different	
TSOs	has	also	been	confirmed	by	Pérez-Arriaga	et	al.	
(2002),	conducting	a	detailed	benchmarking	study	on	
European	transmission	tariffs.	
(b) Case studies on instruments used to pro-
mote investments
Table 6: Instruments used to promote investments 
Examples from natural gas Examples from electricity
National
•	 IT: extra return (e.g. regional transmissi-
on 2% for 7a; national transmission 2% 
for 10a)
•	 BE (170km bidirectional pipeline Eynat-
ten-Opwijk): co-funding EEPR
•	 IT: increments above normal WACC (2% for system 
security investment; 3% for congestion relieving 
investment) 
•	 UK RIIO model: Incentives based on output delivery
Inter-regional
•	 Interconnector (B-UK): nTPA & open 
season; EIB loan of 352mn GBP
•	 Euskadour (ES-F): rTPA & enhanced RoR
•	 BBL (NL-UK): Exemption from rTPA 
•	 BritNed (NL-UK): partial exemption (exemption 
from limitation of revenues)
•	 Estlink (FI-Estonia): Exemption from rTPA
•	 Interconnector IR-UK: full exemption from rTPA and 
limitation of revenues
•	 AC cable between IT-AT: Exemption from rTPA
•	 NorNed (NL-N): TEN-E fund of € 3mn + EIB loan for 
Dutch TSO of € 140mn; rTPA + congestion revenues
•	 HVDC underground cable F-SP: TEN-E fund of € 
225mn + EIB loans 
New supply 
infrastructure
•	 Various new LNG terminals: 80-90% 
capacity dedicated to sponsors or exem-
ptions from rTPA
•	 Greenstreem (LY-IT): part under LTC
•	 Nabucco: Exemption from rTPA
•	 MedRing: use of RES-regulation to generate returns
[Note: See e.g. Kessel et al. (2011) for an in-depth discussion of experience with exempti ons of electricity intercon-
nectors from regulated third party access and/or other provisions related to tarification under Regulation 1228/2003.]
(c) Charging external effects in other infrastruc-
ture sectors
The electricity sector has so far been shielded form 
including	 external	 effects	 into	 pricing.	 However,	 in	
particular electricity transmission lines have high 
negative	externalities,	and	thus	the	debate	to	include	
these appropriately into the pricing is forthcoming. In 
this	context,	lessons	from	other	sectors	are	enlighten-
ing,	in	particular	the	transportation	sector.
For	both	road	and	rail	transportation,	charging	exter-
nal	effects	is	laid	out	in	European	Directives.	The	“Eu-
rovignette”	Directive	1999/62/EC	“on	the	charging	of	
heavy	 goods	 vehicles”	 and	 its	 amendment	 2006/38/
EC were very recently being updated by a Commis-
sion proposal for a new Directive which has been 
approved	 by	 the	 European	 Council	 on	 12	 Septem-
ber	2011.	It	widens	the	“user	pays”	principle	to	also	
a	 “polluter	 pays	 principle”.	 From	 now	 on,	Member	
States have the opportunity to charge for pollution of 
air	and	by	noise,	differentiating	with	respect	to	vehicle	
emission	classes	(EURO	standards).	The	calculation	
of costs is standardized and should include air pollu-
tion	costs,	emission	factors,	monetary	pollutant	and	
noise cost per vehicle and person and the population 
exposed	to	noise.	Also,	maximum	weighted	average	
external cost charges are stated in the new Directive. 
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Within	 certain	 boundaries,	 i.e.	 revenue	 equivalence	
and	a	maximum	toll	of	up	175%	of	the	average	toll,	it	
is also possible to charge for congestion.
In	rail	transportation,	EU	Directive	2001/14/EC	gen-
erally prescribes marginal cost pricing but allows for 
optional	mark-ups	to	consider	environmental	effects	
in	 Article	 7(5):	 “The	 infrastructure	 charge	 may	 be	
modified to take account of the cost of the environ-
mental	 effects	 caused	by	 the	 operation	of	 the	 train.	
Such	 a	 modification	 shall	 be	 differentiated	 accord-
ing	to	the	magnitude	of	the	effect	caused.”	However,	
intermodal competition concerns are raised by the 
requirement that revenue-increasing environmen-
tal charges can only be levied for own usage if other 
modes of transport charges them to a similar extent. 
Otherwise,	Member	States	would	be	assigned	to	de-
cide on the usage of the revenue-increasing charges. 
Also,	 a	 “time-limited	 compensation	 scheme	 for	 the	
use of railway infrastructure for demonstrably unpaid 
environmental,	 accident	 and	 infrastructure	 costs	 of	
competing	modes”	 are	 possible	 under	Article	 10	 in	
case	these	costs	“exceed	the	equivalent	costs	of	rail”	
and it is applied both transparently and free of dis-
crimination to undertakings.
(d) ENTSO-G (2011) – Summary of the Draft Net-
work Code on CAM [gas]
Applies to cross-border interconnection points and 
interconnections between adjacent entry-exit sys-
tems	within	the	same	MS;	includes	principles	of	co-
operation	 among	 TSOs	 regarding	 the	 coordination	
of	maintenance,	 standardization	of	 communication,	
and capacity calculation.
Allocation of firm capacity: 
- Auctions; based on a standardized auc-
tion design; standardized capacity products 
(quarterly,	monthly,	daily,	within-day)	and	
taking place simultaneously for all con-
cerned interconnection points
- Bundled capacity at interconnection points 
jointly	offered	by	the	respective	TSOs	(sin-
gle nomination procedure)
- At least 10% of the available capacity to be 
withheld for short-term auctions
Interruptible capacity:
-	 Minimum	obligation	to	offer	a	daily	product	
for interruptible capacity; at unidirectional 
interconnection	 points,	 backhaul	 capac-
ity	shall	be	offered	at	least	on	interruptible	
basis; same standard capacity products like 
for firm capacity
- Standard interruption lead times on which 
adjacent	TSOs	decide	jointly;	default:	2h
Tariffs:	
-	 Since	 NC	 on	 tariff	 provisions	 still	 not	 in	
place,	 a	 minimum	 set	 of	 rules	 regarding	
tariffs	is	specified:	Regulated	tariff	shall	be	
used	as	reserve	price	in	all	auctions;	thereby,	
the aim should be to achieve revenue equiv-
alence of booking profiles (i.e. regardless of 
the	 booking	 behavior	 of	 network	 users,	
whether they procure longer-term products 
or	a	 set	of	products	 forming	a	profile,	 the	
target revenues should be attained) → Thus 
a rule is needed on what the relationship 
between	reserve	prices	of	 the	different	ca-
pacity products shall be (i.e. determination 
of multipliers)
- These multipliers shall be higher than one 
to	 a	 tariff	determined	 from	an	 annual	 ac-
counting basis (i.e. reserve price for any 
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shorter-term product shall aim to compen-
sate for shortfall in sales volume)37  
-	 Rules	 regarding	 revenue	 split	 and	 reserve	
price for bundled products38 
- Over-recovery: Auction revenues exceeding 
the	allowed	revenue	shall	be	used	for	differ-
ent	aims,	subject	to	approval	by	the	respec-
tive	NRA
- Under-recovery:	TSOs	allowed	to	close	 the	
gap	 by	 adjusting	 tariffs	 [three	 alternative	
ways	(see	ENTSO-G,	2011b;	CEER,	2011):	
(i) additional fee by unit of capacity; (ii) 
adding	a	commodity-related	tariff	compo-
nent	(e.g.	UK,	which,	however,	acts	like	an	
extra tax on the traded commodity; or (iii) 
lump	sum].
37	 See	ENTSO-G	(2011b)	for	a	first	discussion	on	alterna-
tive methodologies to determine such multipliers. Ibid. it is also 
highlighted that a good match of the target revenues minimizes 
negative	 effects	 of	 an	 ex-post	 management	 of	 under-	 or	 over-
recovery	(such	as	distortions	in	economic	signals,	cross-subsidi-
zation,	distortions	in	trade	due	to	high	commodity	tariffs,	tariff	
volatility,	etc.).
38	 CEER	(2011)	provides	some	first	insights	about	possi-
ble	revenue	sharing:	e.g.	50/50	split,	 split	proportionately	 to	re-
serve	price,	according	to	investment	needs,	or	according	to	size	of	
the entry-exit zone.
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Annex 2: Potential objectives of 
tarification and conflicts of interest
Objectives of transmission tariffs
Transmission	tariffs	include	elements	paid	by	the	user	
for the access and the use of a piece of infrastructure. 
In	some	cases,	transmission	tariffs	also	include	other	
elements such as taxes or the costs of renewable sup-
port.	Transmission	tariffs	may	therefore	serve	to	re-
cover	the	costs	related	to	the	grid,	to	provide	signals	
for an efficient use of existing infrastructure and the 
siting	of	new	generation,	network,	and	 load,	and	 to	
fulfill a distributive function.
It	 has	 to	 be	 distinguished	 between	 different	 time	
frames considered: The short-run perspective focuses 
on cost recovery of short-run marginal costs of the 
existing	grid,	and	incentives	for	an	efficient	use	of	ex-
isting	capacities.	By	contrast,	the long-run perspective 
focuses on long-term costs including those of new 
infrastructures. Incentives for the location of supply 
(electricity generators or gas supply points) and load 
(demand)	 can	 be	 provided.	 Contrary	 to	 “normal”,	
competitive	 industries,	 the	 cost	 structure	 in	 infra-
structure sectors is such that the short-run marginal 
costs are negligible when compared to the long-run 
marginal	 costs,	 except	 in	 cases	 of	 congestion	when	
short-run opportunity costs for not being able to use 
the network may be very high.
Transmission	 tariffs	 ideally	 should	 respect	 several	
regulatory	principles	(see	also	Lévêque,	2003a;	Pérez-
Arriaga	 and	 Smeers,	 2003;	 Sakhrani	 and	 Parsons,	
2010).	These	 include:	 cost-recovery	 [tariffs	have	 the	
role to recover the cost of transmission infrastruc-
ture];	 non-discrimination [the	 same	 use	 of	 the	 net-
work	must	 result	 in	 the	 same	 network	 tariff	 under	
the	same	circumstances	not	to	distort	competition];	
and transparency	[in	methodology,	pricing,	etc.].	Na-
tional regulators commonly follow these three prin-
ciples,	and	the	last	two	are	also	explicitly	required	via	
European	law	(Regulations	714/2009	and	715/2009).	
Besides,	 regulators	 may	 orient	 at	 other	 principles,	
such	as	economic	efficiency,	cost	causality	(or	cost	re-
flectiveness),	simplicity	of	the	methodology	and	im-
plementation,	and	stability	of	tariffs.	Moreover,	there	
are other important aspects that the regulators have 
to take into account. These firstly include technical 
aspects;	electricity	flows	follow	physical	laws,	thus,	it	
is technically impossible to determine exactly where a 
flow is generated and where it ends which implies that 
electricity	transmission	tariffs	cannot	be	based	on	fi-
nancial transactions. Also the specific characteristics 
of	 the	national	grid	play	an	 important	role.	Regula-
tors	should	consider	the	economic	impact	of	tariffs;	
it	makes	 a	 difference	whether	 tariffs	 are	 charged	 to	
consumers	or	generators.	Finally,	other	policy	goals	
are	relevant,	too,	namely	the	“new”	role	of	grids	as	an	
enabler of the transition towards a carbon-free econ-
omy or supply security. 
Conflicting objectives and the need to make choices
The multiple objectives mentioned above are not 
always	compatible	with	each	other,	and	often	are	 in	
outright	conflict.	This	is	not	only	the	case	for	different	
tariff	 structures,	 e.g.	 the	 charges	 for	 power	 and	 en-
ergy,	 or	 the	distribution	between	variable	 and	fixed	
costs;	 also,	 a	 higher	 allocative	 precision	 and	 time	
resolution of pricing may conflict with the important 
qualitative	objectives	such	as	transparency,	simplicity,	
and	stability	of	tariffs.
The most basic conflict regards the definition of vari-
able and fixed costs with respect to the short- and 
longer-run.	 While	 short-run	 marginal	 cost	 pricing	
theoretically produces the first-best result in terms 
of	 allocative	 efficiency,	 average	 cost	 approaches	 are	
sometimes favored because they assure a simple al-
location	of	fixed	costs	(see	Olmos	and	Pérez-Arriaga,	
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2009,	for	an	in-depth	discussion).	Here,	the	interde-
pendence between pure production costs and trans-
action costs becomes evident: the transaction costs 
of allocating fixed costs in a marginal-cost pricing 
system may outweigh the welfare gains of the latter. 
Moreover,	Ramsey	tariffs	are	discriminatory,	and	cost	
causality	 implies	 that	 the	beneficiary	pays;	however,	
positive externalities e.g. from investments in in-
frastructures supporting decarbonization or supply 
security might require at least some socialization of 
costs. 
On	 top	 of	 these	 traditional	 conflicts,	 distributional	
aspects	 further	 complicate	 the	 choice	 of	 “optimal”	
transmission	pricing.	Thus,	the	definition	of	the	ba-
sic unit of prices already entails significant distribu-
tional	effects:	fixed	cost	allocation	according	to	peak	
power	use	will	 disfavor	peak	users,	 as	 compared	 to	
using	the	transported	energy	as	the	basis.	Any	tariff	
leads to distribution of rents between producers and 
consumers (e.g. via the explicit definition of G- and 
L-components);	between	larger	and	smaller	consum-
ers (depending on the importance of fixed cost allo-
cation);	or	between	consumers	in	different	locations	
(in cases of locational-specific pricing).
Distributional issues also arise when one compares 
entire	systems	of	tarification,	e.g.	short-run	locational	
marginal pricing and zonal pricing. An argument in 
favor of zonal pricing is the higher competition pre-
vailing in the zone (under the assumption of no inter-
nal	congestion),	leading	to	a	lower	danger	of	market	
power	abuse;	on	the	other	hand,	if	competition	and/
or regulatory authorities are able to oblige each lo-
cal	producer	to	supply	at	marginal	costs,	consumers	
stand to benefit from this regime.
It	follows	that	there	is	not	this	one	optimal	tariff	de-
sign that could be derived based purely on techno-
logical characteristics of the system and economic 
considerations.	Rather,	 transmission	tariffs	can	only	
be assessed once the objectives of the regulator are 
well-defined and clear. This requires (explicit or im-
plicit)	choices	to	be	made	by	the	regulator,	which	are	
not easy to identify in most cases.
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Annex 3: Conclusions of Industrial 
Council Meeting (based on report 
version “V0”, Sept. 2011)
Serge Galant
Technofi
Submission date: September 15, 2011 
The question to be answered by the THINK consor-
tium	is:	“What	is	the	EU	involvement	needed	in	elec-
tricity	and	natural	gas	tarification?”
The tentative answers to the question:	As	usual,	EU	
involvement	 may	 come	 from	 many	 organizations,	
and regards several options (alone or together): sup-
porting	innovation,	standardizing,	better	regulating,	
harmonizing,	 enforcing	 regulations,	 etc.	 If	 there	 is	
any	involvement,	its	additionality	must	be	shown.
Clarity: What is still fuzzed in the first draft of the 
study?
The report must pinpoint:
•	 What	sort	of	grids	could	be	concerned	by	EU	in-
volvement	on	tariffs?
•	 What	 scope	 of	 tariffs	 to	 address	 when	 EU	 in-
volvement is at stake?
•	 What	sort	of	tariff	uses	must	be	considered	at	EU	
level capable of helping (i) using existing assets 
more efficiently; (ii) sending signals to favor effi-
cient consumption (with time of use approaches 
based	on	consumption	pattern);	(iii)	others…
•	 What	are	the	drivers,	which	will	require	EU	in-
tervention	(2020	targets,	2050	orientations,	En-
ergy	Efficiency	Directive,	others?)
•	 Based	on	 the	above,	which	EU-based	organisa-
tions	 need	 to	 be	 involved?	 (EC:	 DG	 Research,	
DG	 Energy,	 DG	 Competition,	 DG	 Regio),	
ACER,	ENTSO-E,	EURELECTRIC?
•	 What	 is	 the	 additionality	 of	 EU	 involvement?	
(For instance making politicians understand the 
future interdependence they will have to pay for 
in order to ensure security of supply and long-
term sustainability)?
•	 Are	 there	 differences	 in	 involvement	 between	
electricity	and	gas?	If	yes,	which	ones?
Completeness: What are the missing topics to be 
included?
There is a need for a state of the art on past involve-
ment	at	EU	level	on	tariffs,	the	most	recent	example	
being the Third Energy Package with the use of tar-
iffs	for	system	innovation	funding.	This	review	could	
bring	arguments	for	pros	and	cons	about	further	EU	
involvement.
The second issue is to detail the why of such an in-
volvement,	let	us	mention	a	few:
•	 Increased	energy	interdependence	requires	a	ref-
eree to propose compromises where there will be 
new	winners	and	losers	(ex:	agricultural	policy),
•	 The	need	for	stable	regulations,	where	a	referee	
is needed to set rules that are fine to the whole 
EU27,
•	 The	needs	for	harmonized	regulations,	which	in	
turn may support technology standards for net-
works and a reduction in future network invest-
ment	costs,
•	 The	 introduction	 of	 a	 European	 component	 in	
the	tariff	economic	structure,	which	would	help	
recover investments having a European added 
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value (say the Super Grid to link with the exist-
ing	grid,	 that	 crosses	 several	 control	 zones	 and	
which is needed to convey electric power from 
the	North	Sea	to	Far	East	Europe,
•	 The	definition	of	novel	incentives	to	catalyze	in-
vestments having a European added value (what 
is the unit of money to be used for future incen-
tives).
The	third	 issue	 is	 to	address	another	area	of	EU	in-
volvement:	the	use	of	congestion	rents	by	TSOs.
A question was left unanswered: Should ITC issues 
regarding	 tariff	 implementation	 be	 covered	 or	 left	
over in the report?
The last issue to be addressed is the role of the target 
model in defining the possible future involvement of 
the	EU	in	electricity/gas	tariffs.
Coherence: What are the incoherences, which must 
be treated in the next version?
The draft slides start with two questions: (i) Is there a 
need to adapt regulation regarding grid tarification? 
And	(ii)	Is	there	a	need	for	stronger	EU-involvement?	
However,	there	is	only	one	recalled	in	the	conclusions.
Overall,	the	assembly	of	attendees	converged	in	say-
ing: No more legislation; just enforce the existing 
ones. Is this message still coherent with the thinking 
time line used in this work?
68
Final Report – January 2012
http://think.eui.eu
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visors (based on report version “V1”, 
Oct. 2011)
Nils-Henrik von der Fehr
Professor at Department of Economics, University 
of Oslo
Submission date: October 30, 2011 
Introduction
My	comments	are	based	on	the	first	draft	of	the	report	
dated	October	14,	2011,	as	presented	at	the	meeting	
of	the	Scientific	Council	 in	Brussels	on	October	18-
19,	2011.
The	report	deals	with	two	very	different	issues,	name-
ly	 the	regulation	of	TSO	revenues	(which	has	 to	do	
with	 incentives	 for	 cost	 efficiency,	 investment	 and	
cost	recovery)	and	tariff	setting	(which	has	to	do	with	
providing signals for grid usage). The aim is to pro-
vide	the	EU	Commission	with	advice	on	EU	involve-
ment in these tasks. The main conclusion is that there 
is	 limited	 need	 for	 direct	 EU	 involvement,	 except	
perhaps	to	formulate	“good	practice	guidelines”	and	
harmonize	certain	tariff	elements.
Overall assessment
The report deals with a very broad topic; not only 
does	it	involve	two	very	different	issues,	but	each	of	
these are extremely large and complicated. It is there-
fore inevitable that the report must be somewhat 
superficial.	However,	 this	 problem	 could	 have	 been	
reduced by concentrating attention on a limited set 
of	questions,	and,	indeed,	by	avoiding	questions	that	
are	 only	 tangential,	 or	 perhaps	 not	 even	 related,	 to	
the	 topic.	Moreover,	 the	 conclusions	 drawn	 are	 not	
always supported by the analysis; while this does not 
necessarily	mean	that	the	conclusions	are	wrong,	they	
are at least not sufficiently substantiated.
Other comments
Given that the report deals with optimal regulation of 
revenues	and	tariffs,	one	misses	a	standard	by	which	
policy should be measured. This is important not only 
to specify the goals towards which the policy should 
aim,	but	also	in	order	to	explain	how	one	could	get	
there.
This	is	particularly	true	for	the	setting	of	tariffs,	which	
inevitably	must	be	seen	as	an	“optimal	tax	problem”;	
the principle of cost-causality can only be followed 
part	of	 the	way,	 begging	 the	question	of	how	 to	 al-
locate	the	remaining	fixed	costs.	In	other	words,	what	
do we do when cost causality has been exhausted?
The	report	side	steps	the	issue	of	tariff	level,	concen-
trating	instead	on	tariff	structure.	While	this	may	be	
seen	as	way	of	narrowing	 the	 scope	of	 the	 analysis,	
one would like a discussion of why this is permissible. 
Not	only	are	tariff	levels	a	hot	issue,	but	it	is	in	general	
difficult	 to	see	the	structure	of	 tariffs	 independently	
of their level; this is particularly true when the point 
of	departure	is	regulation	at	the	EU	level,	where	en-
suring a level playing field across Europe is a concern.
A	 skepticism	 towards	 EU-level	 regulation	 shines	
through the entire text. Such skepticism may well be 
justified,	 but	 it	 needs	 to	be	 just	 that	 -	 justified.	The	
report	must	spell	out	clearly	why	EU-level	regulation	
is	not	 required,	or	 indeed	counter-productive,	 rath-
er	 than	 just	 claim,	 or	 implicitly	 assume,	 that	 this	 is	
the case (where an attempt to provide justification is 
made,	such	as	in	Section	2,	the	argument	tends	to	be	
very general and not directed specifically at the issue 
at hand).
There are also a number of references to fairness (one 
example	occurs	on	p	27),	which	need	to	be	clarified.	
What	is	the	concept	of	fairness	applied	and	why	is	it	
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relevant?
A central issue in the debate about transmission in 
general	and	transmission	tariffs	in	particular	has	been	
the	inter-TSO	compensation	mechanism	in	the	elec-
tricity sector (ITC). There are strong doubts about the 
adequacy	of	this	measure,	and	the	report	should	spell	
out in detail its pros and cons.
This is relevant also for the question of adequate in-
vestment	 in	 transmission	 facilities,	 where	 one	 may	
doubt the possibility of reaching agreements based 
on	 cost-benefit	 analysis,	 even	 if	 such	 could	 be	 un-
dertaken	 appropriately.	While	one	may	be	 skeptical	
about European-level decisions on (certain types of) 
transmission	 investment,	 such	decisions	need	 to	 be	
discussed,	including	the	possibility	of	recovering	the	
costs	through	a	general	tariff	(say,	a	flat	charge	on	all	
users).
Finally,	 the	 report	 is	 not	 clear	 about	 the	 allocation	
of	 tariff	 payments	 between	 consumers	 and	 produc-
ers;	specifically,	the	arguments	for	why	the	so-called	
G-factor should be set at a certain level are unclear. 
This	 is	 important,	 also	 because	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
G-factor	may	affect	the	geographical	location	of	new	
investment in generation and hence efficiency of the 
overall European electricity industry.
Dörte Fouquet
Lawyer, Partner at Becker Büttner Held
Submission date: October 30, 2011 
General comments:
Overall,	the	report	addresses	a	very	interesting	and	in	
fact	 important	topic.	As	such,	 it	could	make	an	im-
portant contribution to the current discussion about 
differences	in	tarification	and	tarification	structure.	
However,	 in	 general,	 the	 text	 of	 the	 report	 would	
need editing. The formulations are sometimes quite 
unclear	and	complicated,	 impeding	the	comprehen-
siveness	of	the	text.	Long	sentences	should	be	split	up	
into	separate	“bite	sized”	ones	to	improve	readability.	
Typos and spelling mistakes would need to be cor-
rected. 
Conceptual comments:
First,	one	should	 think	about	who	 the	actors	 in	 the	
gas supply market of the future would be and take this 
future	energy	supply	landscape	as	a	basis.	While	the	
role	for	TSOs	is	obvious,	in	particular	when	consid-
ering the current infrastructure and the cross-border 
aspect	in	the	gas	trade,	one	should	reconsider	the	role	
for	 DSOs.	 With	 increased	 decentralized	 electricity	
generation and the according use of local infrastruc-
ture,	 the	 gas	 supply	 will	 not	 remain	 unaffected.	 As	
examples of such impacts new technologies to store 
electricity	in	existing	gas	infrastructure,	Smart	Grids	
and Smart Heating systems or the trend to have natu-
ral gas more and more as back up capacity could be 
mentioned. The energy supply of the future will thus 
require	more	 and	more	 cooperation	between	DSOs	
and	TSOs.	The	report	in	this	respect	could	pay	more	
attention	in	particular	to	DSOs	and	their	concerns,	as	
well as Energy Service Companies and other market 
players. 
Second,	 and	 certainly	 related,	 the	 question	 of	 “lo-
cational	 signals”	 and	how	 far	 they	 should	 go	needs	
some more thinking. Should they lead to “one Euro-
pean	Energy	Infrastructure/Grid”,	commonly	owned	
by	all	Member	States,	possibly	even	managed	by	a	Eu-
ropean Agency? The report is unclear on some points 
also what concerns merging markets – for example 
it	says	that	“Boundaries	of	price	zones	should	reflect	
the technical and economic conditions rather than 
political borders“ which suggests a reorganization 
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of the natural gas price zones; or “once market areas 
are combined“ which even takes merger as a precon-
dition?	However,	 they	 should	not,	 I	would	 say.	Not	
only	would	Member	States	oppose	to	any	such	idea,	
which would be in conflict with their national laws 
and	principles	(e.g.	the	concept	of	“Daseinsvorsorge”	
enshrined	 in	 the	 German	Grundgesetz,	 art.	 28GG)	
as	well	as	with	EU	law	(in	particular	the	principle	of	
subsidiarity),	but	it	would	likely	lead	to	overly	com-
plicated,	 administratively	 chaotic	 situations.	 	 Thus	
locational	signals	should	be	kept	on	a	Member	State,	
regional or even local level which again needs par-
ticipation	and	input	also	from	consumers,	DSOs,	and	
other stakeholders in the area.
Comments on the content:
The formulation that “idea of European superhigh-
ways	is	driven	by	different	motivations,	e.g.	the	wish	
to transport solar energy from North Africa to Cen-
tral	Europe,	or	to	transport	nuclear	energy	from	East-
ern	to	Western	Europe,	or	to	transport	more	natural	
gas	from	the	Caspian	Sea	to	Central	Europe”	is	prob-
lematic as those motivations are certainly not shared 
among	the	all	the	Member	States	and	not	a	Commis-
sion motivation. Distinctions should be made and it 
should be indicated who follows which interests.  
Both	the	explanations	on	the	principle	of	subsidiarity	
and the description of externalities could be clearer 
and more detailed. 
The alleged distortions of competition are not entirely 
convincing either; maybe paragraph sketching the sit-
uation as it currently stands may give more strength 
to the following arguments.
While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 legal	 (and	regulatory)	certainty	
is	important	for	investors	(p.	12),	that	does	not		nec-
essarily mean that regulatory periods need to be ex-
tended – a legal or political commitment to follow a 
certain	policy	can	do	the	same.	To	the	contrary,	ex-
tending regulatory periods may also have disadvan-
tages	such	as	potential	abuse,	strengthening	of	market	
positions. Those disadvantages should be mentioned 
as well. 
The	picture	on	“sharing	of	network	operator	charges”	
and	 “socialization”	 of	 grid	 costs	 and	 transmission	
costs is somehow flawed as it does not mention any 
other	reasons	than	“former	absence	of	competition”.	
The allocation rules may well be part of the overall 
legislative and regulatory system. 
On	the	recommendations	 that	 tariffs	 for	 the	cost	of	
infrastructure should not be charged by energy trans-
ported	but	instead	based	on	booked	capacity,	this	is	
what	is	proposed	e.g.	in	Belgium	now.	However,	the	
system already faces criticism and opposition in par-
ticular	from	the	renewable	energy	sector,	as	they	find	
it discriminatory; they would have to pay even if they 
would	not	use	the	grid.	One	should	take	this	discus-
sion	 into	 account,	 to	 present	 both	 sides,	 and	 could	
possibly	differentiate.	
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Annex 5: Conclusions of Public 
Consultation (based on report 
version “V2”, Nov. 2011)
Overall recommendations 
Setting	the	TSO	revenues	and	setting	tariffs	are	sepa-
rate activities. Heterogeneity in approach for the for-
mer	should	not	be	an	issue	as	long	as	the	TSO	is	pro-
vided with sufficient revenues (subject to appropriate 
risk	coverage)	under	price	controls,	in	order	to	deliver	
necessary	non-load	and	load	related	investment.	TSO	
tariffs	are	then	allowed	to	recover	that	revenue.	This	
should	be	left	under	the	auspices	of	Member	States,	as	
of	now.	The	right	tariff	design	should	reflect	national	
circumstances,
There	are	however	obvious	reasons	for	increased	EU	
involvement:
1.	 A	common	set	of	principles	should	be	applied	
across	Member	States	to	facilitate	regional	har-
monization:		this	is	an	area	where	the	EU	could	
more obviously increase its role where it may 
detect	 that	 there	are	 inconsistencies	 in	Mem-
ber State approaches which impede European 
harmonization and competition objectives.
2.	 revenue	 recovery	 and	 tariffs	 issues	 relating	
to investments driven by cross border issues 
should	be	addressed	at	EU	level,	including	(i)	
cross	 border	 circuits,	 interconnectors	 etc…	
and (ii) within border investment driven by 
transit issues. There is a frequent disconnect 
between the bearer of investment costs and the 
beneficiary of those investments.  An overarch-
ing party should address such issues which in-
volve two or member states with a potential for 
inequity in sharing of costs and benefits.
Simplicity should prevail when dealing with revenues 
and	tariffs.
1.	 Pragmatism	 should	 be	 the	 rule:	 European	
bodies provide robust guidelines for national 
application but address any other wider Euro-
pean objective separately from an involvement 
in	tariff	design.
2. Policy objectives which are not consistent with 
economics	should	be	applied	outside	of	tariffs	
and/or implemented in a separate simple and 
transparent manner which is not stirred into 
tariff	design.	
3. Substantial new generation investment will 
come from a large number of new investors 
in	 the	 industry:	 tariffs	need	 to	 be	 sufficiently	
transparent and predictable (which does not 
mean stable) to enable them to invest with con-
fidence in their knowledge of network costs. 
The complexity of the issues raised in the report re-
quires some caution in the recommendations:
1.	 It	 is	 recommended	 that	 tariffs	 for	 the	 cost	 of	
infrastructure should not be charged by en-
ergy	transported,	but	instead	based	on	booked	
capacity depending on the grid user type or 
lump-sum. A careful analysis is needed to ana-
lyze	the	differences	between	the	two-part	tariff	
(energy and demand components) and the tar-
iff	for	time	of	use	(TOU),	in	order	to	highlight	
pros	and	cons	of	both	types	of	tariffs.
2.	 The	main	differences	between	Member	States	
for	 the	 calculation	 of	 allowed	 revenues,	 e.g.	
calculation	of	the	regulated	assets	base	(RAB),	
calculation	of	CAPEX	(including	depreciation	
rates),	OPEX	and	the	WACC	and	etc.,	should	
be further highlighted before proposing har-
monization perspectives.
3. The prerequisites for a detailed cost-benefit 
analysis	of	a	complete	harmonization	of	tariff	
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design need to be stated.
4. A comprehensive comparison of regulatory 
frameworks	 is	 needed	 beyond	 the	 ERGEG	
2007	 study,	 which	 revealed	 significant	 differ-
ences	 in	 natural	 gas	 tariff	 levels:	 these	 differ-
ences were mainly caused by exogenous fac-
tors. Criteria for an appropriate comparison 
in view of regulation purposes would probably 
raise motivations to increase the transmission 
companies’	effective	performance.	
5.	 The	majority	 of	 natural	 gas	 data	 used	 in	 this	
study	 come	 from	 the	 Kema/Rekk	 report	
(2009):		these	data	might	not	reflect	any	longer	
the current  situation of the natural gas market 
in	EU	27.
Regulation issues for TSO revenues
Electricity sector
Consensus on how to account for innovation invest-
ments is still to be found.
Gas sector
A great heterogeneity in allowed revenues determi-
nation	might	 imply	 unjustified	 differences	 between	
countries which in turn could impede the develop-
ment	of	new	infrastructures,	either	because	of	an	in-
adequate remuneration framework leading to a lack 
of	investment	on	one	side,	or	because	of	excess	remu-
neration on one side which makes the infrastructure 
too expensive to pass an eventual economic test. 
Harmonizing the allowed revenues calculation across 
the whole of Europe is a challenging task. The costs 
of harmonization in methodologies used to calcu-
late allowed revenues might substantially exceed its 
benefits.	 Yet,	 possible	 adverse	 effects	 of	 the	 current	
heterogeneity should not be underestimated:  some 
measures should be put in place to better balance har-
monization benefits and costs.
Transmission grid tariff issues in the electricity 
sector
The determination of capacity requirements is chang-
ing	and	becoming	more	complex,	because	of	the	in-
creasing penetration of intermittent renewables: this 
may	have	 consequences	 for	 tariff	design.	But	 it	will	
remain a capacity issue and not an energy issue. Fu-
ture network investments will be driven by the needs 
to accommodate low load factor plants and/or vola-
tile power flows with relatively short/infrequent peri-
ods of high capacity needs.
The argument to introduce a minimum G component 
might	be	 the	wrong	option.	Whether	a	generator	 is	
making	a	profit	or	breaking	even,	it	must,	by	defini-
tion pass through the cost  (otherwise it would be 
making a loss): this will remain true regardless of mar-
ket	design.	Thus,	there	is	no	need	to	set	a	minimum	
threshold or indeed a maximum threshold although 
most	experts	would	agree	the	most	effective	solution	
for	generator	tariffs	is	net	G=0	with	locational	capac-
ity	based	tariffs.	Besides,	is	there	evidence	from	coun-
tries that do have introduced a G-component that the 
location decision of generation was indeed modified? 
Many	generators,	especially	renewables,	are	no	longer	
free with regard to their location decision.
On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 amount	 of	 capacity	 or	 electri-
cal energy which is generated by generation equip-
ment owned by the customer should be charged and 
included	 in	 the	 calculation	 of	 transmission	 tariff.	
Otherwise,	 since	 large	 customers	 or	 self-generators	
start to have their own generation units (small power 
plants),	the	rest	cost	of	the	network	would	be	charged	
to the smaller customers:  this may result in higher 
prices	 for	 the	most	vulnerable	customers,	especially	
when the G component is not applied.
Overall,	it	would	be	useful	to	set	the	respective	har-
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monizing	provisions	in	the	common	EU	document.
A	European	 tariff	 component	might	be	 an	 interest-
ing option to collect money from grid users that than 
could be re-invested into infrastructure projects of 
European	value	that	suffer	from	strong	externalities.	
The use of such an instrument has several advantages 
when compared to so-called traditional public fund-
ing: cross-subsidization is reduced since grid users 
instead of general tax payers are charged; demand 
elasticity for electricity and gas is considered to be 
relatively low.
Yet,	 infrastructure	 projects	 will	 rarely	 truly	 benefit	
every	region	or	country	in	Europe	–	consequently,	a	
European	Tariff	component	implies	cross-subsidiza-
tions	between	different	regions	and	may	thus	also	lack	
acceptance	by	citizens.	Different	levels	of	purchasing	
power	 in	different	countries	will	make	 the	determi-
nation	of	a	“fair”	amount	problematic.	In	addition,	if	
substantial amounts are collected and redistributed 
via	a	European	tariff	component,	players	might	focus	
on rent-seeking rather than trying to internalize the 
external	effects	through	an	adequate	cost	allocation.
Transmission grid tariff issues in the natural gas 
sector   
A comprehensive comparison of regulatory frame-
works	 is	 needed	 beyond	 the	 ERGEG	 2007	 study	
which	has	revealed	significant	differences	in	natural	
gas	 tariff	 levels	 and	 these	 differences	 mainly	 were	
caused by exogenous factors. Criteria for an appropri-
ate comparison in view of regulation purposes would 
probably raise motivations to increase the transmis-
sion	companies’	effective	performance.
Increasing efficient competition in the gas sector while 
avoiding cross-subsidies requires paying a special at-
tention with the methodology to calculate entry-exit 
tariffs,	and	its	implications	on	cost	allocations:	There	
is	 a	 risk	 that	 some	 system	 tariff	decisions	might	 be	
adopted	to	recover,	more	or	less	of	the	costs	from	in-
terconnection	points,	when	compared	to	what	would	
happen	 in	 a	 cost-reflective	 methodology.	 Revenues	
from	auctions	of	Bundled	Capacity	will	probably	be	
split	between	the	TSOs	placing	capacity	elements	in	
the bundle according to a pro-rata rule: there is a risk 
of inflating reserve prices.   
This is another reason to reinforce the harmonization 
of	tariff	methodologies	across	the	EU.
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Introduction  
 
European	energy	regulators	welcome	the	opportunity	to	respond	to	the	latest	draft	report	in	
the	THINK!	series,	addressing	 the	possibilities	 for	EU	 involvement	 in	electricity	and	natural	
gas	transmission	grid	tarification.	
	
In	 general	 terms,	 we	 concur	 with	 the	 conclusion	 that	 heterogeneity	 in	 regulation	 of	 TSOs	
revenues	 does	not	 hamper	 adequate	 investments	 or	 impede	efficient	 competition	 in	 either	
the	gas	or	electricity	sectors.	We	also	agree	with	the	conclusion	that,	given	this,	the	need	for	
intervention	at	an	EU	wide	level	on	this	topic	is	limited	–	but	we	see	that	there	could	be	a	role	
for	 sharing	 best	 practice	 in	 regulation	 and	 reporting.	 On	 the	 conclusions	 surrounding	 the	
approach	to	electricity	and	gas	tarification	and	the	need	to	EU	involvement	at	this	level,	we	
have	more	detailed	comments	to	make.	
	
Across	both	gas	and	electricity	we	would	urge	further	work	in	the	report	to	reflect	the	current	
status	 of	 discussions	 within	 the	 Regulatory	 sphere,	 for	 example:	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	
strong	links	with	the	target	models	for	cross	border	trade	(capacity	allocation	and	congestion	
management)	in	both	gas	and	electricity.	
	
We	call	for	more	discussion	of	the	analysis	that	supports	some	of	the	final	conclusions	in	the	
report,	and	urge	the	inclusion	of	evidence	from	Member	States	where	these	approaches	are	
already	 in	 place	 or	 a	 more	 detailed	 reflection	 of	 the	 breadth	 of	 alternative	 options.	 This	
applies	particularly	to	the	benefits	of	the	locational	G-component	in	electricity	tarification,	and	
to	the	discussion	of	reserve	prices	in	gas	tarification.	
	
We	 also	 highlight	 the	 cross	 cutting	 and	 interacting	 role	 of	 the	 draft	 Energy	 Infrastructure	
Package	 Legislation.	 In	 its	 current	 form,	 the	 legislation	 proposes	 regulatory	 intervention,	
potentially	in	the	form	of	incentives	for	System	Operators,	as	well	as	Public	Funding	for	co-
financing	 of	 some	 projects	 and	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	 of	 the	 relevant	 investments	
taking	into	account	social,	economic	and	environmental	costs	and	benefits.	Further	analysis	
to	draw	out	 interactions	between	 this	new	piece	of	 legislation	and	 the	 topic	of	 the	THINK!	
paper	would	be	helpful.	
	
In	the	remainder	of	these	comments	we	address	electricity	and	gas	tarification	issues	in	turn,	
before	making	some	concluding	remarks.	
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Electricity Tarification: 
	
The	THINK!	report	concludes	that	the	current	heterogeneity	in	electricity	transmission	tariffs	
probably	does	 impede	both	 future	 infrastructure	 investments	and	efficiency,	 and	given	 this	
also	 concludes	 that	 EU	 wide	 intervention	 pushing	 for	 harmonisation	 of	 some	 aspects	 of	
electricity	tarification	could	have	some	positive	impact.		
	
Specifically	 the	 report	 recommends:	 (i)	 harmonisation	 of	 tariffs	 along	 with	 inclusion	 of	 a	
generator	(G)	charge	and	a	 locational	element,	(ii)	definition	of	costs	to	be	included	in	tariff	
charges	 and	 limitation	 of	 kWh	 tariff	 components	 and	 (iii)	 redesign	 of	 ITC	 mechanism	 to	
create	 ex-ante	 charge	 and	 support	 new	 investment.	 With	 respect	 to	 these	 conclusions	
Regulators	have	several	specific	comments	and	we	would	also	urge	the	authors	to	provide	
more	 detail	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 tariff	 harmonisation	 is	 achievable	 independently	 from	
harmonisation	of	any	other	feature	of	the	revenue	regulation:	
	
G-component, locational signals and demand tariffs 
We	 welcome	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 G-component	 and	 locational	 element	 to	 transmission	
charges	 and	 recognise	 that	 a	 G-component	 charge,	 and	 a	 location	 element	 to	 the	
transmission	 tariffs	 could	 result	 in	more	 efficient	 signals	 to	 grid	 users.	 From	 a	 theoretical	
stance,	 this	 encourages	 generation	 to	 site	 in	 less	 costly	 parts	 of	 the	 network,	 and	 sends	
signals	 that	 could	 incentivise	 demand	 participation	 relevant	 to	 longer	 term	 network	
development	issues.		
	
However,	we	feel	that	more	analysis	and	evidence	is	needed	to	support	this	conclusion	fully,	
and	to	extrapolate	the	benefits	to	a	real-world	application.	In	particular,	we	would	like	to	see	
further	 analysis	 of	 the	 distributional	 effects	 of	 a	G-component	 charge	 in	 terms	of	 costs,	 to	
ascertain	 how	 this	 actually	 affects	 profits	 and	 behaviours.	 For	 example,	 we	 advocate	
exploration	 through	examples	of	what	element	of	 this	 cost	 is	 passed	 through	 in	wholesale	
price,	how	does	this	influence	generator	profitability,	what	is	the	most	suitable	variable	for	the	
charge	and	what	impact	does	it	have	on	economic	efficiency?	Also,	consideration	of	how	any	
G-component	may	interact	with	future	capacity	mechanisms	that	could	be	developed	in	some	
countries	would	be	helpful.	
	
We	also	feel	that	more	evidence	is	needed	to	support	the	conclusion	that	the	G-component	
actually	 incentivises	efficient	 generator	 investment	behaviours	 in	practice.	There	are	 some	
positive	examples	of	the	impact	of	locational	G-charges.		On	the	other	hand,	in	many	cases	
the	 choice	 for	 generator	 location	 can	 be	 limited,	 particularly	 in	 the	 case	 of	 renewable	
generation.	Further	evidence	of	 experiences	 from	countries	with	a	 locational	G-component	
and	analysis	of	the	specific	 impact	on	renewable	generation	of	this	proposal	are	needed	to	
support	 this	 conclusion.	 In	 this	 context,	 we	 would	 also	 like	 to	 see	 further	 analysis	 of	 the	
impact	 of	 any	 proposed	G-component	 on	 government	 support	mechanisms	 for	 renewable	
generation,	 and	 further	 impact	 on	 investment	 decisions.	 The	 CEER	 consultation	 currently	
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underway,	 exploring	 the	 implications	 of	 non-harmonised	 renewable	 support	 schemes	may	
also	provide	additional	evidence	to	address	this	area.	
	
A	 wider	 perspective	 is	 also	 needed;	 for	 harmonisation	 of	 tariffs	 to	 be	 effective,	 a	
consideration	 of	 connection	 charges	 is	 also	 needed.	 Although	 many	 regimes	 have	 now	
moved	away	from	deep	connection	charges,	considerable	heterogeneity	still	remains	in	this	
component	 of	 the	 tariff	 charging	 approach.	To	consider	 harmonisation	without	 inclusion	 of	
the	element	of	the	(sometimes	fixed)	charge	linked	to	grid	connection	misses	an	opportunity	
to	arrive	at	the	most	efficient	solution.	
	
Finally,	we	highlight	the	point	that	grid	users	may	respond	to	a	€/MWh	component	in	charges	
through	 lower	energy	 loads.	Because	 individual	peak	demands	are	not	synchronous,	 lower	
energy	loads	cause	a	lower	peak	demand	on	the	grid.		In	others	words,	although	electricity	
transmission	is	largely	a	fixed	cost	industry	(with	respect	to	volumes	transmitted	for	a	given	
capacity), the inclusion of an energy component (€/MWh) in the tariffs may	 then	 be	 cost	
reflective	and	efficient.	So	whilst	a	G-component	could	be	a	helpful	element	in	incentivising	
efficient	 behaviours	 in	 generation,	 demand	 also	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 the	 dimensioning	 of	 the	
transmission	 network.	 Efficient	 price	 signals	 should	 not	 ignore	 the	 role	 that	 responsive	
demand	can	play,	and	the	potential	for	consideration	of	non-network	solutions	(e.g.	demand	
side	management)	as	an	alternative	to	network	investments.		
	
Compatibility of G-component, ITC charge and the target model for cross border trade	
The	report	does	not	draw	out	the	potential	links	between	the	various	transmission	tarification	
approaches	or	compensation	mechanisms	that	are	present	in	the	system	today,	or	the	need	
to	 ensure	 consistency	 and	 coherency	 between	mechanisms	 and	 the	 long	 and	 short	 term	
timeframes.	
	
For	example,	the	ITC	compensates	for	transit	volumes	on	infrastructure	and	losses	and	is	a	
charge	calculated	ex-post	and	 then	allocated	between	TSOs	(a	socialised	charge	from	the	
grid	users	perspective).	A	locational	G-component	is	an	ex-ante	targeted	charge	(usually	per	
MW,	sometimes	including	a	grid	connection	charge)	to	individual	generators	with	the	purpose	
of	providing	guidance	for	efficient	connection	points.	Finally,	congestion	 rent	 is	an	ex-post,	
partially socialised “charge” (linked with market coupling that requires efficient short term 
prices	 reflecting	 a	 locational	 element)	 which	 reflects	 the	 scarcity	 of	 (cross-zonal)	
transmission	capacity.		
	
In	 general	 terms,	 any	 approach	 to	 tarification	 should	 aim	 to	 target	 costs	 (user	 pays	 or	
beneficiary	 pays	 where	 different),	 which	 implies	 attempting	 to	 minimise	 socialisation,	 and	
should	avoid	unproductive	overlap	of	 different	 charging	methods	according	 to	 the	different	
purposes	 they	 serve.	For	example,	 at	 present	 the	 ITC	 is	a	 relatively	 small	 part	 of	national	
TSO	revenues.	In	this	case	the	loss	of	efficiency	in	socialisation	of	this	charge	is	outweighed	
by	 the	 benefits	 from	 increased	 competition.	 But,	 as	 the	 level	 of	 market	 and	 physical	
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integration	grows	this	 level	of	socialisation	have	more	drawbacks	than	benefits	and	a	more	
targeted	scheme	for	the	compensation	for	use	of	infrastructure	might	become	appropriate.	
	
The	 long	 term	 and	 short	 term	 charges	 that	 exist	 in	 transmission	 tarification	 are	 not	
independent,	all	 are	 reflecting	 the	cost	of	access	 to	or	usage	of	 the	same	 infrastructure	 in	
different,	and	possibly	overlapping	ways.	Acknowledgement	of	 these	potential	 interfaces	or	
interactions	 in	 the	THINK!	 report	would	be	helpful.	Synchronisation	between	 timeframes	 is	
also	 important.	 The	 target	 model	 for	 capacity	 allocation	 and	 congestion	 management	 is	
predicated	 on	 short	 term	 locational	 signals	 captured	 within	 wholesale	 market	 prices.	
Coherency	 of	 this	 approach	 with	 long	 term	 transmission	 tarification	 is	 essential,	 and	 not	
currently	a	feature	of	the	THINK!	analysis.	
	
ITC redesign 
At	present,	ITC	is	an	ex-post	charge	that	was	designed	to	facilitate	remuneration	of	national	
TSOs	 for	 hosting	cross	border	 flows.	 In	 its	 present	 form,	 it	 is	 not	 designed	 to	address	 the	
cost	 allocation	 challenges	 faced	 in	 building	 new	 infrastructure	 where	 cost	 and	 benefits	
accrue	to	different	parties.	Addressing	this	issue	by	adapting	the	ITC	mechanism	would	be	a	
challenge	that	requires	substantial	amendments	to	the	current	ITC	design.	If	an	ITC	redesign	
cannot	 be	 achieved	 in	 the	 short	 run,	 the	 cost	 allocation	 challenges	 for	 new	 infrastructure	
projects	may	possibly	be	better	addressed	on	a	bilateral	and	case-by-case	basis	or,	where	
appropriate,	on	a	regional	basis	for	example	in	Regional	 Initiatives	such	as	the	North	Seas	
Countries	Offshore	Grid	Initiative	(NSCOGI)	and	the	Baltic	Energy	Market	Integration	Project	
(BEMIP)	.		
	
Regarding	the	conclusion	that	the	ITC	mechanism	should	be	redesigned	to	create	an	ex-ante	
charge	 that	could	act	as	a	stimulus	 for	new	cross	border	 interconnector	 investment,	 views	
among	 regulators	 are	 mixed	 regarding	 the	 value	 of	 this	 proposal.	 We	 would	 therefore	
encourage	 exploration	 of	 the	 wider	 options	 available	 to	 secure	 delivery	 of	 cross	 border	
infrastructure,	 particularly	 in	 light	 of	 the	 latest	 development	 of	 the	 Energy	 Infrastructure	
Package	and	the	mechanisms	alluded	to	in	this	Package;	and	we	ask	the	authors	to	consider	
practicality	of	these	options,	as	well	as	the	trade-offs	against	priorities	in	the	real	world.	
	
	
Gas Tarification: 
	
We	welcome	the	way	the	analysis	has	been	developed	and,	in	particular,	the	discussion	on	
the	 trade-offs	 between	 short	 and	 long	 term	 issues	 of	 investment	 and	efficient	 competition.	
However,	we	have	similar	concerns	as	expressed	in	the	electricity	tarification	section	above,	
that	sometimes	the	conclusions	lack	sufficient	justification.		
	
The	 report	 concludes	 that	 heterogeneity	 in	 natural	 gas	 transmission	 tarification	 does	 not	
hamper	 adequate	 investments	 but	 may	 hamper	 efficient	 competition	 and	 asserts	 that	
complete	 harmonisation	 of	 tariff	 structures	 across	 the	 EU	 is	 not	 justified	 on	 economic	
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grounds.	We	generally	agree	with	the	point	that	harmonisation	should	be	promoted	carefully	
and,	in	particular,	that	benefits	should	outweigh	the	drawbacks	of	any	change.	But,	we	would	
like	 to	 see	 stronger	 evidence	 and	 arguments	 to	 support	 these	 conclusions,	 in	 particular	
further	 detailed	 work	 to	 explore	 the	 benefits	 and	 drawbacks	 of	 harmonised	 tariff	 design	
structures.	
	
Short-term capacity 
As	 explained	 in	 the	 report,	 short	 term	 capacity	 pricing	 is	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 current	
debates	on	 tariffs.	The	developments	 in	box	3,	at	 the	end	of	section	5,	highlight	 important	
issues	related	to	off-peak	periods	and	revenue	aspects.	To	present	the	full	picture,	however,	
more	emphasis	should	be	put	on	the	arguments	for	and	against	 the	application	of	 low/high	
short-term	reserve	prices,	 in	particular	 regarding	barriers	 to	cross-border	 trade	and	 include	
factual	evidence	from	Member	States	where	these	approaches	are	already	in	place.		
	
The study presents “ensuring signals for long-term investments” as a key benefit of using 
multipliers	greater	 than	1;	 it	should	also	mention	potential	 issues	such	as	 risks	of	distorted	
price	signals	when	prices	do	not	equal	marginal	cost.	The	text	should	be	more	careful	when	
presenting	 the	downsides	of	 low	short-term	capacity	 reserve	prices	and	 especially	when	 it	
focuses	 on	 the	 lessons	 from	 the	 GB	 experience;	 the	 report	 may	 benefit	 from	 a	 fuller	
description	 of	 the	 experiences	 there.	 Preference	 for	 the	 short	 term	 indeed	 has	 some	
drawbacks	but,	at	the	same	time,	the	GB	auction	regime	has	allowed	for	regular	incremental	
capacity	developments.	Regulators	are	not	yet	in	a	position	to	express	a	clear	preference	for	
a	specific	 level	of	short	 term	reserve	prices,	but	we	would	welcome	further	development	of	
the	report	to	set	out	the	pros	and	cons	of	the	different	options	in	a	balanced	way.		
	
Tariff setting 
In	 the	 discussions	 on	 tariff	 setting,	 very	 little	 is	 said	 about	 reserve	 prices	 even	 though	
auctions	have	been	adopted	as	standard	allocation	mechanism	for	interconnection	capacity.	
In	 addition,	 the	 uncertainty	 inherent	 in	 auction	 results	 will	 translate	 into	 over-	 or	 under-
recoveries;	 mechanisms	 aimed	 at	 compensating	 the	 gap	 between	 actual	 and	 allowed	
revenues	 is	an	 important	 aspect	 of	 tariffs	which	 the	 study	does	not	 really	mention,	 except	
when	talking	about	the	commodity	charge	in	5.4.	The	issue	of	how to split a TSO’s allowed 
revenue	between	domestic	and	cross-border	flows	is	not	addressed	either.	Implicit	allocation	
of	capacity	in	the	gas	sector	could	also	be	mentioned	since	it	has	been	an	important	aspect	
in	the	discussions	on	the	gas	target	model.		
	
Objectives 
We	note	that	the	objectives	of	tariffs	presented	in	the	introduction,	on	page	31	and	in	Annex	
3	omit	key	objectives,	for	example	in	comparison	to	Regulation	(EC)	715/2009.	We	suggest	
adding	the	objective	of	“facilitating efficient gas trade and competition” on	the	same	level	as	
the	principles	noted,	along	with	economic	efficiency.	
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Conclusions: 
 
European	energy	regulators	are	committed	to	continuing	to	work	on	the	topic	of	tarification.	
Discussions	 on	 gas	 tarification	 have	 been	 ongoing	 throughout	 2011.	 At	 the	 20th	 Madrid	
Forum	 in	September	2011,	ACER	was	 invited	 to	consult	 stakeholders	on	 the	scope	 of	 the	
Framework	 Guidelines	 on	 Gas	 Harmonised	 Transmission	 Tariff	 Structures.	 It	 was	 also	
requested	 to	 present	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 consultation,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 first	 outline	 of	 the	
Framework	Guideline	 at	 an	 early	meeting	 of	 the	Forum.	ACER	 intends	 to	 launch	a	 public	
consultation	shortly	to	ask	stakeholders	about	their	views	on	the	scope	and	the	main	policy	
options	of	the	tariff	work	such	as,	for	instance,	reserve	price	structure	and	cost	recovery.	
	
In	electricity,	historically	work	on	this	area	has	focused	on	development	of	 the	ITC	scheme	
and	 associated	Guidelines.	We	 look	 forward	 to	 building	 on	 this	 experience,	 and	 engaging	
with	 the	Commission	over	 the	next	 12	months	 to	 understand	whether	 further	 interventions	
are	needed	to	encourage	optimal	levels	of	cross	border	investments	and	promote	efficiency	
and	competition.	
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THINK Topic 6 – DRAFT Version V2: “EU involvement in electricity and natural gas 
transmission grid tarification” 
 
 
ENTSOG would like to thank THINK for the opportunity to comment on its draft report 
entitled: “EU involvement in electricity and natural gas transmission grid tarification”. The 
draft report is balanced and identifies many of the issues previously pinpointed by gas TSOs. 
We are particularly pleased that the economic trade-offs involved in some of the policy 
decisions are clearly stated. 
ENTSOG would like to reiterate the following positions that it has put forward on other 
occasions. 
 
1. Investment climate 
For new investments to come on stream, even if there is adequate user commitment, the 
risk-reward ratio for the investor must be set correctly within the regulatory regime. The 
rate of return must be commensurate with the cost of capital. The draft THINK report gives 
examples on how some regulators are aiming to achieve this, e.g. by allowing a premium on 
new investments, which could serve as models for other national regulators. ACER might 
firstly play a role in identifying where national regulatory agencies put too much emphasis 
on slashing transportation/asset costs at the expense of wider internal energy market 
interests, and secondly in fostering successful practices for incentivising new infrastructure. 
Preference should be given to the underwriting of investments by market demand, in the 
form of long term commitments by system users who book long term capacity. However, 
the draft report also states that “Adequate investments may also include projects that are 
socially desirable but not profitable from the isolated investor’s point of view.” From gas 
TSO’s perspective, these are for instance investments in security of supply which are not 
sufficiently underwritten (adequately booked long-term) by the system users to warrant 
infrastructure investment. We would like to question whether some EU rules and 
 
involvement may not be warranted, if national regulatory regimes do not foresee coverage 
of the gap in the underwriting of investments (i.e. cost allocation to system users with direct 
benefits from the capacities or services provided). 
 
2. Merging of market areas 
ENTSOG fully agrees that market area mergers involve significant trade-offs, which are well-
reflected in the draft THINK report, and therefore calls for a careful case-by-case analysis of 
the costs and benefits before any mergers. Tariff issues are secondary to the 
technical/physical issues associated with the offer of de-coupled entry-exit capacities (The 
Nordic power sector provides a recent example where in Sweden in 2011 a larger market 
area was broken up into multiple zones, reflecting the underlying physical infrastructure). 
Nevertheless, the tariff issues also need to be examined, particularly from a cross-border 
perspective. On an EU level, there may need to be some assistance in resolving some of 
these issues. 
 
3. Capacity products 
“Chain-link-products” are a capacity allocation issue, not primarily a tariff issue. In the CAM 
network code, ENTSOG does not foresee a linking of auctions, because it is discriminatory in 
nature (capacities would be tailored to those who can use a certain route and exclude other 
system users competing for the same capacity). They also counter the hub-to-hub logic of 
the Third Package, and risk fragmenting the capacity market. Additionally a secondary 
market in capacity enabled by the TSOs and other CMP arrangements may free up capacity 
for subsequent reallocation to the system users having the highest willingness to pay. Thus, 
those not securing their desired capacity allocations in the initial long term capacity auctions 
will have several options available to secure their capacity requirements. Furthermore, 
ENTSOG anticipates that additional attention will be given to determine the rules and 
processes that might be associated with the provision of incremental capacities beyond 
those currently supported by the existing gas transmission network infrastructure. These 
processes need to build upon lessons learned from the experience of open season and other 
market test based approaches. Finally, in the longer run, when markets are matured, 
enhanced market linkage mechanisms may develop, as presented in ENTSOG’s response to 
the CEER Target Model consultation. 
 
 
4. Pancaking 
“Pancaking” (i.e. the claim that transports across several entry-exit zones add up to higher 
charges than they create costs) has to be looked at carefully: In entry-exit systems, there 
may actually often be an inherent, systematic problem that leads to disproportional 
advantages for long-haul transports within the entry-exit system. Where the above 
disproportionality occurs, shorter transports have a higher tariff weight relative to the 
distance transported and longer transports have a disproportionally lower weight. 
Consequently, there may be something that one could call “reverse pancaking”, which 
means that a transport across merged zones would be less cost-reflective than a transport 
over several separated zones is. The European gas system both delivers long-distance 
transports, as well as shorter distance transports. Given that with the size of a market area, 
the inherent cross subsidies become bigger, and that the gas transport system in different 
countries serves different purposes, such cross-subsidies should be included in the 
considerations of costs and benefits of mergers. 
 
5. Short- and long term capacity pricing 
ENTSOG particularly supports the draft report’s findings with regard to the pricing of long 
term versus short term capacity products. We agree with the conclusion that discounts on 
short term capacity will lead to significant market distortions and may jeopardise the aim of 
“2014”, as well as undermine the European gas system’s role of delivering long-distance 
transports. A pricing arrangement that does not allow for proper cost recovery through 
capacity charges, due to a flight of users to “cheap” short term capacity, will be distortive by 
introducing cross-subsidies. Furthermore, with a flight from longer term booking, timely 
signals for efficient investments are lost. 
Therefore, ENTSOG has put forward its revenue equivalence principle. This pricing scheme is 
aimed at creating an aggregate equivalence of flat bookings versus profiled bookings for 
short term products. It is inherently incentive neutral and consequently allows system users 
to procure capacity when they identify a need for it. It shall minimise any undue incentives 
either to hoard capacity, or to massively substitute longer term for short term products. 
ENTSOG will codify this principle in the CAM network code, which should then become 
binding on an EU level. 
ENTSO‐E response to the public consultation  
ENTSO‐E welcomes the opportunity to comment on the THINK‐report relating to EU  involvement  in 
electricity and natural gas  transmission grid  tariffs  issued on  the 1st November.   The comments  in 
this report have been provided from a TSO expert perspective and should not be viewed as a formal 
ENTSO‐E position. 
The report covers a series of  important  issues which have a bearing on the efficient  functioning of 
the  internal  electricity  market.  As  the  report  rightly  notes,  the  method  for  setting  tariffs  and 
regulatory regimes which European TSOs face currently differ significantly between Member States. 
As  electricity  markets  become  increasingly  harmonized,  via  the  implementation  of  the  European 
target  model  for  electricity  market  design,  through  the  impacts  of  network  codes  and  as  a 
consequence  of  constructing  new  infrastructure,  the  need  to  amend  the  methods  of  setting 
transmission tariffs in order to avoid distortions in the functioning of that market may also increase.  
ENTSO‐E notes that previous  legislation has  introduced a series of principles which we support and 
consider  should  continue  to  form  the  basis  of  tariff  setting.    That  is,  tariffs  should  be  non‐
discriminatory,  cost‐reflective,  should  facilitate  competition  and  should  promote  the  efficient 
development of networks and functioning of markets.  
ENTSO‐E welcomes the report as a valuable  input to an ongoing process to develop and consult on 
proposals  for  the  progressive  harmonization  of  elements  of  transmission  tariffs.    ENTSO‐E  looks 
forward to playing an active part  in this process and we would be pleased to contribute where we 
can usefully do  so. Our  response briefly  summarizes each of  the  study’s  findings before providing 
ENTSO‐E’s view. We would be pleased to discuss these positions in more detail.  
 
1. Investment Incentives 
Regarding  Investment  Incentives  the  study  concludes  that  the  current  heterogeneity  in  domestic 
regulatory frameworks does not influence the investment activity of TSOs. Rather, the overall level of 
inadequate regulatory returns throughout Europe seems to negatively impact TSO investments. This 
leads  the authors  to conclude  that no EU  involvement beyond  the provision of co‐financing  funds 
and  the  identification of  regulatory best practices  is  required. According  to  the  report  the current 
provisions of the EU Regulation 714/2009 on congestion revenue usage provide further  investment 
incentives to TSOs. 
ENTSO‐E would  like  to  stress  the  importance of appropriate  investment  incentives and of  rewards 
which  are  proportionate  to  the  risks  of  projects.   We would  also  like  to  highlight  that  both  our 
members and, increasingly, members of the finance community consider that this is not the case  in 
many  parts  of  Europe  today.    Therefore  discussions  about  mechanisms  to  create  incentives  are 
welcome. 
ENTSO‐E  supports  the  idea  that  the  identification  of  regulatory  best  practices would  represent  a 
means of  increasing  transparency and  could, potentially,  contribute  to  the  creation of  investment 
incentives.  While  we  agree  that  regulators  should  continue  to  have  a  central  role  in  defining 
incentives  in  the majority of cases, contrary to the  findings of the study, we consider  that specific, 
independent mechanisms could be introduced at EU level in specific cases where there are particular 
barriers or risks to investment which need to be overcome or where national regulatory intervention 
has  proved  ineffective  .  Intervention  could  be  direct  or  involve  working  with  ACER  or  NRAs  to 
develop appropriate solutions to European issues.  We also consider that focused intervention by the 
EU could also prove useful in sending signals to potential investors and supporting the prioritization 
of  investments of EU  interest. Further details on ENTSO‐E’s views and concepts can be  found  in a 
recent ENTSO‐E paper on this topic available from the ENTSO‐E website. 
With regard to the existing provisions on the usage of congestion revenues (Article 16 para. 6 of the 
EU Regulation 714/2009), we are not convinced that significant cross‐border  investment  incentives 
are created by using congestion revenues to invest and are aware of cases in which no incentive or a 
disincentive  to  invest  is provided.    In ENTSO‐E´s view additional  incentives are  required  to deliver 
much needed cross‐border investments in a timely manner.  
 
2. Tariff Harmonization 
The study concludes that current heterogeneity in tariffs hampers adequate investments and impede 
efficient competition. It recommends a harmonization of national tariffs such that: 
 Generators in all EU countries pay for part of the network costs and that locational signals to 
grid users are provided.  
 Energy based tariffs (€/MWh) be avoided. 
 Tariff structures and not absolute levels are harmonized. The main reason for this conclusion 
is that absolute tariff levels depend on the individual network costs which in turn depend on 
the heterogeneous network structures in different Member States. 
ENTSO‐E  considers  that  the  issues  raised  by  the  THINK  report  regarding  transmission  tariffs  are 
important and welcomes the balanced analysis set out in the report.  
Europe is facing a significant need for investment in both generation and transmission capacity. It is 
important  that  the  overall  cost  of  this  investment  is  minimized  and  that  efficient  decisions  are 
encouraged and made.  In  this context we  feel  that  the study overestimates  the  role of grid  tariffs 
while,  as  said  before,  it  underestimates  the  role  of  regulatory  incentives.  TSO  tariffs  represent  a 
relatively  small  element  among  all  the  economic  signals  that  affect  investment  decisions  in 
generation. Harmonization of  that element across Europe  is  likely  to have a  limited effect overall, 
particularly on transmission investment.  
This  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  tariff  harmonization  as  such  shouldn't  be  pursued.  From  a 
theoretical  viewpoint  ENTSO‐E  considers  that  EU  wide  locational  signals  for  generators  could  be 
beneficial. Such an approach would incentivize investors to consider the impact of an investment on 
the overall  transmission grid. Hence,  if appropriately  set, an optimal  trade‐off between all  costs – 
including  grid  reinforcements  ‐  could  be  achieved.  Despite  this  obvious  advantage  the  efforts 
necessary to design and implement a harmonized G‐ component should not be underestimated. The 
report rightly states that no “best method” has been identified yet. Defining and agreeing upon such 
a scheme would not be a straightforward task and would require significant time and consultation.  
ENTSO‐E  fully  supports  the  conclusion  that  tariff  setting  principles  and  structures  rather  than 
absolute  tariff  levels  should  be  harmonized.  The  underlying  reason  –  namely  the  heterogeneous 
network structures and regulatory modes ‐ gains our full support.  ENTSO‐E also considers that both 
capacity/power oriented  tariffs and energy based  tariffs have a  role  to play  in promoting efficient 
system  development  and  system  operation.    As  such,  we  support  the  view  that  an  appropriate 
balance needs to be found.  
ENTSO‐E  also  supports  the  suggestion  to  increase  the  transparency  of  grid  tariffs  and  tariff 
calculation methodologies. Indeed we have taken steps to promote this process via our annual tariff 
report.    In particular, we note  that costs  related  to  the support and  integration of  renewables are 
often included in these tariffs, although these costs are not always grid related (e.g. feed‐in tariffs). A 
more transparent representation of how these costs translate into grid tariffs would help to explain 
the general trend of increasing grid tariffs.   
 
3. Cost allocation 
According to the study the  lack of provisions on the sharing of costs for new  infrastructure projects 
hampers  the  investment  activities  of  TSOs.  Therefore,  the  study  suggests  that  the  current  ITC 
mechanism be redesigned to properly allocate these expenses. It goes on to say that an independent 
European expert team should investigate the issue.  
ENTSO‐E would  like to stress that cost allocation  is not the most contentious  issue associated with 
new infrastructure investments. While cost allocation questions can certainly be complex, we are not 
aware  of  cases  in  which  they  have  prevented  cross‐border  or  other  joint  projects  from  being 
delivered. Bilateral negotiations between TSOs and approvals by flexible regulators appear capable of 
solving  this  issue. Compared to cost allocation principles  investment  incentives have by  far a more 
significant impact on TSOs’ investment decisions. 
We also note proposals to amend the Inter TSO compensation mechanism. The present ITC scheme 
has been designed  to  compensate  for hosting  cross border  flows  (transits)  arising  from electricity 
exports and  imports. The purpose of  ITC  is not to provide a basis for cost and benefit allocation of 
new  investments.  Rather,  it  is  a  consensual  framework  between  41  TSOs  across  Europe  on 
compensating the mutual use of their grids by physical transits. This arrangement was developed and 
implemented by ENTSO‐E and is now underwritten by legislation.  
The suggested approach of involving an independent expert team in transmission planning – a pure 
TSO task ‐ seems inappropriate.  
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